# Introduction

**MEB: Prologue, Chapter 1**

EECS3342 Z: System Specification and Refinement
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## Learning Outcomes

This module is designed to help you understand:

- What a *safety-critical* system is
- **Code of Ethics** for Professional Engineers
- What a ***Formal Method*** Is
- ***Verification*** vs. ***Validation***
- ***Model***-Based System Development



## What is a Safety-Critical System (SCS)?

- A *safety-critical system (**SCS**)* is a system whose ***failure*** or ***malfunction*** has one (or more) of the following consequences:
  - death or serious injury to **people**
  - loss or severe damage to **equipment/property**
  - harm to the **environment**
- Based on the above definition, do you know of any systems that are ***safety-critical***?



## Professional Engineers: Code of Ethics

- *Code of Ethics* is a basic guide for ***professional conduct*** and imposes duties on practitioners, with respect to **society**, **employers**, **clients**, **colleagues** (including employees and subordinates), the **engineering profession** and him or herself.
- It is the duty of a practitioner to act at all times with,
  1. ***fairness*** and ***loyalty*** to the practitioner's associates, employers, clients, subordinates and employees;
  2. ***fidelity*** (i.e., dedication, faithfulness) to public needs;
  3. devotion to ***high ideals*** of personal honour and professional integrity;
  4. ***knowledge*** of developments in the area of professional engineering relevant to any services that are undertaken; and
  5. ***competence*** in the performance of any professional engineering services that are undertaken.
- Consequence of misconduct?
  - ***suspension*** or ***termination*** of professional licenses
  - civil ***law suits***

Source: PEO's Code of Ethics

## Developing Safety-Critical Systems

***Industrial standards*** in various domains list *acceptance criteria* for **mission**- or **safety**-critical systems that practitioners need to comply with: e.g.,

> ***Aviation*** Domain: ***RTCA DO-178C*** "*Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification*"
>
> ***Nuclear*** Domain: ***IEEE 7-4.3.2*** "*Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations*"

Two important criteria are:

1. System ***requirements*** are precise and complete
2. System ***implementation*** conforms to the requirements

But how do we accomplish these criteria?



## Safety-Critical vs. Mission-Critical?

- ***Critical***:
  A task whose successful completion ensures the success of a larger, more complex operation.
  e.g., Success of a pacemaker ⇒ Regulated heartbeats of a patient
- ***Safety***:
  Being free from danger/injury to or loss of human lives.
- ***Mission***:
  An operation or task assigned by a higher authority.

  **Q**. Formally relate being ***safety***-critical and ***mission***-critical.
  **A**.
  - ***safety***-critical ⇒ ***mission***-critical
  - ***mission***-critical ⇏ ***safety***-critical
- Relevant industrial standard: ***RTCA DO-178C*** (replacing RTCA DO-178B in 2012) "*Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification*"

Source: Article from OpenSystems



## Using Formal Methods for Certification

- A ***formal method (FM)*** is a ***mathematically rigorous*** technique for the specification, development, and verification of software and hardware systems.
- ***DO-333*** "*Formal methods supplement to DO-178C and DO-278A*" advocates the use of formal methods:

  *The use of* ***formal methods*** *is motivated by the expectation that, as in other engineering disciplines, performing appropriate* ***mathematical analyses*** *can contribute to establishing the* ***correctness*** *and* ***robustness*** *of a design.*
- FMs, because of their mathematical basis, are capable of:
  - *Unambiguously* describing software system requirements.
  - Enabling *precise* communication between engineers.
  - Providing ***verification (towards certification) evidence*** of:
    - A ***formal*** representation of the system being *healthy*.
    - A ***formal*** representation of the system *satisfying* *safety properties*.



## Verification: Building the Product Right?




- ***Implementation*** built via ***reusable programming components***.
- *Goal* : *Implementation Satisfies Intended Requirements*
- To verify this, we ***formalize*** them as a ***system model*** and a set of (e.g., safety) ***properties***, using the specification language of a theorem prover (EECS3342) or a model checker (EECS4315).
- Two Verification Issues:
  1. Library components may ***not behave as intended***.
  2. Successful checks/proofs ensure that we *built the product right*, with respect to the informal requirements. **But**...

## Validation: Building the Right Product?




- Successful checks/proofs $\not\Rightarrow$ We ***built the right product***.
- The target of our checks/proofs may not be valid:

  The requirements may be ***ambiguous***, ***incomplete***, or ***contradictory***.
- Solution: ***Precise Documentation*** [ EECS4312 ]



## Catching Defects – When?

- To minimize *development costs*, minimize *software defects*.
- Software Development Cycle:

  Requirements → *Design* → *Implementation* → Release

  **Q.** Design or Implementation Phase?

  Catch defects *as early as possible*.

| Design and architecture | Implementation | Integration testing | Customer beta test | Postproduct release |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1X* | 5X | 10X | 15X | 30X |

∵ The cost of fixing defects *increases exponentially* as software progresses through the development lifecycle.

- Discovering *defects* after **release** costs up to 30 times more than catching them in the **design** phase.
- Choice of a *design language*, amendable to ***formal verification***, is therefore critical for your project.

Source: IBM Report



## Model-Based System Development

- ***Modelling*** and ***formal reasoning*** should be performed **before** implementing/coding a system.
  - A system's ***model*** is its ***abstraction***, filtering irrelevant details.

    A system ***model*** means as much to a software engineer as a ***blueprint*** means to an architect.
  - A system may have a list of ***models***, "sorted" by **accuracy**:

    $$\langle m_0, m_1, \dots, \boxed{m_i}, \boxed{m_j}, \dots, m_n \rangle$$

    - The list starts by the most ***abstract*** model with least details.
    - A more ***abstract*** model $\boxed{m_i}$ is said to be ***refined by*** its subsequent, more ***concrete*** model $\boxed{m_j}$.
    - The list ends with the most ***concrete/refined*** model with most details.
  - It is far easier to reason about:
    - a system's ***abstract*** models (rather than its full ***implementation***)
    - ***refinement*** ***steps*** between subsequent models
- The final product is ***correct by construction***.



## Learning through Case Studies

- We will study example ***models of programs/codes***, as well as ***proofs*** on them, drawn from various application domains:
  - REACTIVE Systems [ sensors vs. actuators ]
  - DISTRIBUTED Systems [ (geographically) distributed parties ]
- What you learn in this course will allow you to explore example in other application domains:
  - SEQUENTIAL Programs [ single thread of control ]
  - CONCURRENT Programs [ interleaving processes ]
- The **Rodin Platform** will be used to:
  - Construct system ***models*** using the Even-B notation.
  - Prove ***properties*** and ***refinements*** using ***classical logic*** (propositional and predicate calculus) and ***set theory***.

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