

Specifying & Refining a Bridge Controller

MEB: Chapter 2



EECS3342 E: System
Specification and Refinement
Fall 2025

CHEN-WEI WANG

Learning Outcomes

This module is designed to help you understand:

- What a **Requirement Document (RD)** is
- What a **refinement** is
- Writing **formal specifications**
 - (Static) contexts: constants, axioms, theorems
 - (Dynamic) machines: variables, invariants, events, guards, actions
- **Proof Obligations (POs)** associated with proving:
 - **refinements**
 - system **properties**
- Applying **inference rules** of the **sequent calculus**

Recall: Correct by Construction

- Directly reasoning about source code (written in a programming language) is too complicated to be feasible.
- Instead, given a *requirements document*, prior to implementation, we develop *models* through a series of *refinement* steps:
 - Each model formalizes an *external observer*'s perception of the system.
 - Models are “sorted” with *increasing levels of accuracy* w.r.t. the system.
 - The *first model*, though the most *abstract*, can already be proved satisfying some *requirements*.
 - Starting from the *second model*, each model is analyzed and proved *correct* relative to two criteria:
 1. Some *requirements* (i.e., R-descriptions)
 2. *Proof Obligations (POs)* related to the *preceding model* being *refined by* the *current model* (via “extra” *state* variables and *events*).
 - The *last model* (which is *correct by construction*) should be sufficiently close to be transformed into a working program (e.g., in C).

State Space of a Model

- A model's **state space** is the set of **all** configurations:
 - Each **configuration** assigns values to **constants** & **variables**, subject to:
 - axiom** (e.g., typing constraints, assumptions)
 - invariant** properties/theorems
 - Say an initial model of a bank system with two **constants** and a **variable**:

$$c \in \mathbb{N}1 \wedge L \in \mathbb{N}1 \wedge \text{accounts} \in \text{String} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z} \quad /* \text{typing constraint} */$$

$$\forall id \bullet id \in \text{dom}(\text{accounts}) \Rightarrow -c \leq \text{accounts}(id) \leq L \quad /* \text{desired property} */$$

Q. What is the **state space** of this initial model?

A. All **valid** combinations of c , L , and accounts .

- Configuration 1: ($c = 1,000, L = 500,000, b = \emptyset$)
- Configuration 2: ($c = 2,375, L = 700,000, b = \{("id1", 500), ("id2", 1,250)\}$)

...

[Challenge: **Combinatorial Explosion**]

- Model Concreteness $\uparrow \Rightarrow$ (State Space $\uparrow \wedge$ Verification Difficulty \uparrow)
- A model's **complexity** should be guided by those properties intended to be **verified** against that model.
 - \Rightarrow **Infeasible** to prove **all** desired properties on a a model.
 - \Rightarrow **Feasible** to distribute desired properties over a list of **refinements**.

Roadmap of this Module

- We will walk through the *development process* of constructing *models* of a control system regulating cars on a bridge.
Such controllers exemplify a *reactive system*.
(with sensors and actuators)
- Always stay on top of the following roadmap:
 1. A *Requirements Document* (*RD*) of the bridge controller
 2. A brief overview of the *refinement strategy*
 3. An initial, the most *abstract* model
 4. A subsequent *model* representing the *1st refinement*
 5. A subsequent *model* representing the *2nd refinement*
 6. A subsequent *model* representing the *3rd refinement*

Requirements Document: Mainland, Island

Imagine you are asked to build a bridge (as an alternative to ferry) connecting the downtown and Toronto Island.



Requirements Document: E-Descriptions

Each *E-Description* is an atomic *specification* of a *constraint* or an *assumption* of the system's working environment.


ENV1	The system is equipped with two traffic lights with two colors: green and red.
ENV2	The traffic lights control the entrance to the bridge at both ends of it.
ENV3	Cars are not supposed to pass on a red traffic light, only on a green one.
ENV4	The system is equipped with four sensors with two states: on or off.
ENV5	The sensors are used to detect the presence of a car entering or leaving the bridge: "on" means that a car is willing to enter the bridge or to leave it.

Requirements Document: R-Descriptions

Each *R-Description* is an atomic *specification* of an intended *functionality* or a desired *property* of the working system.

REQ1	The system is controlling cars on a bridge connecting the mainland to an island.
REQ2	The number of cars on bridge and island is limited.
REQ3	The bridge is one-way or the other, not both at the same time.

Requirements Document: Visual Summary of Equipment Pieces



Refinement Strategy

- Before diving into details of the *models*, we first clarify the adopted *design strategy of progressive refinements*.
 0. The *initial model* (m_0) will address the intended functionality of a limited number of cars on the island and bridge.

[REQ2]
 1. A *1st refinement* (m_1 which *refines* m_0) will address the intended functionality of the *bridge being one-way*.

[REQ1, REQ3]
 2. A *2nd refinement* (m_2 which *refines* m_1) will address the environment constraints imposed by *traffic lights*.

[ENV1, ENV2, ENV3]
 3. A *final, 3rd refinement* (m_3 which *refines* m_2) will address the environment constraints imposed by *sensors* and the *architecture*: controller, environment, communication channels.

[ENV4, ENV5]
- Recall *Correct by Construction* :


From each *model* to its *refinement*, only a manageable amount of details are added, making it *feasible* to conduct **analysis** and **proofs**.

Model m_0 : Abstraction

- In this most **abstract** perception of the bridge controller, we do not even consider the bridge, traffic lights, and sensors!
- Instead, we focus on this single **requirement**:

REQ2	The number of cars on bridge and island is limited.
------	---

- Analogies:
 - Observe the system from the sky: island and bridge appear only as a compound.



- “**Zoom in**” on the system as **refinements** are introduced.

Model m_0 : State Space

1. The **static** part is fixed and may be seen/imported.

A **constant** d denotes the maximum number of cars allowed to be on the **island-bridge compound** at any time.

(whereas cars on the mainland is unbounded)

constants: d

axioms:
 $\text{axm0_1} : d \in \mathbb{N}$

Remark. **Axioms** are assumed true and may be used to prove theorems.

2. The **dynamic** part changes as the system **evolves**.

A **variable** n denotes the actual number of cars, at a given moment, in the **island-bridge compound**.

variables: n

invariants:
 $\text{inv0_1} : n \in \mathbb{N}$
 $\text{inv0_2} : n \leq d$

Remark. **Invariants** should be (subject to **proofs**):

- **Established** when the system is first initialized
- **Preserved/Maintained** after any **enabled event**'s actions take effect

Model m_0 : State Transitions via Events

- The system acts as an **ABSTRACT STATE MACHINE (ASM)**: it *evolves* as *actions of enabled events* change values of variables, subject to *invariants*.
- At any given *state* (a *valid configuration* of constants/variables):
 - An event is said to be *enabled* if its guard evaluates to *true*.
 - An event is said to be *disabled* if its guard evaluates to *false*.
 - An *enabled* event makes a *state transition* if it occurs and its *actions* take effect.
- 1st event*: A car exits mainland (and enters the island-bridge compound).

```
ML_out
begin
  n := n + 1
end
```

Correct Specification? Say $d = 2$.

Witness: *Event Trace* $\langle \text{init}, \text{ML_out}, \text{ML_out}, \text{ML_out} \rangle$

- 2nd event*: A car enters mainland (and exits the island-bridge compound).

```
ML_in
begin
  n := n - 1
end
```

Correct Specification? Say $d = 2$.

Witness: *Event Trace* $\langle \text{init}, \text{ML_in} \rangle$

Model m_0 : Actions vs. Before-After Predicates

- When an enabled event e occurs there are two notions of **state**:
 - Before-/Pre-State**: Configuration just **before** e 's actions take effect
 - After-/Post-State**: Configuration just **after** e 's actions take effect
- Remark**. When an enabled event occurs, its **action(s)** cause a **transition** from the **pre-state** to the **post-state**.
- As examples, consider **actions** of m_0 's two events:

Events	<div>ML_out $n := n + 1$</div>	<div>ML_in $n := n - 1$</div>
before-after predicates	<div>$n' = n + 1$</div>	<div>$n' = n - 1$</div>

- An event **action** " $n := n + 1$ " is not a variable assignment; instead, it is a **specification**: " n becomes $n + 1$ (when the state transition completes)".
- The **before-after predicate (BAP)** " $n' = n + 1$ " expresses that n' (the **post-state** value of n) is one more than n (the **pre-state** value of n).
- When we express **proof obligations (POs)** associated with **events**, we use **BAP**.

Design of Events: Invariant Preservation

- Our design of the two events

```
ML_out
begin
  n := n + 1
end
```

```
ML_in
begin
  n := n - 1
end
```

only specifies how the **variable** n should be updated.

- Remember, **invariants** are conditions that should never be **violated**!

```
invariants:
  inv0_1 :  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ 
  inv0_2 :  $n \leq d$ 
```

- By simulating the system as an **ASM**, we discover **witnesses** (i.e., event traces) of the **invariants** not being preserved all the time.

$$\exists s \bullet s \in \text{STATE SPACE} \Rightarrow \neg \text{invariants}(s)$$

- We formulate such a commitment to preserving **invariants** as a **proof obligation (PO)** rule (a.k.a. a **verification condition (VC)** rule).

Sequents: Syntax and Semantics

- We formulate each **PO/VC** rule as a (horizontal or vertical) **sequent**:

$$\boxed{H \vdash G} \qquad \boxed{\begin{array}{c} H \\ \vdash \\ G \end{array}}$$

- The symbol \vdash is called the **turnstile**.
 - H is a set of predicates forming the **hypotheses/assumptions**.
[assumed as **true**]
 - G is a set of predicates forming the **goal/conclusion**.
[claimed to be **provable** from H]
- Informally:
 - $H \vdash G$ is **true** if G can be proved by assuming H .
[i.e., We say “ H **entails** G ” or “ H **yields** G ”]
 - $H \vdash G$ is **false** if G cannot be proved by assuming H .
- Formally: $H \vdash G \iff (H \Rightarrow G)$

Q. What does it mean when H is empty (i.e., no hypotheses)?

A. $\boxed{\vdash G} \equiv \boxed{\text{true} \vdash G}$ [Why not $\boxed{\vdash G} \equiv \boxed{\text{false} \vdash G}$?]

PO of Invariant Preservation: Sketch


- Here is a sketch of the PO/VC rule for *invariant preservation*:

$$\begin{array}{l}
 \text{Axioms} \\
 \text{Invariants Satisfied at Pre-State} \\
 \text{Guards of the Event} \\
 \vdash \\
 \text{Invariants Satisfied at Post-State}
 \end{array}
 \quad \text{INV}$$

- Informally, this is what the above PO/VC *requires to prove*:

Assuming **all** axioms, invariants, and the event's guards hold at the *pre-state*,
 after the *state transition* is made by the event,
all invariants hold at the *post-state*.

PO of Invariant Preservation: Components



- c : list of **constants**
- $A(c)$: list of **axioms**
- v and v' : list of **variables** in **pre**- and **post**-states
- $I(c, v)$: list of **invariants**
- $G(c, v)$: the **event**'s list of guards

$\langle d \rangle$
 $\langle \text{axm0_1} \rangle$
 $v \triangleq \langle n \rangle, v' \triangleq \langle n' \rangle$
 $\langle \text{inv0_1}, \text{inv0_2} \rangle$

- $G(\langle d \rangle, \langle n \rangle)$ of $ML_out \triangleq \langle \text{true} \rangle$, $G(\langle d \rangle, \langle n \rangle)$ of $ML_in \triangleq \langle \text{true} \rangle$
- $E(c, v)$: effect of the **event**'s actions i.t.o. what variable values **become**
 $E(\langle d \rangle, \langle n \rangle)$ of $ML_out \triangleq \langle n + 1 \rangle$, $E(\langle d \rangle, \langle n \rangle)$ of $ML_in \triangleq \langle n - 1 \rangle$
- $v' = E(c, v)$: **before-after predicate** formalizing E 's actions

BAP of ML_out : $\langle n' \rangle = \langle n + 1 \rangle$, BAP of ML_in : $\langle n' \rangle = \langle n - 1 \rangle$

Rule of Invariant Preservation: Sequents

- Based on the components $(c, A(c), v, I(c, v), E(c, v))$, we are able to formally state the **PO/VC Rule of Invariant Preservation**:

$$\boxed{
 \begin{array}{l}
 A(c) \\
 I(c, v) \\
 G(c, v) \\
 \vdash \\
 I_i(c, E(c, v))
 \end{array}
 } \quad \text{INV} \quad \text{where } I_i \text{ denotes a single invariant condition}$$

- Accordingly, how many **sequents** to be proved? [# events \times # invariants]
- We have two **sequents** generated for **event** ML_out of model m_0 :

$$\boxed{
 \begin{array}{l}
 d \in \mathbb{N} \\
 n \in \mathbb{N} \\
 n \leq d \\
 \vdash \\
 n + 1 \in \mathbb{N}
 \end{array}
 }$$

ML_out/inv0.1/INV

$$\boxed{
 \begin{array}{l}
 d \in \mathbb{N} \\
 n \in \mathbb{N} \\
 n \leq d \\
 \vdash \\
 n + 1 \leq d
 \end{array}
 }$$


ML_out/inv0.2/INV

Exercise. Write the **POs of invariant preservation** for event ML_in .

- Before claiming that a **model** is **correct**, outstanding **sequents** associated with all **POs** must be proved/discharged.

Inference Rules: Syntax and Semantics

- An **inference rule (IR)** has the following form:




Formally: $A \Rightarrow C$ is an axiom.

Informally: To prove C , it is sufficient to prove A instead.

Informally: C is the case, assuming that A is the case.

- L is a name label for referencing the **inference rule** in proofs.
 - A is a **set** of sequents known as **antecedents** of rule L .
 - C is a **single** sequent known as **consequent** of rule L .
- Let's consider **inference rules (IRs)** with two different flavours:



- IR **MON**: To prove $H1, H2 \vdash G$, it suffices to prove $H1 \vdash G$ instead.
- IR **P2**: $n \in \mathbb{N} \vdash n+1 \in \mathbb{N}$ is an **axiom**.

[proved automatically without further justifications]

Proof of Sequent: Steps and Structure

- To prove the following sequent (related to *invariant preservation*):

$$\boxed{
 \begin{array}{l}
 d \in \mathbb{N} \\
 n \in \mathbb{N} \\
 n \leq d \\
 \vdash \\
 n + 1 \in \mathbb{N}
 \end{array}
 } \quad \underline{\text{ML_out/inv0_1/INV}}$$

1. Apply a *inference rule*, which *transforms* some “outstanding” **sequent** to one or more other **sequents** to be proved instead.
 2. Keep applying *inference rules* until all *transformed* **sequents** are *axioms* that do not require any further justifications.
- Here is a *formal proof* of ML_out/inv0_1/INV, by applying IRs **MON** and **P2**:

$$\boxed{
 \begin{array}{l}
 d \in \mathbb{N} \\
 n \in \mathbb{N} \\
 n \leq d \\
 \vdash \\
 n + 1 \in \mathbb{N}
 \end{array}
 } \quad \text{MON} \quad \boxed{
 \begin{array}{l}
 n \in \mathbb{N} \\
 \vdash \\
 n + 1 \in \mathbb{N}
 \end{array}
 } \quad \text{P2}$$

Example Inference Rules (1)

$$\frac{}{\vdash 0 \in \mathbb{N}} \quad \mathbf{P1}$$

1st Peano axiom: 0 is a natural number.

$$\frac{}{n \in \mathbb{N} \vdash n+1 \in \mathbb{N}} \quad \mathbf{P2}$$

2nd Peano axiom: $n+1$ is a natural number, assuming that n is a natural number.

$$\frac{}{0 < n \vdash n-1 \in \mathbb{N}} \quad \mathbf{P2'}$$

$n-1$ is a natural number, assuming that n is positive.

$$\frac{}{n \in \mathbb{N} \vdash 0 \leq n} \quad \mathbf{P3}$$

3rd Peano axiom: n is non-negative, assuming that n is a natural number.

Example Inference Rules (2)

$$\frac{}{n < m \vdash n + 1 \leq m} \quad \text{INC}$$

$n + 1$ is less than or equal to m ,
assuming that n is strictly less than m .

$$\frac{}{n \leq m \vdash n - 1 < m} \quad \text{DEC}$$

$n - 1$ is strictly less than m ,
assuming that n is less than or equal to m .

Example Inference Rules (3)

$$\frac{H1 \vdash G}{H1, H2 \vdash G} \quad \text{MON}$$

To prove a goal under certain hypotheses, it suffices to prove it under less hypotheses.

$$\frac{H, P \vdash R \quad H, Q \vdash R}{H, P \vee Q \vdash R} \quad \text{OR_L}$$

Proof by Cases:

To prove a goal under a disjunctive assumption, it suffices to prove independently the same goal, twice, under each disjunct.

$$\frac{H \vdash P}{H \vdash P \vee Q} \quad \text{OR_R1}$$

To prove a disjunction, it suffices to prove the left disjunct.

$$\frac{H \vdash Q}{H \vdash P \vee Q} \quad \text{OR_R2}$$

To prove a disjunction, it suffices to prove the right disjunct.

Revisiting Design of Events: *ML_out*

- Recall that we already proved **PO** $\boxed{ML_out/inv0_1/INV}$:

$ \begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \leq d \\ \vdash \\ n + 1 \in \mathbb{N} \end{array} $	MON	$ \begin{array}{l} n \in \mathbb{N} \\ \vdash \\ n + 1 \in \mathbb{N} \end{array} $	P2
---	------------	---	-----------

\therefore ***ML_out/inv0_1/INV*** succeeds in being discharged.


- How about the other **PO** $\boxed{ML_out/inv0_2/INV}$ for the same event?

$ \begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \leq d \\ \vdash \\ n + 1 \leq d \end{array} $	MON	$ \begin{array}{l} n \leq d \\ \vdash \\ n + 1 \leq d \end{array} $?
---	------------	---	----------

\therefore ***ML_out/inv0_2/INV*** fails to be discharged.


Revisiting Design of Events: ML_in

- How about the **PO** $ML_in/inv0_1/INV$ for ML_in :



$\therefore ML_in/inv0_1/INV$ fails to be discharged.

- How about the other **PO** $ML_in/inv0_2/INV$ for the same event?



$\therefore ML_in/inv0_2/INV$ succeeds in being discharged.

Fixing the Design of Events

- Proofs of *ML_out/inv0_2/INV* and *ML_in/inv0_1/INV* fail due to the two events being *enabled when they should not*.
- Having this feedback, we add proper *guards* to *ML_out* and *ML_in*:


```
ML_out
  when
     $n < d$ 
  then
     $n := n + 1$ 
  end
```

```
ML_in
  when
     $n > 0$ 
  then
     $n := n - 1$ 
  end
```

- Having changed both events, updated *sequents* will be generated for the PO/VC rule of *invariant preservation*.
- All *sequents* ($\{ML_out, ML_in\} \times \{inv0_1, inv0_2\}$) now *provable*?


Revisiting Fixed Design of Events: *ML_out*

- How about the **PO** $\boxed{\text{ML_out/inv0_1/INV}}$ for *ML_out*:



\therefore **ML_out/inv0_1/INV** still succeeds in being discharged!


- How about the other **PO** $\boxed{\text{ML_out/inv0_2/INV}}$ for the same event?



\therefore **ML_out/inv0_2/INV** now succeeds in being discharged!


Revisiting Fixed Design of Events: ML_in

- How about the **PO** $ML_in/inv0_1/INV$ for ML_in :



$\therefore ML_in/inv0_1/INV$ now succeeds in being discharged!

- How about the other **PO** $ML_in/inv0_2/INV$ for the same event?



$\therefore ML_in/inv0_2/INV$ still succeeds in being discharged!

Initializing the Abstract System m_0

- Discharging the four **sequents** proved that both **invariant** conditions are **preserved** between occurrences/interleavings of **events** ML_{out} and ML_{in} .
- But how are the **invariants established** in the first place?

Analogy. Proving P via **mathematical induction**, two cases to prove:

- $P(1), P(2), \dots$ [**base** cases \approx **establishing** inv.]
- $P(n) \Rightarrow P(n+1)$ [**inductive** cases \approx **preserving** inv.]

- Therefore, we specify how the **ASM**'s **initial state** looks like:

- ✓ The IB compound, once **initialized**, has no cars.
- ✓ Initialization always possible: guard is **true**.
- ✓ There is no **pre-state** for *init*.
 \therefore The RHS of $:=$ must not involve variables.
 \therefore The RHS of $:=$ may only involve constants.
- ✓ There is only the **post-state** for *init*.
 \therefore Before-**After Predicate**: $n' = 0$

```

init
  begin
    n := 0
  end

```

PO of Invariant Establishment

```

init
begin
  n := 0
end
    
```

- ✓ An **reactive system**, once **initialized**, should never terminate.
- ✓ Event *init* cannot “preserve” the **invariants**.
 \therefore State before its occurrence (**pre-state**) does not exist.
- ✓ Event *init* only required to **establish** invariants for the first time

○ A new formal component is needed:

- $K(c)$: effect of **init**’s actions i.t.o. what variable values **become**
e.g., $K(\langle d \rangle)$ of *init* $\cong \langle 0 \rangle$
- $v' = K(c)$: **before-after predicate** formalizing *init*’s actions
e.g., BAP of *init*: $\langle n' \rangle = \langle 0 \rangle$

○ Accordingly, PO of **invariant establishment** is formulated as a **sequent**:

Axioms

\vdash

Invariants Satisfied at **Post-State**

INV

$A(c)$

\vdash

$I_i(c, K(c))$

INV

Discharging PO of Invariant Establishment

- How many **sequents** to be proved? [# invariants]
- We have two **sequents** generated for **event** *init* of model m_0 :

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ \vdash \\ 0 \in \mathbb{N} \end{array}}$$

init/inv0_1/INV

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ \vdash \\ 0 \leq d \end{array}}$$

init/inv0_2/INV

- Can we discharge the **PO** $\boxed{\text{init/inv0_1/INV}}$?

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ \vdash \\ 0 \in \mathbb{N} \end{array}}$$

MON

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} \vdash \\ 0 \in \mathbb{N} \end{array}}$$

P1

\therefore **init/inv0_1/INV**
succeeds in being discharged.

- Can we discharge the **PO** $\boxed{\text{init/inv0_2/INV}}$?

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ \vdash \\ 0 \leq d \end{array}}$$

P3

\therefore **init/inv0_2/INV**
succeeds in being discharged.

System Property: Deadlock Freedom

- So far we have proved that our initial model m_0 is s.t. all **invariant conditions** are:
 - Established when system is first initialized via *init*
 - Preserved whenever there is a **state transition**
(via an enabled event: *ML_out* or *ML_in*)
- However, whenever **event occurrences** are conditional (i.e., **guards** stronger than **true**), there is a possibility of **deadlock**:
 - A state where **guards** of all events evaluate to **false**
 - When a **deadlock** happens, none of the **events** is **enabled**.
⇒ The system is blocked and not reactive anymore!
- We express this **non-blocking** property as a new requirement:

REQ4	Once started, the system should work for ever.
------	--

PO of Deadlock Freedom (1)

- Recall some of the formal components we discussed:

- c : list of **constants** $\langle d \rangle$
- $A(c)$: list of **axioms** $\langle \text{axm0_1} \rangle$
- v and v' : list of **variables** in **pre**- and **post**-states $v \triangleq \langle n \rangle, v' \triangleq \langle n' \rangle$
- $I(c, v)$: list of **invariants** $\langle \text{inv0_1}, \text{inv0_2} \rangle$
- $G(c, v)$: the event's list of **guards**

$$G(\langle d \rangle, \langle n \rangle) \text{ of } ML_out \triangleq \langle n < d \rangle, G(\langle d \rangle, \langle n \rangle) \text{ of } ML_in \triangleq \langle n > 0 \rangle$$

- A system is **deadlock-free** if at least one of its **events** is **enabled**:

Axioms
Invariants Satisfied at **Pre-State**
 \vdash
 Disjunction of the guards satisfied at **Pre-State**

DLF

$A(c)$
 $I(c, v)$
 \vdash
 $G_1(c, v) \vee \dots \vee G_m(c, v)$

DLF

To prove about deadlock freedom

- An event's effect of state transition is **not** relevant.
- Instead, the evaluation of all events' **guards** at the **pre-state** is relevant.

PO of Deadlock Freedom (2)

- **Deadlock freedom** is not necessarily a desired property.
 \Rightarrow When it is (like m_0), then the generated **sequents** must be discharged.
- Applying the PO of **deadlock freedom** to the initial model m_0 :

$ \begin{array}{l} A(c) \\ I(c, \mathbf{v}) \\ \vdash \\ G_1(c, \mathbf{v}) \vee \dots \vee G_m(c, \mathbf{v}) \end{array} $	$\underline{\text{DLF}}$	$ \begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \leq d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \vee n > 0 \end{array} $	$\underline{\text{DLF}}$
---	--------------------------	---	--------------------------

Our bridge controller being **deadlock-free** means that cars can **always** enter (via ML_out) or leave (via ML_in) the island-bridge compound.

- Can we formally discharge this **PO** for our **initial model** m_0 ?

Example Inference Rules (4)

$$\frac{}{H, P \vdash P} \text{ HYP}$$

A goal is proved if it can be assumed.

$$\frac{}{\perp \vdash P} \text{ FALSE_L}$$

Assuming **false** (\perp),
anything can be proved.

$$\frac{}{P \vdash \top} \text{ TRUE_R}$$

true (\top) is proved,
regardless of the assumption.

$$\frac{}{P \vdash E = E} \text{ EQ}$$

An expression being equal to itself is proved,
regardless of the assumption.

Example Inference Rules (5)

$$H(\mathbf{F}), \mathbf{E} = \mathbf{F} \vdash P(\mathbf{F})$$

EQ_LR

$$H(\mathbf{E}), \mathbf{E} = \mathbf{F} \vdash P(\mathbf{E})$$

To prove a goal $P(\mathbf{E})$ assuming $H(\mathbf{E})$, where both P and H depend on expression \mathbf{E} , it suffices to prove $P(\mathbf{F})$ assuming $H(\mathbf{F})$, where both P and H depend on expression \mathbf{F} , given that \mathbf{E} is equal to \mathbf{F} .

$$H(\mathbf{E}), \mathbf{E} = \mathbf{F} \vdash P(\mathbf{E})$$

EQ_RL

$$H(\mathbf{F}), \mathbf{E} = \mathbf{F} \vdash P(\mathbf{F})$$

To prove a goal $P(\mathbf{F})$ assuming $H(\mathbf{F})$, where both P and H depend on expression \mathbf{F} , it suffices to prove $P(\mathbf{E})$ assuming $H(\mathbf{E})$, where both P and H depend on expression \mathbf{E} , given that \mathbf{E} is equal to \mathbf{F} .

Discharging PO of DLF: Exercise

 $A(c)$
 $I(c, \mathbf{v})$
 \vdash
 $G_1(c, \mathbf{v}) \vee \dots \vee G_m(c, \mathbf{v})$
DLF
 $d \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \leq d$
 \vdash
 $n < d \vee n > 0$

??

Discharging PO of DLF: First Attempt


$$\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \leq d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \vee n > 0 \end{array}$$

\equiv

$$\begin{array}{l} \begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n < d \vee n = d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \vee n > 0 \end{array} \text{ MON } \begin{array}{l} n < d \vee n = d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \vee n > 0 \end{array} \text{ OR_L } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \begin{array}{l} n < d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \vee n > 0 \end{array} \text{ OR_R1 } \begin{array}{l} n < d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \end{array} \text{ HYP} \\ \begin{array}{l} n = d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \vee n > 0 \end{array} \text{ EQ_LR, MON } \begin{array}{l} \vdash \\ d < d \vee d > 0 \end{array} \text{ OR_R2 } \begin{array}{l} \vdash \\ d > 0 \end{array} ? \end{array} \right. \end{array}$$

Why Did the DLF PO Fail to Discharge?

- In our first attempt, proof of the 2nd case failed: $\vdash d > 0$
- This **unprovable** sequent gave us a good hint:
 - For the model under consideration (m_0) to be **deadlock-free**, it is required that $d > 0$. [≥ 1 car allowed in the IB compound]
 - But current **specification** of m_0 **not** strong enough to entail this:
 - $\neg(d > 0) \equiv d \leq 0$ is possible for the current model
 - Given **axm0_1** : $d \in \mathbb{N}$
- $\Rightarrow d = 0$ is allowed by m_0 which causes a **deadlock**.
- Recall the *init* event and the two **guarded** events:



When $d = 0$, the disjunction of guards evaluates to **false**: $0 < 0 \vee 0 > 0$

\Rightarrow As soon as the system is initialized, it **deadlocks immediately**

as no car can either enter or leave the IR compound!!

Fixing the Context of Initial Model

- Having understood the failed proof, we add a proper **axiom** to m_0 :

axioms:
axm0_2 : $d > 0$

- We have effectively elaborated on **REQ2**:


REQ2	The number of cars on bridge and island is limited but positive.
------	--

- Having changed the context, an updated **sequent** will be generated for the PO/VC rule of **deadlock freedom**.
- Is this new sequent now **provable**?

Discharging PO of DLF: Second Attempt


$$\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ d > 0 \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \leq d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \vee n > 0 \end{array}$$

\equiv



Initial Model: Summary

- The final version of our *initial model* m_0 is **provably correct** w.r.t.:
 - Establishment of *Invariants*
 - Preservation of *Invariants*
 - Deadlock* Freedom
- Here is the final *specification* of m_0 :



Index (1)

Learning Outcomes

Recall: Correct by Construction

State Space of a Model

Roadmap of this Module

Requirements Document: Mainland, Island

Requirements Document: E-Descriptions

Requirements Document: R-Descriptions

Requirements Document:

Visual Summary of Equipment Pieces

Refinement Strategy

Model m_0 : Abstraction

Index (2)

Model m_0 : State Space

Model m_0 : State Transitions via Events

Model m_0 : Actions vs. Before-After Predicates

Design of Events: Invariant Preservation

Sequents: Syntax and Semantics

PO of Invariant Preservation: Sketch

PO of Invariant Preservation: Components

Rule of Invariant Preservation: Sequents

Inference Rules: Syntax and Semantics

Proof of Sequent: Steps and Structure

Example Inference Rules (1)

Index (3)

Example Inference Rules (2)

Example Inference Rules (3)

Revisiting Design of Events: ML_{out}

Revisiting Design of Events: ML_{in}

Fixing the Design of Events

Revisiting Fixed Design of Events: ML_{out}

Revisiting Fixed Design of Events: ML_{in}

Initializing the Abstract System m_0

PO of Invariant Establishment

Discharging PO of Invariant Establishment

System Property: Deadlock Freedom

Index (4)

PO of Deadlock Freedom (1)

PO of Deadlock Freedom (2)

Example Inference Rules (4)

Example Inference Rules (5)

Discharging PO of DLF: Exercise

Discharging PO of DLF: First Attempt

Why Did the DLF PO Fail to Discharge?

Fixing the Context of Initial Model

Discharging PO of DLF: Second Attempt

Initial Model: Summary