Introduction

MEB: Prologue, Chapter 1

EECS3342 Z: System
Specification and Refinement
Winter 2022

CHEN-WEI WANG

Learning Outcomes

This module is designed to help you understand:

- What a *safety-critical* system is
- **Code of Ethics** for Professional Engineers
- What a ***Formal Method*** Is
- ***Verification*** vs. ***Validation***
- ***Model***-Based System Development

What is a Safety-Critical System (SCS)?

A *safety-critical system (**SCS**)* is a system whose ***failure*** or ***malfunction*** has one (or more) of the following consequences:

- death or serious injury to **people**
- loss or severe damage to **equipment/property**
- harm to the **environment**

Professional Engineers: Code of Ethics

- *Code of Ethics* is a basic guide for ***professional conduct*** and imposes duties on practitioners, with respect to **society**, **employers**, **clients**, **colleagues** (including employees and subordinates), the **engineering profession** and him or herself.
- It is the duty of a practitioner to act at all times with,
  1. ***fairness*** and ***loyalty*** to the practitioner's associates, employers, clients, subordinates and employees;
  2. ***fidelity*** to public needs;
  3. devotion to ***high ideals*** of personal honour and professional integrity;
  4. ***knowledge*** of developments in the area of professional engineering relevant to any services that are undertaken; and
  5. ***competence*** in the performance of any professional engineering services that are undertaken.
- Consequence of misconduct?
  - ***suspension*** or ***termination*** of professional licenses
  - civil ***law suits***

Source: PEO's Code of Ethics

Developing Safety-Critical Systems

Industrial standards in various domains list *acceptance criteria* for mission- or safety-critical systems that practitioners need to comply with: e.g.,

> ***Aviation*** Domain: ***RTCA DO-178C*** "*Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification*"
>
> ***Nuclear*** Domain: ***IEEE 7-4.3.2*** "*Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations*"

Two important criteria are:

1. System ***requirements*** are precise and complete
2. System ***implementation*** conforms to the requirements

But how do we accomplish these criteria?

Using Formal Methods for Certification

- A ***formal method (FM)*** is a ***mathematically rigorous*** technique for the specification, development, and verification of software and hardware systems.
- ***DO-333*** "*Formal methods supplement to DO-178C and DO-278A*" advocates the use of formal methods:

  > *The use of **formal methods** is motivated by the expectation that, as in other engineering disciplines, performing appropriate **mathematical analyses** can contribute to establishing the **correctness** and **robustness** of a design.*

- FMs, because of their mathematical basis, are capable of:
  - *Unambiguously* describing software system requirements.
  - Enabling *precise* communication between engineers.
  - Providing ***verification evidence*** of:
    - A ***formal*** representation of the system being *healthy*.
    - A ***formal*** representation of the system *satisfying* *safety properties*.

Verification: Building the Product Right?



- ***Implementation*** built via ***reusable programming components***.
- *Goal* : *Implementation Satisfies Intended Requirements*
- To verify this, we ***formalize*** them as a ***system model*** and a set of (e.g., safety) ***properties***, using the specification language of a <u>theorem prover</u> (EECS3342) or a <u>model checker</u> (EECS4315).
- Two Verification Issues:
  1. Library components may ***not behave as intended***.
  2. Successful checks/proofs ensure that we *built the product right* , with respect to the <u>informal</u> requirements. But...

Validation: Building the Right Product?



- Successful checks/proofs $\not\Rightarrow$ We ***built the right product***.
- The target of our checks/proofs may not be valid:

  The requirements may be ***ambiguous***, ***incomplete***, or ***contradictory***.

- <u>Solution</u>: ***Precise Documentation*** [EECS4312]

Model-Based System Development

- ***Modelling*** and ***formal reasoning*** should be performed <u>**before**</u> implementing/coding a system.
  - A system's ***model*** is its ***abstraction***, filtering irrelevant details.
    A system ***model*** means as much to a software engineer as a ***blueprint*** means to an architect.
  - A system may have a list of ***models***, "sorted" by **accuracy**:
    $$\langle m_0, m_1, \ldots, \boxed{m_i}, \boxed{m_j}, \ldots, m_n \rangle$$
    - The list starts by the <u>most</u> ***abstract*** model with least details.
    - A more ***abstract*** model $\boxed{m_i}$ is said to be ***refined by*** its subsequent, more ***concrete*** model $\boxed{m_j}$.
    - The list ends with the <u>most</u> ***concrete/refined*** model with most details.
  - It is far easier to reason about:
    - a system's ***abstract*** models (rather than its full ***implementation***)
    - ***refinement steps*** between subsequent models
- The final product is ***correct by construction***.

Learning through Case Studies

- We will study example ***models of programs/codes***, as well as ***proofs*** on them, drawn from various application domains:
  - SEQUENTIAL Programs [single thread of control]
  - CONCURRENT Programs [interleaving processes]
  - DISTRIBUTED Systems [(geographically) distributed parties]
  - REACTIVE Systems [sensors vs. actuators]
- The **Rodin Platform** will be used to:
  - Construct system ***models*** using the Even-B notation.
  - Prove ***properties*** and ***refinements*** using ***classical logic*** (<u>propositional</u> and <u>predicate</u> calculus) and ***set theory***.

Index (1)

Learning Outcomes
What is a Safety-Critical System (SCS)?
Professional Engineers: Code of Ethics
Developing Safety-Critical Systems
Using Formal Methods to for Certification
Verification: Building the Product Right?
Validation: Building the Right Product?
Model-Based System Development
Learning through Case Studies

Review of Math

MEB: Chapter 9

EECS3342 Z: System
Specification and Refinement
Winter 2022

CHEN-WEI WANG

Learning Outcomes of this Lecture

This module is designed to help you **review**:

- Propositional Logic
- Predicate Logic
- Sets, Relations, and Functions

Propositional Logic (1)

- A *proposition* is a statement of claim that must be of either *true* or *false*, but not both.
- Basic logical operands are of type Boolean: *true* and *false*.
- We use logical operators to construct compound statements.
  - Unary logical operator: negation ($\neg$)

p	$\neg p$
true	*false*
false	*true*

  - Binary logical operators: conjunction ($\wedge$), disjunction ($\vee$), implication ($\Rightarrow$), equivalence ($\equiv$), and if-and-only-if ($\iff$).

p	q	$p \wedge q$	$p \vee q$	$p \Rightarrow q$	$p \iff q$	$p \equiv q$
true	*true*	*true*	*true*	*true*	*true*	*true*
true	*false*	*false*	*true*	*false*	*false*	*false*
false	*true*	*false*	*true*	*true*	*false*	*false*
false	*false*	*false*	*false*	*true*	*true*	*true*

Propositional Logic: Implication (1)

- Written as $p \Rightarrow q$ [pronounced as "p implies q"]
  - We call p the antecedent, assumption, or premise.
  - We call q the consequence or conclusion.
- Compare the *truth* of $p \Rightarrow q$ to whether a contract is *honoured*:
  - antecedent/assumption/premise $p \approx$ promised terms [e.g., salary]
  - consequence/conclusion $q \approx$ obligations [e.g., duties]
- When the promised terms are met, then the contract is:
  - *honoured* if the obligations fulfilled. [$(true \Rightarrow true) \iff true$]
  - *breached* if the obligations violated. [$(true \Rightarrow false) \iff false$]
- When the promised terms are not met, then:
  - Fulfilling the obligation (q) or not ($\neg q$) does *not breach* the contract.

p	q	$p \Rightarrow q$
false	*true*	*true*
false	*false*	*true*

Propositional Logic: Implication (2)

There are alternative, equivalent ways to expressing $p \Rightarrow q$:

- q **if** p

  q is *true* if p is *true*
- p **only if** q

  If p is *true*, then for $p \Rightarrow q$ to be *true*, it can only be that q is also *true*.
  Otherwise, if p is *true* but q is *false*, then $(true \Rightarrow false) \equiv false$.

  Note. To prove $p \equiv q$, prove $p \iff q$ (pronounced: "p if and only if q"):
  - p **if** q [$q \Rightarrow p$]
  - p **only if** q [$p \Rightarrow q$]
- p is **sufficient** for q

  For q to be *true*, it is sufficient to have p being *true*.
- q is **necessary** for p [similar to p **only if** q]

  If p is *true*, then it is necessarily the case that q is also *true*.
  Otherwise, if p is *true* but q is *false*, then $(true \Rightarrow false) \equiv false$.
- q **unless** $\neg p$ [When is $p \Rightarrow q$ *true*?]

  If q is *true*, then $p \Rightarrow q$ *true* regardless of p.
  If q is *false*, then $p \Rightarrow q$ cannot be *true* unless p is *false*.

Propositional Logic: Implication (3)

Given an implication $p \Rightarrow q$, we may construct its:

- **Inverse**: $\neg p \Rightarrow \neg q$ [negate antecedent and consequence]
- **Converse**: $q \Rightarrow p$ [swap antecedent and consequence]
- **Contrapositive**: $\neg q \Rightarrow \neg p$ [inverse of converse]

Propositional Logic (2)

- **Axiom**: Definition of $\Rightarrow$

$$p \Rightarrow q \equiv \neg p \vee q$$

- **Theorem**: Identity of $\Rightarrow$

$$true \Rightarrow p \equiv p$$

- **Theorem**: Zero of $\Rightarrow$

$$false \Rightarrow p \equiv true$$

- **Axiom**: De Morgan

$$\begin{array}{lcl} \neg(p \wedge q) & \equiv & \neg p \vee \neg q \\ \neg(p \vee q) & \equiv & \neg p \wedge \neg q \end{array}$$

- **Axiom**: Double Negation

$$p \equiv \neg\,(\neg\, p)$$

- **Theorem**: Contrapositive

$$p \Rightarrow q \equiv \neg q \Rightarrow \neg p$$

Predicate Logic (1)

- A *predicate* is a ***universal*** or ***existential*** statement about objects in some universe of disclosure.
- Unlike propositions, predicates are typically specified using ***variables***, each of which declared with some ***range*** of values.
- We use the following symbols for common numerical ranges:
  - $\mathbb{Z}$: the set of integers [$-\infty, \dots, -1, 0, 1, \dots, +\infty$]
  - $\mathbb{N}$: the set of natural numbers [$0, 1, \dots, +\infty$]
- Variable(s) in a predicate may be ***quantified***:
  - *Universal quantification* :
    All values that a variable may take satisfy certain property.
    e.g., Given that i is a natural number, i is *always* non-negative.
  - *Existential quantification* :
    Some value that a variable may take satisfies certain property.
    e.g., Given that i is an integer, i *can be* negative.

Predicate Logic (2.1): Universal Q. ($\forall$)

- A *universal quantification* has the form $(\forall X \bullet R \Rightarrow P)$
  - X is a comma-separated list of variable names
  - R is a *constraint on types/ranges* of the listed variables
  - P is a *property* to be satisfied
- ***For all*** (combinations of) values of variables listed in X that satisfies R, it is the case that P is satisfied.
  - $\forall i \bullet i \in \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow i \geq 0$ [*true*]
  - $\forall i \bullet i \in \mathbb{Z} \Rightarrow i \geq 0$ [*false*]
  - $\forall i, j \bullet i \in \mathbb{Z} \wedge j \in \mathbb{Z} \Rightarrow i < j \vee i > j$ [*false*]
- *Proof Strategies*
  1. How to prove $(\forall X \bullet R \Rightarrow P)$ ***true***?
     - **Hint**. When is $R \Rightarrow P$ ***true***? [$true \Rightarrow true$, $false \Rightarrow \_$]
     - Show that for all instances of $x \in X$ s.t. $R(x)$, $P(x)$ holds.
     - Show that for all instances of $x \in X$ it is the case $\neg R(x)$.
  2. How to prove $(\forall X \bullet R \Rightarrow P)$ ***false***?
     - **Hint**. When is $R \Rightarrow P$ ***false***? [$true \Rightarrow false$]
     - Give a ***witness/counterexample*** of $x \in X$ s.t. $R(x)$, $\neg P(x)$ holds.

Predicate Logic (2.2): Existential Q. (∃)

- An *existential quantification* has the form $(\exists X \bullet R \wedge P)$
  - X is a comma-separated list of variable names
  - R is a *constraint on types/ranges* of the listed variables
  - P is a *property* to be satisfied
- ***There exist*** (a combination of) values of variables listed in X that satisfy both R and P.
  - $\exists i \bullet i \in \mathbb{N} \wedge i \geq 0$ [*true*]
  - $\exists i \bullet i \in \mathbb{Z} \wedge i \geq 0$ [*true*]
  - $\exists i, j \bullet i \in \mathbb{Z} \wedge j \in \mathbb{Z} \wedge i < j \vee i > j$ [*true*]
- *Proof Strategies*
  1. How to prove $(\exists X \bullet R \wedge P)$ ***true***?
     - **Hint**. When is $R \wedge P$ ***true***? [*true* ∧ *true*]
     - Give a ***witness*** of $x \in X$ s.t. $R(x)$, $P(x)$ holds.
  2. How to prove $(\exists X \bullet R \wedge P)$ ***false***?
     - **Hint**. When is $R \wedge P$ ***false***? [*true* ∧ *false*, *false* ∧ _]
     - Show that for all instances of $x \in X$ s.t. $R(x)$, $\neg P(x)$ holds.
     - Show that for all instances of $x \in X$ it is the case $\neg R(x)$.

Predicate Logic (3): Exercises

- Prove or disprove: $\forall x \bullet (x \in \mathbb{Z} \wedge 1 \leq x \leq 10) \Rightarrow x > 0$.

  All 10 integers between 1 and 10 are greater than 0.
- Prove or disprove: $\forall x \bullet (x \in \mathbb{Z} \wedge 1 \leq x \leq 10) \Rightarrow x > 1$.

  Integer 1 (a witness/counterexample) in the range between 1 and 10 is *not* greater than 1.
- Prove or disprove: $\exists x \bullet (x \in \mathbb{Z} \wedge 1 \leq x \leq 10) \wedge x > 1$.

  Integer 2 (a witness) in the range between 1 and 10 is greater than 1.
- Prove or disprove that $\exists x \bullet (x \in \mathbb{Z} \wedge 1 \leq x \leq 10) \wedge x > 10$?

  All integers in the range between 1 and 10 are *not* greater than 10.

Predicate Logic (4): Switching Quantifications

Conversions between ∀ and ∃:

$$(\forall X \bullet R \Rightarrow P) \iff \neg(\exists X \bullet R \wedge \neg P)$$
$$(\exists X \bullet R \wedge P) \iff \neg(\forall X \bullet R \Rightarrow \neg P)$$

Sets: Definitions and Membership

- A *set* is a collection of objects.
  - Objects in a set are called its *elements* or *members*.
  - *Order* in which elements are arranged does not matter.
  - An element can appear *at most once* in the set.
- We may define a set using:
  - ***Set Enumeration***: Explicitly list all members in a set.

    e.g., $\{1, 3, 5, 7, 9\}$
  - ***Set Comprehension***: Implicitly specify the condition that all members satisfy.

    e.g., $\{x \mid 1 \leq x \leq 10 \wedge x \texttt{ is an odd number}\}$
- An empty set (denoted as $\{\}$ or $\varnothing$) has no members.
- We may check if an element is a *member* of a set:

  e.g., $5 \in \{1, 3, 5, 7, 9\}$ [*true*]

  e.g., $4 \notin \{x \mid x \leq 1 \leq 10, x \texttt{ is an odd number}\}$ [*true*]
- The number of elements in a set is called its *cardinality*.

  e.g., $|\varnothing| = 0$, $|\{x \mid x \leq 1 \leq 10, x \texttt{ is an odd number}\}| = 5$

Set Relations

Given two sets S_1 and S_2:

- S_1 is a ***subset*** of S_2 if every member of S_1 is a member of S_2.

$$S_1 \subseteq S_2 \iff (\forall x \bullet x \in S1 \Rightarrow x \in S2)$$

- S_1 and S_2 are ***equal*** iff they are the subset of each other.

$$S_1 = S_2 \iff S_1 \subseteq S_2 \wedge S_2 \subseteq S_1$$

- S_1 is a ***proper subset*** of S_2 if it is a strictly smaller subset.

$$S_1 \subset S_2 \iff S_1 \subseteq S_2 \wedge |S1| < |S2|$$

Set Relations: Exercises

$? \subseteq S$ always holds	[$\varnothing$ and S]
$? \subset S$ always fails	[S]
$? \subset S$ holds for some S and fails for some S	[$\varnothing$]
$S_1 = S_2 \Rightarrow S_1 \subseteq S_2$?	[Yes]
$S_1 \subseteq S_2 \Rightarrow S_1 = S_2$?	[No]

Set Operations

Given two sets S_1 and S_2:

- ***Union*** of S_1 and S_2 is a set whose members are in either.

$$S_1 \cup S_2 = \{x \mid x \in S_1 \vee x \in S_2\}$$

- ***Intersection*** of S_1 and S_2 is a set whose members are in both.

$$S_1 \cap S_2 = \{x \mid x \in S_1 \wedge x \in S_2\}$$

- ***Difference*** of S_1 and S_2 is a set whose members are in S_1 but not S_2.

$$S_1 \setminus S_2 = \{x \mid x \in S_1 \wedge x \notin S_2\}$$

Power Sets

The *power set* of a set S is a *set* of all S's *subsets*.

$$\mathbb{P}(S) = \{s \mid s \subseteq S\}$$

The power set contains subsets of *cardinalities* 0, 1, 2, ..., $|S|$.
e.g., $\mathbb{P}(\{1,2,3\})$ is a set of sets, where each member set s has cardinality 0, 1, 2, or 3:

$$\left\{\begin{array}{l} \varnothing, \\ \{1\},\ \{2\},\ \{3\}, \\ \{1,2\},\ \{2,3\},\ \{3,1\}, \\ \{1,2,3\} \end{array}\right\}$$

Exercise: What is $\mathbb{P}(\{1,2,3,4,5\}) \setminus \mathbb{P}(\{1,2,3\})$?

Set of Tuples

Given n sets $S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_n$, a *cross/Cartesian product* of theses sets is a set of n-tuples.

Each *n-tuple* $(e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_n)$ contains n elements, each of which a member of the corresponding set.

$$S_1 \times S_2 \times \cdots \times S_n = \{(e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_n) \mid e_i \in S_i \land 1 \le i \le n\}$$

e.g., $\{a, b\} \times \{2, 4\} \times \{\$, \&\}$ is a set of triples:

$$\begin{aligned} & \{a, b\} \times \{2, 4\} \times \{\$, \&\} \\ = \; & \{\, (e_1, e_2, e_3) \mid e_1 \in \{a, b\} \land e_2 \in \{2, 4\} \land e_3 \in \{\$, \&\} \,\} \\ = \; & \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (a, 2, \$), (a, 2, \&), (a, 4, \$), (a, 4, \&), \\ (b, 2, \$), (b, 2, \&), (b, 4, \$), (b, 4, \&) \end{array} \right\} \end{aligned}$$

Relations (1): Constructing a Relation

A *relation* is a set of mappings, each being an ***ordered pair*** that maps a member of set S to a member of set T.

e.g., Say $S = \{1, 2, 3\}$ and $T = \{a, b\}$

- $\varnothing$ is an empty relation.
- $\boxed{S \times T}$ is the *maximum* relation (say r_1) between S and T, mapping from each member of S to each member in T:

  $$\{(1, a), (1, b), (2, a), (2, b), (3, a), (3, b)\}$$

- $\{(x, y) \mid (x, y) \in S \times T \land x \neq 1\}$ is a relation (say r_2) that maps only some members in S to every member in T:

  $$\{(2, a), (2, b), (3, a), (3, b)\}$$

Relations (2.1): Set of Possible Relations

- We use the power set operator to express the set of *all possible relations* on S and T:

  $$\mathbb{P}(S \times T)$$

  Each member in $\mathbb{P}(S \times T)$ is a relation.
- To declare a relation variable r, we use the colon (`:`) symbol to mean *set membership*:

  $$r : \mathbb{P}(S \times T)$$

- Or alternatively, we write:

  $$r : S \leftrightarrow T$$

  where the set $S \leftrightarrow T$ is synonymous to the set $\mathbb{P}(S \times T)$

Relations (2.2): Exercise

Enumerate $\{a, b\} \leftrightarrow \{1, 2, 3\}$.

- **Hints**:
  - You may enumerate all relations in $\mathbb{P}(\{a, b\} \times \{1, 2, 3\})$ via their *cardinalities*: 0, 1, $\ldots$, $|\{a, b\} \times \{1, 2, 3\}|$.
  - What's the *maximum* relation in $\mathbb{P}(\{a, b\} \times \{1, 2, 3\})$?

    $$\{\, (a, 1), (a, 2), (a, 3), (b, 1), (b, 2), (b, 3) \,\}$$

- The answer is a set containing ***all*** of the following relations:
  - Relation with cardinality 0: $\varnothing$
  - How many relations with cardinality 1? $\left[\, \binom{|\{a,b\}\times\{1,2,3\}|}{1} = 6 \,\right]$
  - How many relations with cardinality 2? $\left[\, \binom{|\{a,b\}\times\{1,2,3\}|}{2} = \frac{6\times5}{2!} = 15 \,\right]$

    $\ldots$

  - Relation with cardinality $|\{a, b\} \times \{1, 2, 3\}|$:

    $$\{\, (a, 1), (a, 2), (a, 3), (b, 1), (b, 2), (b, 3) \,\}$$

Relations (3.1): Domain, Range, Inverse

Given a relation

r = {(a, 1), (b, 2), (c, 3), (a, 4), (b, 5), (c, 6), (d, 1), (e, 2), (f, 3)}

- ***domain*** of r: set of first-elements from r
  - Definition: $\text{dom}(r) = \{ \, d \mid (d, r') \in r \, \}$
  - e.g., $\text{dom}(r) = \{a, b, c, d, e, f\}$
  - ASCII syntax: `dom(r)`
- ***range*** of r: set of second-elements from r
  - Definition: $\text{ran}(r) = \{ \, r' \mid (d, r') \in r \, \}$
  - e.g., $\text{ran}(r) = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$
  - ASCII syntax: `ran(r)`
- ***inverse*** of r: a relation like r with elements swapped
  - Definition: $r^{-1} = \{ \, (r', d) \mid (d, r') \in r \, \}$
  - e.g., $r^{-1} = \{(1, a), (2, b), (3, c), (4, a), (5, b), (6, c), (1, d), (2, e), (3, f)\}$
  - ASCII syntax: `r~`

Relations (3.2): Image

Given a relation

r = {(a, 1), (b, 2), (c, 3), (a, 4), (b, 5), (c, 6), (d, 1), (e, 2), (f, 3)}

relational image of r over set s: sub-range of r mapped by s.

- Definition: $r[s] = \{ \, r' \mid (d, r') \in r \wedge d \in s \, \}$
- e.g., $r[\{a, b\}] = \{1, 2, 4, 5\}$
- ASCII syntax: `r[s]`

Relations (3.3): Restrictions

Given a relation

r = {(a, 1), (b, 2), (c, 3), (a, 4), (b, 5), (c, 6), (d, 1), (e, 2), (f, 3)}

- ***domain restriction*** of r over set ds: sub-relation of r with domain ds.
  - Definition: $ds \lhd r = \{ \, (d, r') \mid (d, r') \in r \wedge d \in ds \, \}$
  - e.g., $\{a, b\} \lhd r = \{(\mathbf{a}, 1), (\mathbf{b}, 2), (\mathbf{a}, 4), (\mathbf{b}, 5)\}$
  - ASCII syntax: `ds <| r`
- ***range restriction*** of r over set rs: sub-relation of r with range rs.
  - Definition: $r \rhd rs = \{ \, (d, r') \mid (d, r') \in r \wedge r' \in rs \, \}$
  - e.g., $r \rhd \{1, 2\} = \{(a, \mathbf{1}), (b, \mathbf{2}), (d, \mathbf{1}), (e, \mathbf{2})\}$
  - ASCII syntax: `r |> rs`

Relations (3.4): Subtractions

Given a relation

r = {(a, 1), (b, 2), (c, 3), (a, 4), (b, 5), (c, 6), (d, 1), (e, 2), (f, 3)}

- ***domain subtraction*** of r over set ds: sub-relation of r with domain <u>not</u> ds.
  - Definition: $ds \mathbin{⩤} r = \{ \, (d, r') \mid (d, r') \in r \wedge d \notin ds \, \}$
  - e.g., $\{a, b\} \mathbin{⩤} r = \{(\mathbf{c}, 3), (\mathbf{c}, 6), (\mathbf{d}, 1), (\mathbf{e}, 2), (\mathbf{f}, 3)\}$
  - ASCII syntax: `ds <<| r`
- ***range subtraction*** of r over set rs: sub-relation of r with range <u>not</u> rs.
  - Definition: $r \mathbin{⩥} rs = \{ \, (d, r') \mid (d, r') \in r \wedge r' \notin rs \, \}$
  - e.g., $r \mathbin{⩥} \{1, 2\} = \{\{(c, \mathbf{3}), (a, \mathbf{4}), (b, \mathbf{5}), (c, \mathbf{6}), (f, \mathbf{3})\}\}$
  - ASCII syntax: `r |>> rs`

Relations (3.5): Overriding

Given a relation

r = {(a, 1), (b, 2), (c, 3), (a, 4), (b, 5), (c, 6), (d, 1), (e, 2), (f, 3)}

overriding of r with relation t: a relation which agrees with t within $\mathrm{dom}(t)$, and agrees with r outside $\mathrm{dom}(t)$

- Definition: $r \mathbin{\lhd\!\!\!+} t = \{\ (d, r') \mid (d, r') \in t \lor ((d, r') \in r \land d \notin \mathrm{dom}(t))\ \}$
- e.g.,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& r \mathbin{\lhd\!\!\!+} \{(a,3),(c,4)\} \\
= \;& \underbrace{\{(a,3),(c,4)\}}_{\{(d,r')\mid(d,r')\in t\}} \cup \underbrace{\{(b,2),(b,5),(d,1),(e,2),(f,3)\}}_{\{(d,r')\mid(d,r')\in r\land d\notin\mathrm{dom}(t)\}} \\
= \;& \{(a,3),(c,4),(b,2),(b,5),(d,1),(e,2),(f,3)\}
\end{aligned}
$$

- ASCII syntax: `r <+ t`

Relations (4): Exercises

1. *Define $r[s]$ in terms of other relational operations.*

   Answer: $r[s] = \mathrm{ran}(s \lhd r)$
   e.g.,

$$
r[\underbrace{\{a,b\}}_{s}] = \mathrm{ran}(\underbrace{\{(\mathbf{a},1),(\mathbf{b},2),(\mathbf{a},4),(\mathbf{b},5)\}}_{\{a,b\}\lhd r}) = \{1,2,4,5\}
$$

2. *Define $r \mathbin{\lhd\!\!\!+} t$ in terms of other relational operators.*

   Answer: $r \mathbin{\lhd\!\!\!+} t = t \cup (\mathrm{dom}(t) \mathbin{⩤} r)$
   e.g.,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& r \mathbin{\lhd\!\!\!+} \underbrace{\{(a,3),(c,4)\}}_{t} \\
= \;& \underbrace{\{(a,3),(c,4)\}}_{t} \cup \underbrace{\{(b,2),(b,5),(d,1),(e,2),(f,3)\}}_{\underbrace{\mathrm{dom}(t)}_{\{a,c\}} \mathbin{⩤} r} \\
= \;& \{(a,3),(c,4),(b,2),(b,5),(d,1),(e,2),(f,3)\}
\end{aligned}
$$

Functions (1): Functional Property

- A ***relation*** r on sets S and T (i.e., $r \in S \leftrightarrow T$) is also a *function* if it satisfies the ***functional property***:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathit{isFunctional}(r) \\
& \iff \\
& \forall s, t_1, t_2 \bullet (s \in S \land t_1 \in T \land t_2 \in T) \Rightarrow ((s, t_1) \in r \land (s, t_2) \in r \Rightarrow t_1 = t_2)
\end{aligned}
$$

  - That is, in a ***function***, it is forbidden for a member of S to map to more than one members of T.
  - Equivalently, in a ***function***, two distinct members of T cannot be mapped by the same member of S.
- e.g., Say $S = \{1, 2, 3\}$ and $T = \{a, b\}$, which of the following ***relations*** satisfy the above ***functional property***?
  - $S \times T$ [No]

    Witness 1: $(1, a), (1, b)$; **Witness 2**: $(2, a), (2, b)$; **Witness 3**: $(3, a), (3, b)$.
  - $(S \times T) \setminus \{(x, y) \mid (x, y) \in S \times T \land x = 1\}$ [No]

    Witness 1: $(2, a), (2, b)$; **Witness 2**: $(3, a), (3, b)$
  - $\{(1, a), (2, b), (3, a)\}$ [Yes]
  - $\{(1, a), (2, b)\}$ [Yes]

Functions (2.1): Total vs. Partial

Given a **relation** $r \in S \leftrightarrow T$

- r is a ***partial function*** if it satisfies the ***functional property***:

$$
\boxed{r \in S \rightarrow\!\!\!\!\!+\, T} \iff (\mathtt{isFunctional(r)} \land \mathrm{dom}(r) \subseteq S)
$$

  Remark. $r \in S \rightarrow\!\!\!\!\!+\, T$ means there **may (or may not) be** $s \in S$ s.t. $r(s)$ is ***undefined***.
  - e.g., $\{\ \{(\mathbf{2}, a), (\mathbf{1}, b)\}, \{(\mathbf{2}, a), (\mathbf{3}, a), (\mathbf{1}, b)\}\ \} \subseteq \{1, 2, 3\} \rightarrow\!\!\!\!\!+\, \{a, b\}$
  - ASCII syntax: `r : +->`
- r is a ***total function*** if there is a mapping for each $s \in S$:

$$
\boxed{r \in S \rightarrow T} \iff (\mathtt{isFunctional(r)} \land \mathrm{dom}(r) = S)
$$

  Remark. $r \in S \rightarrow T$ implies $r \in S \rightarrow\!\!\!\!\!+\, T$, but not vice versa. Why?
  - e.g., $\{(\mathbf{2}, a), (\mathbf{3}, a), (\mathbf{1}, b)\} \in \{1, 2, 3\} \rightarrow \{a, b\}$
  - e.g., $\{(\mathbf{2}, a), (\mathbf{1}, b)\} \notin \{1, 2, 3\} \rightarrow \{a, b\}$
  - ASCII syntax: `r : -->`

Functions (2.2): Relation Image vs. Function Application

- Recall: A ***function*** is a ***relation***, but a ***relation*** is not necessarily a ***function***.
- Say we have a ***partial function*** $f \in \{1,2,3\} ⇸ \{a,b\}$:

$$f = \{(\mathbf{3}, a), (\mathbf{1}, b)\}$$

  - With f wearing the ***relation*** hat, we can invoke *relational images* :

$$\begin{aligned} f[\{3\}] &= \{a\} \\ f[\{1\}] &= \{b\} \\ f[\{2\}] &= \varnothing \end{aligned}$$

    Remark. Given that the inputs are **singleton** sets (e.g., $\{3\}$), so are the output sets (e.g., $\{a\}$). ∵ Each member in the domain is mappe to at most one member in the range.

  - With f wearing the ***function*** hat, we can invoke *functional applications* :

$$\begin{aligned} f(3) &= a \\ f(1) &= b \\ f(2) &\ \mathtt{is}\ \textbf{\textit{undefined}} \end{aligned}$$

Functions (2.3): Modelling Decision

An organization has a system for keeping **track** of its employees as to where they are on the premises (e.g., ``Zone A, Floor 23''). To achieve this, each employee is issued with an active badge which, when scanned, synchronizes their current positions to a central database.

Assume the following two sets:

- *Employee* denotes the **set** of all employees working for the organization.
- *Location* denotes the **set** of all valid locations in the organization.

1. Is it appropriate to *model/formalize* such a **track** functionality as a ***relation*** (i.e., *where_is* ∈ *Employee* ↔ *Location*)?
   Answer. No – an employee cannot be at distinct locations simultaneously.
   e.g., *where_is*[*Alan*] = { ``Zone A, Floor 23'', ``Zone C, Floor 46'' }
2. How about a ***total function*** (i.e., *where_is* ∈ *Employee* → *Location*)?
   Answer. No – in reality, not necessarily all employees show up.
   e.g., *where_is*(*Mark*) should be ***undefined*** if Mark happens to be on vacation.
3. How about a ***partial function*** (i.e., *where_is* ∈ *Employee* ⇸ *Location*)?
   Answer. Yes – this addresses the inflexibility of the total function.

Functions (3.1): Injective Functions

Given a ***function*** f (either partial or total):

- f is ***injective/one-to-one/an injection*** if f does **not** map more than one members of S to a single member of T.

$$\mathtt{isInjective}(f) \iff \forall s_1, s_2, t \bullet (s_1 \in S \land s_2 \in S \land t \in T) \Rightarrow ((s_1, t) \in f \land (s_2, t) \in f \Rightarrow s_1 = s_2)$$

- If f is a ***partial injection***, we write: $\boxed{f \in S ⤔ T}$
  - e.g., $\{\ \varnothing, \{(1,\mathbf{a})\}, \{(2,\mathbf{a}), (3,\mathbf{b})\}\ \} \subseteq \{1,2,3\} ⤔ \{a,b\}$
  - e.g., $\{(1,\mathbf{b}), (2,a), (3,\mathbf{b})\} \notin \{1,2,3\} ⤔ \{a,b\}$ [total, not inj.]
  - e.g., $\{(1,\mathbf{b}), (3,\mathbf{b})\} \notin \{1,2,3\} ⤔ \{a,b\}$ [partial, not inj.]
  - ASCII syntax: `f : >+>`
- If f is a ***total injection***, we write: $\boxed{f \in S \rightarrowtail T}$
  - e.g., $\{1,2,3\} \rightarrowtail \{a,b\} = \varnothing$
  - e.g., $\{(2,d), (1,a), (3,c)\} \in \{1,2,3\} \rightarrowtail \{a,b,c,d\}$
  - e.g., $\{(\mathbf{2},d), (\mathbf{1},c)\} \notin \{1,2,3\} \rightarrowtail \{a,b,c,d\}$ [not total, inj.]
  - e.g., $\{(2,\mathbf{d}), (1,c), (3,\mathbf{d})\} \notin \{1,2,3\} \rightarrowtail \{a,b,c,d\}$ [total, not inj.]
  - ASCII syntax: `f : >->`

Functions (3.2): Surjective Functions

Given a ***function*** f (either partial or total):

- f is ***surjective/onto/a surjection*** if f maps to all members of T.

$$\mathtt{isSurjective}(f) \iff \mathrm{ran}(f) = T$$

- If f is a ***partial surjection***, we write: $\boxed{f \in S ⤀ T}$
  - e.g., $\{\ \{(1,\mathbf{b}), (2,\mathbf{a})\}, \{(1,\mathbf{b}), (2,\mathbf{a}), (3,\mathbf{b})\}\ \} \subseteq \{1,2,3\} ⤀ \{a,b\}$
  - e.g., $\{(2,\mathbf{a}), (1,\mathbf{a}), (3,\mathbf{a})\ \} \notin \{1,2,3\} ⤀ \{a,b\}$ [total, not sur.]
  - e.g., $\{(2,\mathbf{b}), (1,\mathbf{b})\} \notin \{1,2,3\} ⤀ \{a,b\}$ [partial, not sur.]
  - ASCII syntax: `f : +->>`
- If f is a ***total surjection***, we write: $\boxed{f \in S \twoheadrightarrow T}$
  - e.g., $\{\ \{(2,a), (1,b), (3,a)\}, \{(2,b), (1,a), (3,b)\}\ \} \subseteq \{1,2,3\} \twoheadrightarrow \{a,b\}$
  - e.g., $\{(\mathbf{2},a), (\mathbf{3},b)\} \notin \{1,2,3\} \twoheadrightarrow \{a,b\}$ [not total, sur.]
  - e.g., $\{(2,\mathbf{a}), (3,\mathbf{a}), (1,\mathbf{a})\} \notin \{1,2,3\} \twoheadrightarrow \{a,b\}$ [total., not sur]
  - ASCII syntax: `f : -->>`

Functions (3.3): Bijective Functions

Given a function f:

f is ***bijective***/***a bijection***/*one-to-one correspondence* if f is ***total***, ***injective***, and ***surjective***.

- e.g., $\{1,2,3\} ⤖ \{a,b\} = \varnothing$
- e.g., $\{\ \{(1,a),(2,b),(3,c)\},\{(2,a),(3,b),(1,c)\}\ \} \subseteq \{1,2,3\} ⤖ \{a,b,c\}$
- e.g., $\{(\mathbf{2},b),(\mathbf{3},c),(\mathbf{4},a)\} \notin \{1,2,3,4\} ⤖ \{a,b,c\}$
  [not total, inj., sur.]
- e.g., $\{(1,\mathbf{a}),(2,b),(3,c),(4,\mathbf{a})\} \notin \{1,2,3,4\} ⤖ \{a,b,c\}$
  [total, not inj., sur.]
- e.g., $\{(1,\mathbf{a}),(2,\mathbf{c})\} \notin \{1,2\} ⤖ \{a,b,c\}$
  [total, inj., not sur.]
- ASCII syntax: `f : >->>`

Functions (4.1): Exercises



Functions (4.2): Modelling Decisions

1. Should an array `a` declared as "`String[] a`" be *modelled/formalized* as a *partial* function (i.e., $a \in \mathbb{Z} ⇸ String$) or a *total* function (i.e., $a \in \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow String$)?
   Answer. $a \in \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow String$ is not appropriate as:
   - Indices are non-negative (i.e., $a(i)$, where $i < 0$, is ***undefined***).
   - Each array size is finite: not all positive integers are valid indices.
2. What does it mean if an **array** is *modelled/formalized* as a partial ***injection*** (i.e., $a \in \mathbb{Z} ⤔ String$)?
   Answer. It means that the array does **not** contain any duplicates.
3. Can an integer array "`int[] a`" be *modelled/formalized* as a partial ***surjection*** (i.e., $a \in \mathbb{Z} ⤀ \mathbb{Z}$)?
   Answer. Yes, if `a` stores all 2^{32} integers (i.e., $[-2^{31},\ 2^{31}-1]$).
4. Can a string array "`String[] a`" be *modelled/formalized* as a partial ***surjection*** (i.e., $a \in \mathbb{Z} ⤀ String$)?
   Answer. No $\because$ # possible strings is ∞.
5. Can an integer array "`int[]`" storing all 2^{32} values be *modelled/formalized* as a ***bijection*** (i.e., $a \in \mathbb{Z} ⤖ \mathbb{Z}$)?
   Answer. No, because it cannot be ***total*** (as discussed earlier).

Beyond this lecture . . .

- For the $where\_is \in Employee ⇸ Location$ model, what does it mean when it is:
  - ***Injective*** [$where\_is \in Employee ⤔ Location$]
  - ***Surjective*** [$where\_is \in Employee ⤀ Location$]
  - ***Bijective*** [$where\_is \in Employee ⤖ Location$]
- Review examples discussed in your earlier math courses on ***logic*** and ***set theory***.
- Ask questions in the Q&A sessions to clarify the reviewed concepts.

Index (1)

Learning Outcomes of this Lecture

Propositional Logic (1)

Propositional Logic: Implication (1)

Propositional Logic: Implication (2)

Propositional Logic: Implication (3)

Propositional Logic (2)

Predicate Logic (1)

Predicate Logic (2.1): Universal Q. (∀)

Predicate Logic (2.2): Existential Q. (∃)

Predicate Logic (3): Exercises

Predicate Logic (4): Switching Quantifications

Index (2)

Sets: Definitions and Membership

Set Relations

Set Relations: Exercises

Set Operations

Power Sets

Set of Tuples

Relations (1): Constructing a Relation

Relations (2.1): Set of Possible Relations

Relations (2.2): Exercise

Relations (3.1): Domain, Range, Inverse

Relations (3.2): Image

Index (3)

Relations (3.3): Restrictions

Relations (3.4): Subtractions

Relations (3.5): Overriding

Relations (4): Exercises

Functions (1): Functional Property

Functions (2.1): Total vs. Partial

Functions (2.2):
Relation Image vs. Function Application

Functions (2.3): Modelling Decision

Functions (3.1): Injective Functions

Functions (3.2): Surjective Functions

Index (4)

Functions (3.3): Bijective Functions

Functions (4.1): Exercises

Functions (4.2): Modelling Decisions

Beyond this lecture . . .

Specifying & Refining a Bridge Controller

MEB: Chapter 2

EECS3342 Z: System
Specification and Refinement
Winter 2022

CHEN-WEI WANG

Learning Outcomes

This module is designed to help you understand:

- What a ***Requirement Document*** (***RD***) is
- What a ***refinement*** is
- Writing ***formal specifications***
  - (Static) contexts: constants, axioms, theorems
  - (Dynamic) machines: variables, invariants, events, guards, actions
- ***Proof Obligations*** (***POs***) associated with proving:
  - ***refinements***
  - system ***properties***
- Applying ***inference rules*** of the ***sequent calculus***

Recall: Correct by Construction

- Directly reasoning about **source code** (written in a programming language) is too complicated to be feasible.
- Instead, given a ***requirements document***, prior to **implementation**, we develop ***models*** through a series of ***refinement*** steps:
  - Each model formalizes an ***external observer***'s perception of the system.
  - Models are "sorted" with ***increasing levels of accuracy*** w.r.t. the system.
  - The ***first model***, though the most ***abstract***, can already be proved satisfying some ***requirements***.
  - Starting from the ***second model***, each model is analyzed and proved ***correct*** relative to two criteria:
    1. Some ***requirements*** (i.e., R-descriptions)
    2. ***Proof Obligations*** (***POs***) related to the ***preceding model*** being ***refined by*** the ***current model*** (via "extra" ***state*** variables and ***events***).
  - The ***last model*** (which is *correct by construction*) should be **sufficiently close** to be transformed into a **working program** (e.g., in C).

State Space of a Model

- A model's *state space* is the set of **all** configurations:
  - Each ***configuration*** assigns values to **constants** & **variables**, subject to:
    - ***axiom*** (e.g., typing constraints, assumptions)
    - ***invariant*** properties/theorems
  - Say an initial model of a bank system with two constants and a variable:

    $c \in \mathbb{N}1 \wedge L \in \mathbb{N}1 \wedge accounts \in String \nrightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ /* typing constraint */

    $\forall id \bullet id \in \mathrm{dom}(accounts) \Rightarrow -c \leq accounts(id) \leq L$ /* desired property */

    Q. What is the ***state space*** of this initial model?

    A. All valid combinations of *c*, *L*, and *accounts*.
    - Configuration 1: $(c = 1,000, L = 500,000, b = \varnothing)$
    - Configuration 2: $(c = 2,375, L = 700,000, b = \{(''id1'', 500), (''id2'', 1,250)\})$

    $\dots$ [Challenge: ***Combinatorial Explosion***]
  - Model Concreteness ↑ ⇒ (State Space ↑ ∧ Verification Difficulty ↑)
- A model's ***complexity*** should be guided by those properties intended to be verified against that model.

  ⇒ ***Infeasible*** to prove **all** desired properties on a model.

  ⇒ ***Feasible*** to distribute desired properties over a list of ***refinements***.

Roadmap of this Module

- We will walk through the *development process* of constructing ***models*** of a control system regulating cars on a bridge.
  Such controllers exemplify a ***reactive system***.
  (with **sensors** and **actuators**)
- Always stay on top of the following roadmap:
  1. A ***Requirements Document*** (***RD***) of the bridge controller
  2. A brief overview of the ***refinement strategy***
  3. An initial, the most ***abstract*** model
  4. A subsequent ***model*** representing the ***1st refinement***
  5. A subsequent ***model*** representing the ***2nd refinement***
  6. A subsequent ***model*** representing the ***3rd refinement***

Requirements Document: Mainland, Island

Imagine you are asked to build a bridge (as an alternative to ferry) connecting the downtown and Toronto Island.

Page Source: `https://soldbyshane.com/area/toronto-islands/`

Requirements Document: E-Descriptions

Each ***E-Description*** is an **atomic** ***specification*** of a ***constraint*** or an ***assumption*** of the system's working environment.

ENV1	The system is equipped with two traffic lights with two colors: green and red.
ENV2	The traffic lights control the entrance to the bridge at both ends of it.
ENV3	Cars are not supposed to pass on a red traffic light, only on a green one.
ENV4	The system is equipped with four sensors with two states: on or off.
ENV5	The sensors are used to detect the presence of a car entering or leaving the bridge: "on" means that a car is willing to enter the bridge or to leave it.

Requirements Document: R-Descriptions

Each ***R-Description*** is an **atomic** ***specification*** of an intended ***functionality*** or a desired ***property*** of the working system.

REQ1	The system is controlling cars on a bridge connecting the mainland to an island.
REQ2	The number of cars on bridge and island is limited.
REQ3	The bridge is one-way or the other, not both at the same time.

Requirements Document:
Visual Summary of Equipment Pieces



Refinement Strategy

- Before diving into details of the ***models***, we first clarify the adopted ***design strategy of progressive refinements***.
  0. The ***initial model*** (m_0) will address the intended functionality of a limited number of cars on the island and bridge.
     [**REQ2**]
  1. A ***1st refinement*** (m_1 which ***refines*** m_0) will address the intended functionality of the *bridge being one-way*.
     [**REQ1**, **REQ3**]
  2. A ***2nd refinement*** (m_2 which ***refines*** m_1) will address the environment constraints imposed by *traffic lights*.
     [**ENV1, ENV2, ENV3**]
  3. A ***final, 3rd refinement*** (m_3 which ***refines*** m_2) will address the environment constraints imposed by *sensors* and the *architecture*: controller, environment, communication channels.
     [**ENV4, ENV5**]
- Recall *Correct by Construction* :

  From each ***model*** to its ***refinement***, only a manageable amount of details are added, making it ***feasible*** to conduct **analysis** and **proofs**.

Model m_0: Abstraction

- In this most ***abstract*** perception of the bridge controller, we do **not** even consider the bridge, traffic lights, and sensors!
- Instead, we focus on this single ***requirement***:

REQ2	The number of cars on bridge and island is limited.

- **Analogies**:
  - Observe the system from the sky: island and bridge appear only as a compound.



  - "***Zoom in***" on the system as ***refinements*** are introduced.

Model m_0: State Space

1. The ***static*** part is fixed and may be seen/imported.
   A ***constant*** d denotes the maximum number of cars allowed to be on the ***island-bridge compound*** at any time.
   (whereas cars on the mainland is unbounded)

   constants: d

   axioms:
   axm0_1 : $d \in \mathbb{N}$

   Remark. ***Axioms*** are assumed true and may be used to prove theorems.
2. The ***dynamic*** part changes as the system ***evolves***.
   A ***variable*** n denotes the actual number of cars, at a given moment, in the ***island-bridge compound***.

   variables: n

   invariants:
   inv0_1 : $n \in \mathbb{N}$
   inv0_2 : $n \leq d$

   Remark. ***Invariants*** should be (subject to **proofs**):
   - ***Established*** when the system is first initialized
   - ***Preserved***/***Maintained*** after any ***enabled event***'s actions take effect

Model m_0: State Transitions via Events

- The system acts as an **ABSTRACT STATE MACHINE (ASM)**: it *evolves* as *actions of enabled events* change values of variables, subject to *invariants*.
- At any given *state* (a valid *configuration* of constants/variables):
  - An event is said to be *enabled* if its guard evaluates to *true*.
  - An event is said to be *disabled* if its guard evaluates to *false*.
  - An *enabled* event makes a *state transition* if it occurs and its *actions* take effect.
- *1st event*: A car exits mainland (and enters the island-bridge compound).

```
ML_out
  begin
    $n := n + 1$
  end
```

Correct Specification? Say $d = 2$.
Witness: *Event Trace* $\langle init, ML\_in \rangle$

- *2nd event*: A car enters mainland (and exits the island-bridge compound).

```
ML_in
  begin
    $n := n - 1$
  end
```

Correct Specification? Say $d = 2$.
Witness: *Event Trace* $\langle init, ML\_out, ML\_out, ML\_out \rangle$

Model m_0: Actions vs. Before-After Predicates

- When an enabled event e occurs there are two notions of *state*:
  - *Before-/Pre-State*: Configuration just *before* e's actions take effect
  - *After-/Post-State*: Configuration just *after* e's actions take effect

  Remark. When an enabled event occurs, its *action(s)* cause a **transition** from the *pre-state* to the *post-state*.
- As examples, consider *actions* of m_0's two events:

Events	ML_out $n := n + 1$	ML_in $n := n - 1$
before–after predicates	$n' = n + 1$	$n' = n - 1$

  - An event *action* "$n := n + 1$" is not a variable assignment; instead, it is a *specification*: "*n becomes n + 1 (when the state transition completes)*".
  - The *before-after predicate* (*BAP*) "$n' = n + 1$" expresses that n' (the *post-state* value of n) is one more than n (the *pre-state* value of n).
- When we express *proof obligations* (*POs*) associated with *events*, we use *BAP*.

Design of Events: Invariant Preservation

- Our design of the two events

```
ML_out
  begin
    $n := n + 1$
  end
```

```
ML_in
  begin
    $n := n - 1$
  end
```

  only specifies how the *variable* n should be updated.
- Remember, *invariants* are conditions that should never be *violated*!

invariants:
  inv0_1 : $n \in \mathbb{N}$
  inv0_2 : $n \leq d$

- By simulating the system as an *ASM*, we discover *witnesses* (i.e., event traces) of the *invariants* not being preserved all the time.

$$\exists s \bullet s \in \text{STATE SPACE} \Rightarrow \neg invariants(s)$$

- We formulate such a commitment to preserving *invariants* as a *proof obligation (PO)* rule (a.k.a. a *verification condition (VC)* rule).

Sequents: Syntax and Semantics

- We formulate each *PO/VC* rule as a (horizontal or vertical) *sequent*:

$$\boxed{H \vdash G} \qquad \boxed{\begin{array}{c} H \\ \vdash \\ G \end{array}}$$

  - The symbol $\vdash$ is called the *turnstile*.
  - H is a set of predicates forming the *hypotheses/assumptions*.
    [assumed as *true*]
  - G is a set of predicates forming the *goal/conclusion*.
    [claimed to be *provable* from H]
- Informally:
  - $H \vdash G$ is *true* if G can be proved by assuming H.
    [i.e., We say "H *entails* G" or "H *yields* G"]
  - $H \vdash G$ is *false* if G cannot be proved by assuming H.
- Formally: $H \vdash G \iff (H \Rightarrow G)$

  Q. What does it mean when H is empty (i.e., no hypotheses)?

  A. $\boxed{\vdash G} \equiv \boxed{true \vdash G}$ [Why not $\boxed{\vdash G} \equiv \boxed{false \vdash G}$?]

PO of Invariant Preservation: Sketch

- Here is a sketch of the PO/VC rule for *invariant preservation*:

Axioms
Invariants Satisfied at ***Pre-State***
Guards of the Event
$\vdash$
Invariants Satisfied at ***Post-State***
INV

- Informally, this is what the above PO/VC *requires to prove*:

Assuming **all** axioms, invariants, and the event's guards hold at the ***pre-state***,
after the ***state transition*** is made by the event,
all invariants hold at the ***post-state***.

PO of Invariant Preservation: Components

constants: d

variables: n

axioms:
axm0_1 : $d \in \mathbb{N}$

invariants:
inv0_1 : $n \in \mathbb{N}$
inv0_2 : $n \le d$

```
ML_out
  begin
    n := n + 1
  end
```

```
ML_in
  begin
    n := n − 1
  end
```

- c: list of ***constants*** $\langle d \rangle$
- $A(c)$: list of ***axioms*** $\langle \textbf{axm0\_1} \rangle$
- $\boldsymbol{v}$ and $\boldsymbol{v'}$: list of ***variables*** in ***pre***- and ***post***-states $\boldsymbol{v} \mathrel{\hat=} \langle n \rangle$, $\boldsymbol{v'} \mathrel{\hat=} \langle n' \rangle$
- $I(c, v)$: list of ***invariants*** $\langle \textbf{inv0\_1}, \textbf{inv0\_2} \rangle$
- $G(c, v)$: the ***event***'s list of guards

$G(\langle d \rangle, \langle n \rangle)$ of $ML\_out \mathrel{\hat=} \langle \textbf{true} \rangle$, $G(\langle d \rangle, \langle n \rangle)$ of $ML\_in \mathrel{\hat=} \langle \textbf{true} \rangle$

- $E(c, v)$: effect of the ***event***'s actions i.t.o. what variable values ***become***

$E(\langle d \rangle, \langle n \rangle)$ of $ML\_out \mathrel{\hat=} \langle \boldsymbol{n} + 1 \rangle$, $E(\langle d \rangle, \langle n \rangle)$ of $ML\_out \mathrel{\hat=} \langle \boldsymbol{n} - 1 \rangle$

- $v' = E(c, v)$: ***before-after predicate*** formalizing E's actions

BAP of ML_out: $\langle \boldsymbol{n'} \rangle = \langle \boldsymbol{n} + 1 \rangle$, BAP of ML_in: $\langle \boldsymbol{n'} \rangle = \langle \boldsymbol{n} - 1 \rangle$

Rule of Invariant Preservation: Sequents

- Based on the components (c, $A(c)$, v, $I(c, v)$, $E(c, v)$), we are able to formally state the ***PO/VC Rule of Invariant Preservation***:

$A(c)$
$I(c, \boldsymbol{v})$
$G(c, \boldsymbol{v})$
$\vdash$
$I_i(c, \boldsymbol{E(c, v)})$
INV where I_i denotes a single invariant condition

  - Accordingly, how many ***sequents*** to be proved? [# events × # invariants]
  - We have two ***sequents*** generated for ***event*** *ML_out* of model m_0:

$d \in \mathbb{N}$
$n \in \mathbb{N}$
$n \le d$
$\vdash$
$n + 1 \in \mathbb{N}$
ML_out/**inv0_1**/INV

$d \in \mathbb{N}$
$n \in \mathbb{N}$
$n \le d$
$\vdash$
$n + 1 \le d$
ML_out/**inv0_2**/INV

Exercise. Write the ***POs of invariant preservation*** for event *ML_in*.

- Before claiming that a ***model*** is *correct*, outstanding ***sequents*** associated with all ***POs*** must be proved/discharged.

Inference Rules: Syntax and Semantics

- An *inference rule (IR)* has the following form:

$$\frac{\boldsymbol{A}}{\boldsymbol{C}}\ \textbf{L}$$

Formally: $A \Rightarrow C$ is an axiom.

Informally: To prove C, it is sufficient to prove A instead.

Informally: C is the case, assuming that A is the case.

  - L is a name label for referencing the ***inference rule*** in proofs.
  - $\boldsymbol{A}$ is a **set** of sequents known as ***antecedents*** of rule L.
  - $\boldsymbol{C}$ is a **single** sequent known as ***consequent*** of rule L.
- Let's consider ***inference rules (IRs)*** with two different flavours:

$$\frac{H1 \ \vdash\ G}{H1, H2 \ \vdash\ G}\ \textbf{MON} \qquad \frac{}{n \in \mathbb{N} \ \vdash\ n + 1 \in \mathbb{N}}\ \textbf{P2}$$

  - IR **MON**: To prove $H1, H2 \ \vdash\ G$, it suffices to prove $H1 \ \vdash\ G$ instead.
  - IR **P2**: $n \in \mathbb{N} \ \vdash\ n + 1 \in \mathbb{N}$ is an ***axiom***.

[proved automatically without further justifications]

Proof of Sequent: Steps and Structure

- To prove the following sequent (related to ***invariant preservation***):

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \leq d \\ \vdash \\ n + 1 \in \mathbb{N} \end{array}} \quad \underline{\text{ML\_out/}\textbf{inv0\_1}\text{/INV}}$$

1. Apply a ***inference rule***, which ***transforms*** some "outstanding" **sequent** to <u>one</u> or <u>more</u> other **sequents** to be proved instead.
2. Keep applying ***inference rules*** until <u>**all**</u> ***transformed*** **sequents** are ***axioms*** that do <u>**not**</u> require any further justifications.

- Here is a *formal proof* of ML_out/**inv0_1**/INV, by applying IRs **MON** and **P2**:

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \leq d \\ \vdash \\ n + 1 \in \mathbb{N} \end{array}} \quad \textbf{MON} \quad \boxed{\begin{array}{l} n \in \mathbb{N} \\ \vdash \\ n + 1 \in \mathbb{N} \end{array}} \quad \textbf{P2}$$

Example Inference Rules (1)

$\dfrac{}{\vdash \; 0 \in \mathbb{N}}$ **P1**	1st Peano axiom: 0 is a natural number.
$\dfrac{}{n \in \mathbb{N} \; \vdash \; n + 1 \in \mathbb{N}}$ **P2**	2nd Peano axiom: $n + 1$ is a natural number, assuming that n is a natural number.
$\dfrac{}{0 < n \; \vdash \; n - 1 \in \mathbb{N}}$ **P2'**	$n - 1$ is a natural number, assuming that n is positive.
$\dfrac{}{n \in \mathbb{N} \; \vdash \; 0 \leq n}$ **P3**	3rd Peano axiom: n is non-negative, assuming that n is a natural number.

Example Inference Rules (2)

$\dfrac{}{n < m \; \vdash \; n + 1 \leq m}$ **INC**	$n + 1$ is less than or equal to m, assuming that n is strictly less than m.
$\dfrac{}{n \leq m \; \vdash \; n - 1 < m}$ **DEC**	$n - 1$ is strictly less than m, assuming that n is less than or equal to m.

Example Inference Rules (3)

$\dfrac{H1 \; \vdash \; G}{H1, H2 \; \vdash \; G}$ **MON**	To prove a goal under certain hypotheses, it suffices to prove it under less hypotheses.
$\dfrac{H, P \; \vdash \; R \qquad H, Q \; \vdash \; R}{H, P \lor Q \; \vdash \; R}$ **OR_L**	*<u>Proof by Cases</u>*: To prove a goal under a disjunctive assumption, it suffices to prove <u>**independently**</u> the same goal, <u>twice</u>, under each disjunct.
$\dfrac{H \; \vdash \; P}{H \; \vdash \; P \lor Q}$ **OR_R1**	To prove a disjunction, it suffices to prove the left disjunct.
$\dfrac{H \; \vdash \; Q}{H \; \vdash \; P \lor Q}$ **OR_R2**	To prove a disjunction, it suffices to prove the right disjunct.

Revisiting Design of Events: *ML_out*

- Recall that we already proved ***PO*** $\boxed{\text{ML\_out/}\textbf{inv0\_1}\text{/INV}}$:

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \le d \\ \vdash \\ n+1 \in \mathbb{N} \end{array}} \quad \textbf{MON} \quad \boxed{\begin{array}{l} n \in \mathbb{N} \\ \vdash \\ n+1 \in \mathbb{N} \end{array}} \quad \textbf{P2}$$

∴ ***ML_out/inv0_1/INV*** succeeds in being discharged.

- How about the other ***PO*** $\boxed{\text{ML\_out/}\textbf{inv0\_2}\text{/INV}}$ for the same event?

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \le d \\ \vdash \\ n+1 \le d \end{array}} \quad \textbf{MON} \quad \boxed{\begin{array}{l} n \le d \\ \vdash \\ n+1 \le d \end{array}} \quad \textbf{?}$$

∴ ***ML_out/inv0_2/INV*** fails to be discharged.

Revisiting Design of Events: *ML_in*

- How about the ***PO*** $\boxed{\text{ML\_in/}\textbf{inv0\_1}\text{/INV}}$ for *ML_in*:

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \le d \\ \vdash \\ n-1 \in \mathbb{N} \end{array}} \quad \textbf{MON} \quad \boxed{\begin{array}{l} n \in \mathbb{N} \\ \vdash \\ n-1 \in \mathbb{N} \end{array}} \quad \textbf{?}$$

∴ ***ML_in/inv0_1/INV*** fails to be discharged.

- How about the other ***PO*** $\boxed{\text{ML\_in/}\textbf{inv0\_2}\text{/INV}}$ for the same event?

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \le d \\ \vdash \\ n-1 \le d \end{array}} \quad \textbf{MON} \quad \boxed{\begin{array}{l} n \le d \\ \vdash \\ n-1 < d \lor n-1 = d \end{array}} \quad \textbf{OR\_1} \quad \boxed{\begin{array}{l} n \le d \\ \vdash \\ n-1 < d \end{array}} \quad \textbf{DEC}$$

∴ ***ML_in/inv0_2/INV*** succeeds in being discharged.

Fixing the Design of Events

- Proofs of ***ML_out/inv0_2/INV*** and ***ML_in/inv0_1/INV*** fail due to the two events being *enabled when they should not*.
- Having this feedback, we add proper ***guards*** to *ML_out* and *ML_in*:

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} \text{ML\_out} \\ \quad \textbf{when} \\ \qquad n < d \\ \quad \textbf{then} \\ \qquad n := n + 1 \\ \quad \textbf{end} \end{array}} \qquad \boxed{\begin{array}{l} \text{ML\_in} \\ \quad \textbf{when} \\ \qquad n > 0 \\ \quad \textbf{then} \\ \qquad n := n - 1 \\ \quad \textbf{end} \end{array}}$$

- Having changed both events, updated ***sequents*** will be generated for the PO/VC rule of ***invariant preservation***.
- All ***sequents*** $(\{ML\_out,\ ML\_in\} \times \{\textbf{inv0\_1},\ \textbf{inv0\_2}\})$ now ***provable***?

Revisiting Fixed Design of Events: *ML_out*

- How about the ***PO*** $\boxed{\text{ML\_out/}\textbf{inv0\_1}\text{/INV}}$ for *ML_out*:

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \le d \\ n < d \\ \vdash \\ n+1 \in \mathbb{N} \end{array}} \quad \textbf{MON} \quad \boxed{\begin{array}{l} n \in \mathbb{N} \\ \vdash \\ n+1 \in \mathbb{N} \end{array}} \quad \textbf{P2}$$

∴ ***ML_out/inv0_1/INV*** still succeeds in being discharged!

- How about the other ***PO*** $\boxed{\text{ML\_out/}\textbf{inv0\_2}\text{/INV}}$ for the same event?

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \le d \\ n < d \\ \vdash \\ n+1 \le d \end{array}} \quad \textbf{MON} \quad \boxed{\begin{array}{l} n < d \\ \vdash \\ n+1 \le d \end{array}} \quad \textbf{INC}$$

∴ ***ML_out/inv0_2/INV*** now succeeds in being discharged!

Revisiting Fixed Design of Events: *ML_in*

- How about the ***PO*** $\boxed{\text{ML\_in/}\textbf{inv0\_1}\text{/INV}}$ for *ML_in*:

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \le d \\ n > 0 \\ \vdash \\ n-1 \in \mathbb{N} \end{array}} \quad \textbf{MON} \quad \boxed{\begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ \vdash \\ n-1 \in \mathbb{N} \end{array}} \quad \textbf{P2'}$$

∴ ***ML_in/inv0_1/INV*** now <u>succeeds</u> in being discharged!

- How about the other ***PO*** $\boxed{\text{ML\_in/}\textbf{inv0\_2}\text{/INV}}$ for the same event?

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \le d \\ n > 0 \\ \vdash \\ n-1 \le d \end{array}} \quad \textbf{MON} \quad \boxed{\begin{array}{l} n \le d \\ \vdash \\ n-1 < d \lor n-1 = d \end{array}} \quad \textbf{OR\_1} \quad \boxed{\begin{array}{l} n \le d \\ \vdash \\ n-1 < d \end{array}} \quad \textbf{DEC}$$

∴ ***ML_in/inv0_2/INV*** still <u>succeeds</u> in being discharged!

Initializing the Abstract System m_0

- Discharging the <u>four</u> ***sequents*** proved that <u>both</u> ***invariant*** conditions are ***preserved*** between occurrences/interleavings of ***events*** `ML_out` and `ML_in`.
- But how are the ***invariants established*** in the first place?

<u>Analogy</u>. Proving P via ***mathematical induction***, two cases to prove:

- $P(1), P(2), \ldots$ [***base*** cases ≈ ***establishing*** inv.]
- $P(n) \Rightarrow P(n+1)$ [***inductive*** cases ≈ ***preserving*** inv.]

- Therefore, we specify how the ***ASM*** 's ***initial state*** looks like:

```
init
  begin
    n := 0
  end
```

✓ The IB compound, once ***initialized***, has <u>no</u> cars.

✓ Initialization always possible: guard is ***true***.

✓ There is no ***pre-state*** for *init*.

∴ The <u>RHS</u> of := must <u>not</u> involve variables.

∴ The <u>RHS</u> of := may <u>only</u> involve constants.

✓ There is only the ***post-state*** for *init*.

∴ Before-***After Predicate***: $n' = 0$

PO of Invariant Establishment

```
init
  begin
    n := 0
  end
```

✓ An ***reactive system***, once ***initialized***, should <u>never</u> terminate.

✓ Event *init* can<u>not</u> “preserve” the ***invariants***.

∵ State before its occurrence (***pre-state***) does <u>not</u> exist.

✓ Event *init* only required to ***establish*** invariants for the first time

- A new formal component is needed:
  - $K(c)$: effect of ***init***'s actions i.t.o. what variable values ***<u>become</u>***
    e.g., $K(\langle d \rangle)$ of *init* $\widehat{=}$ $\langle 0 \rangle$
  - $v' = K(c)$: ***before-after predicate*** formalizing *init*'s actions
    e.g., BAP of *init*: $\langle n' \rangle = \langle 0 \rangle$
- Accordingly, PO of ***invariant establisment*** is formulated as a ***sequent***:

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} \text{Axioms} \\ \vdash \\ \textit{Invariants}\ \text{Satisfied at}\ \textit{Post-State} \end{array}} \quad \underline{\text{INV}} \qquad \boxed{\begin{array}{l} A(c) \\ \vdash \\ I_i(c, \mathbf{K(c)}) \end{array}} \quad \underline{\text{INV}}$$

Discharging PO of Invariant Establishment

- How many ***sequents*** to be proved? [# invariants]
- We have <u>two</u> ***sequents*** generated for ***event*** *init* of model m_0:

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ \vdash \\ 0 \in \mathbb{N} \end{array}} \quad \underline{\textbf{init/inv0\_1/INV}} \qquad \boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ \vdash \\ 0 \le d \end{array}} \quad \underline{\textbf{init/inv0\_2/INV}}$$

- Can we discharge the ***PO*** $\boxed{\text{init/}\textbf{inv0\_1}\text{/INV}}$?

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ \vdash \\ 0 \in \mathbb{N} \end{array}} \quad \textbf{MON} \quad \boxed{\begin{array}{l} \vdash \\ 0 \in \mathbb{N} \end{array}} \quad \textbf{P1}$$

∴ ***init/inv0_1/INV*** <u>succeeds</u> in being discharged.

- Can we discharge the ***PO*** $\boxed{\text{init/}\textbf{inv0\_2}\text{/INV}}$?

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ \vdash \\ 0 \le d \end{array}} \quad \textbf{P3}$$

∴ ***init/inv0_2/INV*** <u>succeeds</u> in being discharged.

System Property: Deadlock Freedom

- So far we have proved that our initial model m_0 is s.t. all ***invariant conditions*** are:
  - Established when system is first initialized via *init*
  - Preserved whenevner there is a ***state transition***

    (via an enabled event: *ML_out* or *ML_in*)
- However, whenever ***event occurrences*** are conditional (i.e., ***guards*** stronger than ***true***), there is a possibility of ***deadlock*** :
  - A state where ***guards*** of all events evaluate to ***false***
  - When a ***deadlock*** happens, none of the ***events*** is ***enabled***.

    ⇒ The system is blocked and not reactive anymore!
- We express this ***non-blocking*** property as a new requirement:

REQ4	Once started, the system should work for ever.

PO of Deadlock Freedom (1)

- Recall some of the formal components we discussed:
  - c: list of ***constants*** $\langle d \rangle$
  - $A(c)$: list of ***axioms*** $\langle \mathbf{axm0\_1} \rangle$
  - $\mathbf{v}$ and $\mathbf{v'}$: list of ***variables*** in ***pre***- and ***post***-states $\mathbf{v} \mathrel{\widehat{=}} \langle n \rangle$, $\mathbf{v'} \mathrel{\widehat{=}} \langle n' \rangle$
  - $I(c, v)$: list of ***invariants*** $\langle \mathbf{inv0\_1}, \mathbf{inv0\_2} \rangle$
  - $G(c, v)$: the event's list of ***guards***

    $G(\langle d \rangle, \langle n \rangle)$ of $ML\_out \mathrel{\widehat{=}} \langle n < d \rangle$, $G(\langle d \rangle, \langle n \rangle)$ of $ML\_in \mathrel{\widehat{=}} \langle n > 0 \rangle$
- A system is ***deadlock-free*** if at least one of its ***events*** is ***enabled***:

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} \text{Axioms} \\ \textit{Invariants} \text{ Satisfied at } \textit{Pre-State} \\ \vdash \\ \text{Disjunction of the guards satisfied at } \textit{Pre-State} \end{array}} \ \underline{\text{DLF}} \qquad \boxed{\begin{array}{l} A(c) \\ I(c, \mathbf{v}) \\ \vdash \\ G_1(c, \mathbf{v}) \vee \cdots \vee G_m(c, \mathbf{v}) \end{array}} \ \underline{\text{DLF}}$$

To prove about deadlock freedom

- An event's effect of state transition is **not** relevant.
- Instead, the evaluation of all events' ***guards*** at the ***pre-state*** is relevant.

PO of Deadlock Freedom (2)

- ***Deadlock freedom*** is not necessarily a desired property.

  ⇒ When it is (like m_0), then the generated ***sequents*** must be discharged.
- Applying the PO of ***deadlock freedom*** to the initial model m_0:

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} A(c) \\ I(c, \mathbf{v}) \\ \vdash \\ G_1(c, \mathbf{v}) \vee \cdots \vee G_m(c, \mathbf{v}) \end{array}} \ \underline{\text{DLF}} \qquad \boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \leq d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \vee n > 0 \end{array}} \ \underline{\text{DLF}}$$

  Our bridge controller being ***deadlock-free*** means that cars can ***always*** enter (via *ML_out*) or leave (via *ML_in*) the island-bridge compound.
- Can we formally discharge this ***PO*** for our ***initial model*** m_0?

Example Inference Rules (4)

$\dfrac{}{H, P \vdash P}$ **HYP**	A goal is proved if it can be assumed.
$\dfrac{}{\bot \vdash P}$ **FALSE_L**	Assuming ***false*** ($\bot$), anything can be proved.
$\dfrac{}{P \vdash \top}$ **TRUE_R**	***true*** ($\top$) is proved, regardless of the assumption.
$\dfrac{}{P \vdash E = E}$ **EQ**	An expression being equal to itself is proved, regardless of the assumption.

Example Inference Rules (5)

$$\frac{H(F),\ E = F\ \vdash\ P(F)}{H(E),\ E = F\ \vdash\ P(E)}\quad \textbf{EQ\_LR}$$

To prove a goal $P(E)$ assuming $H(E)$, where both P and H depend on expression E, it suffices to prove $P(F)$ assuming $H(F)$, where both P and H depend on expresion F, given that E is equal to F.

$$\frac{H(E),\ E = F\ \vdash\ P(E)}{H(F),\ E = F\ \vdash\ P(F)}\quad \textbf{EQ\_RL}$$

To prove a goal $P(F)$ assuming $H(F)$, where both P and H depend on expression F, it suffices to prove $P(E)$ assuming $H(E)$, where both P and H depend on expresion E, given that E is equal to F.

Discharging PO of DLF: Exercise

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} A(c) \\ I(c, v) \\ \vdash \\ G_1(c, v) \lor \cdots \lor G_m(c, v) \end{array}}\ \ \underline{\text{DLF}}\ \ \boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \le d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \lor n > 0 \end{array}}\ \ ??$$

Discharging PO of DLF: First Attempt

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \le d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \lor n > 0 \end{array}}$$

$$\equiv$$

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n < d \lor n = d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \lor n > 0 \end{array}}\ \textbf{MON}\ \boxed{\begin{array}{l} n < d \lor n = d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \lor n > 0 \end{array}}\ \textbf{OR\_L} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \boxed{\begin{array}{l} n < d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \lor n > 0 \end{array}}\ \textbf{OR\_R1}\ \boxed{\begin{array}{l} n < d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \end{array}}\ \textbf{HYP} \\ \boxed{\begin{array}{l} n = d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \lor n > 0 \end{array}}\ \textbf{EQ\_LR, MON}\ \boxed{\begin{array}{l} \vdash \\ d < d \lor d > 0 \end{array}}\ \textbf{OR\_R2}\ \boxed{\begin{array}{l} \vdash \\ d > 0 \end{array}}\ \textbf{?} \end{array} \right.$$

Why Did the DLF PO Fail to Discharge?

- In our first attempt, proof of the 2nd case failed: $\vdash\ d > 0$
- This ***unprovable*** sequent gave us a good hint:
  - For the model under consideration (m_0) to be ***deadlock-free***, it is required that $d > 0$. [$\geq$ 1 car allowed in the IB compound]
  - But current ***specification*** of m_0 ***not*** strong enough to entail this:
    - $\neg(d > 0) \equiv d \le 0$ is possible for the current model
    - Given **axm0_1** : $d \in \mathbb{N}$

    $\Rightarrow d = 0$ is allowed by m_0 which causes a ***deadlock***.
- Recall the *init* event and the two ***guarded*** events:

```
init
  begin
    n := 0
  end
```

```
ML_out
  when
    n < d
  then
    n := n + 1
  end
```

```
ML_in
  when
    n > 0
  then
    n := n − 1
  end
```

When $d = 0$, the disjunction of guards evaluates to ***false***: $0 < 0 \lor 0 > 0$

$\Rightarrow$ As soon as the system is initialized, it ***deadlocks immediately*** as no car can either enter or leave the IR compound!!

Fixing the Context of Initial Model

- Having understood the failed proof, we add a proper ***axiom*** to m_0:

axioms:
  axm0_2 : $d > 0$

- We have effectively elaborated on **REQ2**:

REQ2	The number of cars on bridge and island is limited but positive.

- Having changed the context, an updated ***sequent*** will be generated for the PO/VC rule of ***deadlock freedom***.
- Is this new sequent now ***provable***?

Discharging PO of DLF: Second Attempt



$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ d > 0 \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \leq d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \lor n > 0 \end{array}}$$

$$\equiv$$

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ d > 0 \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n < d \lor n = d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \lor n > 0 \end{array}} \; \textbf{MON} \; \boxed{\begin{array}{l} d > 0 \\ n < d \lor n = d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \lor n > 0 \end{array}} \; \textbf{OR\_L} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \boxed{\begin{array}{l} d > 0 \\ n < d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \lor n > 0 \end{array}} \; \textbf{OR\_R1} \; \boxed{\begin{array}{l} d > 0 \\ n < d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \end{array}} \; \textbf{HYP} \\ \boxed{\begin{array}{l} d > 0 \\ n = d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \lor n > 0 \end{array}} \; \textbf{EQ\_LR, MON} \; \boxed{\begin{array}{l} d > 0 \\ \vdash \\ d < d \lor d > 0 \end{array}} \; \textbf{OR\_R2} \; \boxed{\begin{array}{l} d > 0 \\ \vdash \\ d > 0 \end{array}} \; \textbf{HYP} \end{array} \right.$$

Initial Model: Summary

- The final version of our ***initial model*** m_0 is ***provably correct*** w.r.t.:
  - Establishment of ***Invariants***
  - Preservation of ***Invariants***
  - ***Deadlock*** Freedom
- Here is the final ***specification*** of m_0:

constants: d

axioms:
  axm0_1 : $d \in \mathbb{N}$
  axm0_2 : $d > 0$

variables: n

invariants:
  inv0_1 : $n \in \mathbb{N}$
  inv0_2 : $n \leq d$

init
  begin
    $n := 0$
  end

ML_out
  when
    $n < d$
  then
    $n := n + 1$
  end

ML_in
  when
    $n > 0$
  then
    $n := n - 1$
  end

Model m_1: "More Concrete" Abstraction

- First ***refinement*** has a more ***concrete*** perception of the bridge controller:
  - We "**zoom in**" by observing the system from **closer to the ground**, so that the island-bridge compound is split into:
    - the island
    - the (one-way) bridge



  - Nonetheless, traffic lights and sensors remain ***abstracted*** away!
- That is, we focus on these two ***requirement***:

REQ1	The system is controlling cars on a bridge connecting the mainland to an island.
REQ3	The bridge is one-way or the other, not both at the same time.

- We are ***obliged to prove*** this ***added concreteness*** is ***consistent*** with m_0.

Model m_1: Refined State Space

1. The **static** part is the same as m_0's:

constants: d

axioms:
axm0_1 : $d \in \mathbb{N}$
axm0_2 : $d > 0$

2. The **dynamic** part of the ***concrete state*** consists of three ***variables***:



- *a*: number of cars on the bridge, heading to the island
- *b*: number of cars on the island
- *c*: number of cars on the bridge, heading to the mainland

variables: a, b, c

invariants:
inv1_1 : $a \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_2 : $b \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_3 : $c \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_4 : ??
inv1_5 : ??

✓ **inv1_1**, **inv1_2**, **inv1_3** are ***typing*** constraints.

✓ **inv1_4** ***links***/***glues*** the ***abstract*** and ***concrete*** states.

✓ **inv1_5** specifies that the bridge is one-way.

Model m_1: State Transitions via Events

- The system acts as an **ABSTRACT STATE MACHINE (ASM)**: it ***evolves*** as ***actions of enabled events*** change values of variables, subject to ***invariants***.
- We first consider the "old" ***events*** already existing in m_0.
- ***Concrete***/***Refined*** version of ***event*** *ML_out*:

```
ML_out
  when
    ??
  then
    a := a + 1
  end
```

- Meaning of *ML_out* is ***refined***: a car exits mainland (getting on the bridge).
- *ML_out* ***enabled*** only when:
  - the bridge's current traffic flows to the island
  - number of cars on both the bridge and the island is limited

- ***Concrete***/***Refined*** version of ***event*** *ML_in*:

```
ML_in
  when
    ??
  then
    c := c - 1
  end
```

- Meaning of *ML_in* is ***refined***: a car enters mainland (getting off the bridge).
- *ML_in* ***enabled*** only when: there is some car on the bridge heading to the mainland.

Model m_1: Actions vs. Before-After Predicates

- Consider the ***concrete***/***refined*** version of ***actions*** of m_0's two events:

Events	ML_in **when** $0 < c$ **then** $c := c - 1$ **end**	ML_out **when** $a + b < d$ $c = 0$ **then** $a := a + 1$ **end**
Before–after predicates	$a' = a \;\wedge\; b' = b \;\wedge$ $c' = c - 1$	$a' = a + 1 \;\wedge\; b' = b \;\wedge$ $c' = c$

  - An event's ***actions*** are a **specification**: "c becomes c - 1 after the transition".
  - The ***before-after predicate*** (***BAP***) "$c' = c - 1$" expresses that c' (the ***post-state*** value of c) is one less than c (the ***pre-state*** value of c).
  - Given that the ***concrete state*** consists of three variables:
    - An event's ***actions*** only specify those changing from ***pre***-state to ***post***-state. [e.g., $c' = c - 1$]
    - Other unmentioned variables have their ***post***-state values remain unchanged. [e.g., $a' = a \wedge b' = b$]
- When we express ***proof obligations*** (***POs***) associated with ***events***, we use ***BAP***.

States & Invariants: Abstract vs. Concrete

- m_0 refines m_1 by introducing more ***variables***:
  - ***Abstract*** State (of m_0 being refined):

variables: n

  - ***Concrete*** State (of the refinement model m_1):

variables: a, b, c

- Accordingly, ***invariants*** may involve different ***states***:
  - ***Abstract*** Invariants (involving the ***abstract*** state only):

invariants:
inv0_1 : $n \in \mathbb{N}$
inv0_2 : $n \leq d$

  - ***Concrete*** Invariants (involving at least the ***concrete*** state):

invariants:
inv1_1 : $a \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_2 : $b \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_3 : $c \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_4 : $a + b + c = n$
inv1_5 : $a = 0 \vee c = 0$

Events: Abstract vs. Concrete

- When an ***event*** exists in both models m_0 and m_1, there are two versions of it:
  - The ***abstract*** version modifies the ***abstract*** state.

(abstract_)ML_out
when
$n < d$
then
$a := n := n + 1$
end

(abstract_)ML_in
when
$n > 0$
then
$n := n - 1$
end

  - The ***concrete*** version modifies the ***concrete*** state.

(concrete_)ML_out
when
$a + b < d$
$c = 0$
then
$a := a + 1$
end

(concrete_)ML_in
when
$c > 0$
then
$c := c - 1$
end

- A ***new event*** may **only** exist in m_1 (the ***concrete*** model): we will deal with this kind of events later, separately from "redefined/overridden" events.

PO of Refinement: Components (1)

constants: d

axioms:
axm0_1 : $d \in \mathbb{N}$
axm0_2 : $d > 0$

variables: a, b, c

invariants:
inv1_1 : $a \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_2 : $b \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_3 : $c \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_4 : $a + b + c = n$
inv1_5 : $a = 0 \lor c = 0$

ML_out
when
$a + b < d$
$c = 0$
then
$a := a + 1$
end

ML_in
when
$c > 0$
then
$c := c - 1$
end

- c: list of ***constants*** $\langle d \rangle$
- $A(c)$: list of ***axioms*** $\langle$**axm0_1**$\rangle$
- v and v': ***abstract variables*** in pre- & post-states $v \mathrel{\widehat{=}} \langle n \rangle,\ v' \mathrel{\widehat{=}} \langle n \rangle$
- w and w': ***concrete variables*** in pre- & post-states $w \mathrel{\widehat{=}} \langle a, b, c \rangle,\ w' \mathrel{\widehat{=}} \langle a', b', c' \rangle$
- $I(c, v)$: list of ***abstract invariants*** $\langle$**inv0_1**, **inv0_2**$\rangle$
- $J(c, v, w)$: list of ***concrete invariants*** $\langle$**inv1_1**, **inv1_2**, **inv1_3**, **inv1_4**, **inv1_5**$\rangle$

PO of Refinement: Components (2)

constants: d

axioms:
axm0_1 : $d \in \mathbb{N}$
axm0_2 : $d > 0$

variables: a, b, c

invariants:
inv1_1 : $a \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_2 : $b \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_3 : $c \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_4 : $a + b + c = n$
inv1_5 : $a = 0 \lor c = 0$

ML_out
when
$a + b < d$
$c = 0$
then
$a := a + 1$
end

ML_in
when
$c > 0$
then
$c := c - 1$
end

- $G(c, v)$: list of guards of the ***abstract event***

$$G(\langle d \rangle, \langle n \rangle) \text{ of } ML\_out \mathrel{\widehat{=}} \langle n < d \rangle,\ G(c, v) \text{ of } ML\_in \mathrel{\widehat{=}} \langle n > 0 \rangle$$

- $H(c, w)$: list of guards of the ***concrete event***

$$H(\langle d \rangle, \langle a, b, c \rangle) \text{ of } ML\_out \mathrel{\widehat{=}} \langle a + b < d, c = 0 \rangle,\ H(c, w) \text{ of } ML\_in \mathrel{\widehat{=}} \langle c > 0 \rangle$$

PO of Refinement: Components (3)

constants: d

axioms:
axm0_1 : $d \in \mathbb{N}$
axm0_2 : $d > 0$

variables: a, b, c

invariants:
inv1_1 : $a \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_2 : $b \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_3 : $c \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_4 : $a + b + c = n$
inv1_5 : $a = 0 \lor c = 0$

ML_out
when
$a + b < d$
$c = 0$
then
$a := a + 1$
end

ML_in
when
$c > 0$
then
$c := c - 1$
end

- $E(c, v)$: effect of the ***abstract event***'s actions i.t.o. what variable values **become**

$$E(\langle d \rangle, \langle n \rangle) \text{ of } ML\_out \mathrel{\widehat{=}} \langle \mathbf{n} + 1 \rangle,\ E(\langle d \rangle, \langle n \rangle) \text{ of } ML\_out \mathrel{\widehat{=}} \langle \mathbf{n} - 1 \rangle$$

- $F(c, w)$: effect of the ***concrete event***'s actions i.t.o. what variable values **become**

$$F(c, v) \text{ of } ML\_out \mathrel{\widehat{=}} \langle \mathbf{a} + 1, b, c \rangle,\ F(c, w) \text{ of } ML\_out \mathrel{\widehat{=}} \langle a, b, \mathbf{c} - 1 \rangle$$

Sketching PO of Refinement

The PO/VC rule for a *proper refinement* consists of two parts:

1. ***Guard Strengthening***

Axioms
Abstract Invariants Satisfied at Pre-State
Concrete Invariants Satisfied at Pre-State
Guards of the ***Concrete Event***
⊢
Guards of the ***Abstract Event***

GRD

- A ***concrete*** event is enabled if its ***abstract*** counterpart is enabled.
- A ***concrete*** transition always has an ***abstract*** counterpart.

2. ***Invariant Preservation***

Axioms
Abstract Invariants Satisfied at Pre-State
Concrete Invariants Satisfied at Pre-State
Guards of the ***Concrete Event***
⊢
Concrete Invariants Satisfied at **Post**-State

INV

- A ***concrete*** event performs a ***transition*** on ***concrete*** states.
- This ***concrete*** state ***transition*** must be consistent with how its ***abstract*** counterpart performs a corresponding ***abstract transition***.

Note. ***Guard strengthening*** and ***invariant preservation*** are only applicable to events that might be ***enabled*** after the system is launched. The special, non-guarded `init` event will be discussed separately later.

Refinement Rule: Guard Strengthening

- Based on the components, we are able to formally state the ***PO/VC Rule of Guard Strengthening for Refinement***:

$A(c)$
$I(c, v)$
$J(c, v, w)$
$H(c, w)$
$\vdash$
$G_i(c, v)$

GRD

where G_i denotes a single ***guard*** condition of the ***abstract*** event

  - How many ***sequents*** to be proved? [# ***abstract*** guards]
  - For *ML_out*, only one ***abstract*** guard, so one ***sequent*** is generated :

$d \in \mathbb{N}$ $\quad d > 0$
$n \in \mathbb{N}$ $\quad n \leq d$
$a \in \mathbb{N}$ $\quad b \in \mathbb{N}$ $\quad c \in \mathbb{N}$ $\quad a + b + c = n$ $\quad a = 0 \lor c = 0$
$a + b < d$ $\quad c = 0$
$\vdash$
$n < d$

ML_out/GRD

- **Exercise**. Write *ML_in*'s ***PO of Guard Strengthening for Refinement***.

PO Rule: Guard Strengthening of *ML_out*

axm0_1	$\{\ d \in \mathbb{N}$
axm0_2	$\{\ d > 0$
inv0_1	$\{\ n \in \mathbb{N}$
inv0_2	$\{\ n \leq d$
inv1_1	$\{\ a \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_2	$\{\ b \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_3	$\{\ c \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_4	$\{\ a + b + c = n$
inv1_5	$\{\ a = 0 \lor c = 0$
Concrete guards of *ML_out*	$a + b < d$ $c = 0$
	$\vdash$
Abstract guards of *ML_out*	$\{\ n < d$

ML_out/GRD

PO Rule: Guard Strengthening of *ML_in*

axm0_1	$\{\ d \in \mathbb{N}$
axm0_2	$\{\ d > 0$
inv0_1	$\{\ n \in \mathbb{N}$
inv0_2	$\{\ n \leq d$
inv1_1	$\{\ a \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_2	$\{\ b \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_3	$\{\ c \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_4	$\{\ a + b + c = n$
inv1_5	$\{\ a = 0 \lor c = 0$
Concrete guards of *ML_in*	$\{\ c > 0$
	$\vdash$
Abstract guards of *ML_in*	$\{\ n > 0$

ML_in/GRD

Proving Refinement: ML_out/GRD

$$\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ d > 0 \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \leq d \\ a \in \mathbb{N} \\ b \in \mathbb{N} \\ c \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + c = n \\ a = 0 \lor c = 0 \\ a + b < d \\ c = 0 \\ \vdash \\ n < d \end{array} \quad \textbf{MON} \quad \begin{array}{l} a + b + c = n \\ a + b < d \\ c = 0 \\ \vdash \\ n < d \end{array} \quad \textbf{EQ\_LR, MON} \quad \begin{array}{l} a + b + 0 = n \\ a + b < d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \end{array} \quad \textbf{ARI} \quad \begin{array}{l} a + b = n \\ a + b < d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \end{array} \quad \textbf{EQ\_LR, MON} \quad \begin{array}{l} n < d \\ \vdash \\ n < d \end{array} \quad \textbf{HYP}$$

Proving Refinement: ML_in/GRD

$$\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ d > 0 \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \leq d \\ a \in \mathbb{N} \\ b \in \mathbb{N} \\ c \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + c = n \\ a = 0 \lor c = 0 \\ c > 0 \\ \vdash \\ n > 0 \end{array} \quad \textbf{MON} \quad \begin{array}{l} b \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + c = n \\ a = 0 \lor c = 0 \\ c > 0 \\ \vdash \\ n > 0 \end{array} \quad \textbf{OR\_L} \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \begin{array}{l} b \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + c = n \\ a = 0 \\ c > 0 \\ \vdash \\ n > 0 \end{array} \; \textbf{EQ\_LR, MON} \; \begin{array}{l} b \in \mathbb{N} \\ 0 + b + c = n \\ c > 0 \\ \vdash \\ n > 0 \end{array} \; \textbf{ARI} \; \begin{array}{l} b \in \mathbb{N} \\ b + c = n \\ c > 0 \\ \vdash \\ n > 0 \end{array} \; \textbf{ARI} \; \begin{array}{l} c \leq n \\ c > 0 \\ \vdash \\ n > 0 \end{array} \; \textbf{ARI} \; \begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ \vdash \\ n > 0 \end{array} \; \textbf{HYP} \\ \\ \begin{array}{l} b \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + c = n \\ c = 0 \\ c > 0 \\ \vdash \\ n > 0 \end{array} \; \textbf{EQ\_LR} \; \begin{array}{l} b \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + 0 = n \\ c = 0 \\ 0 > 0 \\ \vdash \\ n > 0 \end{array} \; \textbf{EQ\_LR, MON} \; \begin{array}{l} 0 > 0 \\ \vdash \\ n > 0 \end{array} \; \textbf{ARI} \; \begin{array}{l} \bot \\ \vdash \\ n > 0 \end{array} \; \textbf{FALSE\_L} \end{array} \right.$$

Refinement Rule: Invariant Preservation

- Based on the components, we are able to formally state the ***PO/VC Rule of Invariant Preservation for Refinement***:

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} A(c) \\ I(c, v) \\ J(c, v, w) \\ H(c, w) \\ \vdash \\ J_i(c, E(c, v), F(c, w)) \end{array}} \quad \underline{\text{INV}} \qquad \text{where } J_i \text{ denotes a } \underline{\text{single}} \text{ } \textbf{\textit{concrete invariant}}$$

  - How many ***sequents*** to be proved? [# *concrete* evts × # *concrete* invariants]
  - Here are two (of the ten) ***sequents*** generated:

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ d > 0 \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \leq d \\ a \in \mathbb{N} \\ b \in \mathbb{N} \\ c \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + c = n \\ a = 0 \lor c = 0 \\ a + b < d \\ c = 0 \\ \vdash \\ (a + 1) + b + c = (n + 1) \end{array}} \quad \underline{\text{ML\_out/inv1\_4/INV}} \qquad \boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ d > 0 \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \leq d \\ a \in \mathbb{N} \\ b \in \mathbb{N} \\ c \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + c = n \\ a = 0 \lor c = 0 \\ c > 0 \\ \vdash \\ a = 0 \lor (c - 1) = 0 \end{array}} \quad \underline{\text{ML\_in/inv1\_5/INV}}$$

- **Exercises**. Specify and prove other **eight** ***POs of Invariant Preservation***.

Visualizing Inv. Preservation in Refinement

Each ***concrete*** event (w to w') is ***simulated by*** an ***abstract*** event (v to v'):

- ***abstract*** & ***concrete*** pre-states related by ***concrete*** invariants $J(c, v, w)$
- ***abstract*** & ***concrete*** post-states related by ***concrete*** invariants $J(c, v', w')$



INV PO of m_1: ML_out/inv1_4/INV

axm0_1	$\{ d \in \mathbb{N}$
axm0_2	$\{ d > 0$
inv0_1	$\{ n \in \mathbb{N}$
inv0_2	$\{ n \leq d$
inv1_1	$\{ a \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_2	$\{ b \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_3	$\{ c \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_4	$\{ a + b + c = n$
inv1_5	$\{ a = 0 \lor c = 0$
Concrete guards of *ML_out*	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} a + b < d \\ c = 0 \end{array} \right.$
	$\vdash$
Concrete invariant **inv1_4** with *ML_out*'s effect in the post-state	$\{ (a+1) + b + c = (n+1)$

ML_out/inv1_4/INV

INV PO of m_1: ML_in/inv1_5/INV

axm0_1	$\{ d \in \mathbb{N}$
axm0_2	$\{ d > 0$
inv0_1	$\{ n \in \mathbb{N}$
inv0_2	$\{ n \leq d$
inv1_1	$\{ a \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_2	$\{ b \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_3	$\{ c \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_4	$\{ a + b + c = n$
inv1_5	$\{ a = 0 \lor c = 0$
Concrete guards of *ML_in*	$\{ c > 0$
	$\vdash$
Concrete invariant **inv1_5** with *ML_in*'s effect in the post-state	$\{ a = 0 \lor (c - 1) = 0$

ML_in/inv1_5/INV

Proving Refinement: ML_out/inv1_4/INV



$d \in \mathbb{N}$
$d > 0$
$n \in \mathbb{N}$
$n \leq d$
$a \in \mathbb{N}$
$b \in \mathbb{N}$
$c \in \mathbb{N}$
$a + b + c = n$
$a = 0 \lor c = 0$
$a + b < d$
$c = 0$
$\vdash$
$(a+1) + b + c = (n+1)$

MON

$a + b + c = n$
$\vdash$
$(a + 1) + b + c = (n + 1)$

ARI

$a + b + c = n$
$\vdash$
$a + b + c + 1 = n + 1$

EQ_LR, MON

$\vdash$
$n + 1 = n + 1$

EQ

Proving Refinement: ML_in/inv1_5/INV



$d \in \mathbb{N}$
$d > 0$
$n \in \mathbb{N}$
$n \leq d$
$a \in \mathbb{N}$
$b \in \mathbb{N}$
$c \in \mathbb{N}$
$a + b + c = n$
$a = 0 \lor c = 0$
$c > 0$
$\vdash$
$a = 0 \lor (c - 1) = 0$

MON

$a = 0 \lor c = 0$
$c > 0$
$\vdash$
$a = 0 \lor (c - 1) = 0$

OR_L

$a = 0$
$c > 0$
$\vdash$
$a = 0 \lor (c - 1) = 0$

OR_R1

$a = 0$
$c > 0$
$\vdash$
$a = 0$

HYP

$c = 0$
$c > 0$
$\vdash$
$a = 0 \lor (c - 1) = 0$

EQ_LR, MON

$0 > 0$
$\vdash$
$a = 0 \lor (0 - 1) = 0$

ARI

$\bot$
$\vdash$
$a = 0 \lor -1 = 0$

FALSE_L

Initializing the Refined System m_1

- Discharging the **twelve sequents** proved that:
  - ***concrete invariants*** preserved by `ML_out` & `ML_in`
  - ***concrete guards*** of *ML_out* & *ML_in* entail their ***abstract*** counterparts
- What's left is the specification of how the ***ASM***'s ***initial state*** looks like:

```
init
  begin
    a := 0
    b := 0
    c := 0
  end
```

✓ No cars on bridge (heading either way) and island

✓ Initialization always possible: guard is ***true***.

✓ There is no ***pre-state*** for *init*.

∴ The RHS of := must not involve variables.

∴ The RHS of := may only involve constants.

✓ There is only the ***post-state*** for *init*.

∴ Before-***After Predicate***: $a' = 0 \wedge b' = 0 \wedge c' = 0$

PO of m_1 Concrete Invariant Establishment

- Some (new) formal components are needed:
  - $K(c)$: effect of ***abstract init***'s actions:
    e.g., $K(\langle d \rangle)$ of *init* $\widehat{=} \langle 0 \rangle$
  - $v' = K(c)$: ***before-after predicate*** formalizing ***abstract*** *init*'s actions
    e.g., BAP of *init*: $\langle \mathbf{n'} \rangle = \langle 0 \rangle$
  - $L(c)$: effect of ***concrete init***'s actions:
    e.g., $K(\langle d \rangle)$ of *init* $\widehat{=} \langle 0, 0, 0 \rangle$
  - $w' = L(c)$: ***before-after predicate*** formalizing ***concrete*** *init*'s actions
    e.g., BAP of *init*: $\langle \mathbf{a'}, \mathbf{b'}, \mathbf{c'} \rangle = \langle 0, 0, 0 \rangle$
- Accordingly, PO of ***invariant establishment*** is formulated as a **sequent**:

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} \text{Axioms} \\ \vdash \\ \textit{Concrete Invariants} \text{ Satisfied at Post-State} \end{array}} \quad \text{INV} \qquad \boxed{\begin{array}{l} A(c) \\ \vdash \\ J_i(c, \mathbf{K(c)}, \mathbf{L(c)}) \end{array}} \quad \text{INV}$$

Discharging PO of m_1 Concrete Invariant Establishment

- How many ***sequents*** to be proved? [# *concrete* invariants]
- Two (of the five) sequents generated for ***concrete*** *init* of m_1:

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ d > 0 \\ \vdash \\ 0 + 0 + 0 = 0 \end{array}} \quad \text{init/}\mathbf{inv1\_4}\text{/INV} \qquad \boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ d > 0 \\ \vdash \\ 0 = 0 \vee 0 = 0 \end{array}} \quad \text{init/}\mathbf{inv1\_5}\text{/INV}$$

- Can we discharge the ***PO*** init/**inv1_4**/INV ?

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ d > 0 \\ \vdash \\ 0 + 0 + 0 = 0 \end{array}} \quad \textbf{ARI, MON} \quad \boxed{\vdash \top} \quad \textbf{TRUE\_R}$$

∴ ***init/inv1_4/INV*** succeeds in being discharged.

- Can we discharge the ***PO*** init/**inv1_5**/INV ?

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ d > 0 \\ \vdash \\ 0 = 0 \vee 0 = 0 \end{array}} \quad \textbf{ARI, MON} \quad \boxed{\vdash \top} \quad \textbf{TRUE\_R}$$

∴ ***init/inv1_5/INV*** succeeds in being discharged.

Model m_1: New, Concrete Events

- The system acts as an **ABSTRACT STATE MACHINE (ASM)** : it ***evolves*** as ***actions of enabled events*** change values of variables, subject to ***invariants***.
- Considered ***concrete/refined events*** already existing in m_0: *ML_out* & *ML_in*
- ***New event*** *IL_in*:

```
IL_in
  when
    ??
  then
    ??
  end
```

  - *IL_in* denotes a car entering the island (getting off the bridge).
  - *IL_in* ***enabled*** only when:
    - The bridge's current traffic flows to the island.
      Q. Limited number of cars on the bridge and the island?
      A. Ensured when the earlier *ML_out* (of same car) occurred
- ***New event*** *IL_out*:

```
IL_out
  when
    ??
  then
    ??
  end
```

  - *IL_out* denotes a car exiting the island (getting on the bridge).
  - *IL_out* ***enabled*** only when:
    - There is some car on the island.
    - The bridge's current traffic flows to the mainland.

Model m_1: BA Predicates of Multiple Actions

Consider ***actions*** of m_1's two ***new*** events:

```
IL_in
  when
    a > 0
  then
    a := a − 1
    b := b + 1
  end
```

```
IL_out
  when
    b > 0
    a = 0
  then
    b := b − 1
    c := c + 1
  end
```

- What is the ***BAP*** of *ML_in*'s ***actions***?

$$a' = a - 1 \land b' = b + 1 \land c' = c$$

- What is the ***BAP*** of *ML_in*'s ***actions***?

$$a' = a \land b' = b - 1 \land c' = c + 1$$

Visualizing Inv. Preservation in Refinement

- Recall how a ***concrete*** event is ***simulated*** by its ***abstract*** counterpart:



- For each ***new*** event:
  - Strictly speaking, it does **not** have an ***abstract*** counterpart.
  - It is ***simulated by*** a special ***abstract*** event (transforming v to v'):

```
skip
  begin

  end
```

- *skip* is a "dummy" event: non-guarded and does nothing
- **Q**. ***BAP*** of the skip event?

  A. $n' = n$

Refinement Rule: Invariant Preservation

- The new events *IL_in* and *IL_out* do not exist in $\mathbf{m_0}$, but:
  - They **exist** in $\mathbf{m_1}$ and may impact upon the ***concrete*** state space.
  - They ***preserve*** the ***concrete invariants***, just as *ML_out* & *ML_in* do.
- Recall the ***PO/VC Rule of Invariant Preservation for Refinement***:

$$\frac{\begin{array}{l} A(c) \\ I(c, v) \\ J(c, v, w) \\ H(c, w) \\ \vdash \\ J_i(c, E(c, v), F(c, w)) \end{array}}{}\ \text{INV}$$

where J_i denotes a single ***concrete invariant***

  - How many ***sequents*** to be proved? [# *new* evts × # *concrete* invariants]
  - Here are two (of the ten) ***sequents*** generated:

$$\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ d > 0 \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \leq d \\ a \in \mathbb{N} \\ b \in \mathbb{N} \\ c \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + c = n \\ a = 0 \lor c = 0 \\ a > 0 \\ \vdash \\ (a - 1) + (b + 1) + c = n \end{array}\ \text{IL\_in/inv1\_4/INV} \qquad \begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ d > 0 \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \leq d \\ a \in \mathbb{N} \\ b \in \mathbb{N} \\ c \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + c = n \\ a = 0 \lor c = 0 \\ a > 0 \\ \vdash \\ (a - 1) = 0 \lor c = 0 \end{array}\ \text{IL\_in/inv1\_5/INV}$$

- **Exercises**. Specify and prove other **eight** ***POs of Invariant Preservation***.

INV PO of m_1: IL_in/inv1_4/INV

axm0_1 { $d \in \mathbb{N}$
axm0_2 { $d > 0$
inv0_1 { $n \in \mathbb{N}$
inv0_2 { $n \leq d$
inv1_1 { $a \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_2 { $b \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_3 { $c \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_4 { $a + b + c = n$
inv1_5 { $a = 0 \lor c = 0$
Guards of *IL_in* { $a > 0$
$\vdash$
Concrete invariant **inv1_4** with *IL_in*'s effect in the post-state { $(a - 1) + (b + 1) + c = n$

IL_in/inv1_4/INV

INV PO of m_1: IL_in/inv1_5/INV

axm0_1	$\{ d \in \mathbb{N}$
axm0_2	$\{ d > 0$
inv0_1	$\{ n \in \mathbb{N}$
inv0_2	$\{ n \leq d$
inv1_1	$\{ a \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_2	$\{ b \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_3	$\{ c \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_4	$\{ a + b + c = n$
inv1_5	$\{ a = 0 \vee c = 0$
Guards of *IL_in*	$\{ a > 0$
	$\vdash$
Concrete invariant **inv1_5** with *IL_in*'s effect in the post-state	$\{ (a - 1) = 0 \vee c = 0$

IL_in/inv1_5/INV

Proving Refinement: IL_in/inv1_4/INV



$d \in \mathbb{N}$
$d > 0$
$n \in \mathbb{N}$
$n \leq d$
$a \in \mathbb{N}$
$b \in \mathbb{N}$
$c \in \mathbb{N}$
$a + b + c = n$
$a = 0 \vee c = 0$
$a > 0$
$\vdash$
$(a - 1) + (b + 1) + c = n$

MON

$a + b + c = n$
$\vdash$
$(a - 1) + (b + 1) + c = n$

ARI

$a + b + c = n$
$\vdash$
$a + b + c = n$

HYP

Proving Refinement: IL_in/inv1_5/INV



$d \in \mathbb{N}$
$d > 0$
$n \in \mathbb{N}$
$n \leq d$
$a \in \mathbb{N}$
$b \in \mathbb{N}$
$c \in \mathbb{N}$
$a + b + c = n$
$a = 0 \vee c = 0$
$a > 0$
$\vdash$
$(a - 1) = 0 \vee c = 0$

MON

$a = 0 \vee c = 0$
$a > 0$
$\vdash$
$(a - 1) = 0 \vee c = 0$

OR_L

$a = 0$
$a > 0$
$\vdash$
$(a - 1) = 0 \vee c = 0$

EQ_LR, MON

$0 > 0$
$\vdash$
$(0 - 1) = 0 \vee c = 0$

ARI

$\perp$
$\vdash$
$-1 = 0 \vee c = 0$

FALSE_L

$c = 0$
$a > 0$
$\vdash$
$(a - 1) = 0 \vee c = 0$

OR_R2

$c = 0$
$a > 0$
$\vdash$
$c = 0$

HYP

Livelock Caused by New Events Diverging

- An alternative m_1 (with **inv1_4**, **inv1_5**, and **guards** of new events removed):

```
constants:   d

axioms:
   axm0_1 : d ∈ ℕ
   axm0_2 : d > 0

variables:   a, b, c

invariants:
   inv1_1 : a ∈ ℤ
   inv1_2 : b ∈ ℤ
   inv1_3 : c ∈ ℤ

ML_out
   when
      a + b < d
      c = 0
   then
      a := a + 1
   end

ML_in
   when
      c > 0
   then
      c := c − 1
   end

IL_in
   begin
      a := a − 1
      b := b + 1
   end

IL_out
   begin
      b := b − 1
      c := c + 1
   end
```

Concrete invariants are **under-specified**: only typing constraints.

Exercises: Show that **Invariant Preservation** is provable, but **Guard Strengthening** is not.

- Say this alternative m_1 is implemented as is: *IL_in* and *IL_out* **always** ***enabled*** and may occur ***indefinitely***, preventing other "old" events (*ML_out* and *ML_in*) from ever happening:

  $\langle init, IL\_in, IL\_out, IL\_in, IL\_out, \ldots \rangle$

  Q: What are the corresponding ***abstract*** transitions?

  A: $\langle init, skip, skip, skip, skip, \ldots \rangle$ [≈ executing `while(true);`]

- We say that these two ***new*** events *diverge*, creating a *livelock*:
  - Different from a ***deadlock*** ∵ **always** an event occurring (*IL_in* or *IL_out*).
  - But their ***indefinite*** occurrences contribute **nothing** useful.

PO of Convergence of New Events

The PO/VC rule for *non-divergence/livelock freedom* consists of two parts:

- Interleaving of ***new*** events charactered as an integer expression: ***variant***.
- A variant $V(c, w)$ may refer to constants and/or ***concrete*** variables.
- In the original m_1, let's try $\boxed{\textbf{variants} : 2 \cdot a + b}$

1. ***Variant Stays Non-Negative***

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} A(c) \\ I(c, v) \\ J(c, v, w) \\ H(c, w) \\ \vdash \\ V(c, w) \in \mathbb{N} \end{array}} \quad \underline{\text{NAT}}$$

- Variant $V(c, w)$ measures how many more times the ***new*** events can occur.
- If a ***new*** event is ***enabled***, then $V(c, w) > 0$.
- When $V(c, w)$ reaches 0, some "old" events must happen s.t. $V(c, w)$ goes back above 0.

2. ***A New Event Occurrence Decreases Variant***

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} A(c) \\ I(c, v) \\ J(c, v, w) \\ H(c, w) \\ \vdash \\ V(c, F(c, w)) < V(c, w) \end{array}} \quad \underline{\text{VAR}}$$

- If a ***new*** event is ***enabled*** and occurs, the value of $V(c, w) \downarrow$.

PO of Convergence of New Events: NAT

- Recall: PO related to ***Variant Stays Non-Negative***:

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} A(c) \\ I(c, v) \\ J(c, v, w) \\ H(c, w) \\ \vdash \\ V(c, w) \in \mathbb{N} \end{array}} \quad \underline{\text{NAT}}$$

How many ***sequents*** to be proved?

[# ***new*** events]

- For the ***new*** event *IL_in*:

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{lll} d \in \mathbb{N} & d > 0 & \\ n \in \mathbb{N} & n \leq d & \\ a \in \mathbb{N} & b \in \mathbb{N} & c \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + c = n & a = 0 \lor c = 0 & \\ a > 0 & & \\ \vdash & & \\ 2 \cdot a + b \in \mathbb{N} & & \end{array}} \quad \underline{\text{IL\_in/NAT}}$$

Exercises: Prove **IL_in/NAT** and Formulate/Prove **IL_out/NAT**.

PO of Convergence of New Events: VAR

- Recall: PO related to ***A New Event Occurrence Decreases Variant***

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} A(c) \\ I(c, v) \\ J(c, v, w) \\ H(c, w) \\ \vdash \\ V(c, F(c, w)) < V(c, w) \end{array}} \quad \underline{\text{VAR}}$$

How many ***sequents*** to be proved?

[# ***new*** events]

- For the ***new*** event *IL_in*:

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{lll} d \in \mathbb{N} & d > 0 & \\ n \in \mathbb{N} & n \leq d & \\ a \in \mathbb{N} & b \in \mathbb{N} & c \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + c = n & a = 0 \lor c = 0 & \\ a > 0 & & \\ \vdash & & \\ 2 \cdot (a - 1) + (b + 1) < 2 \cdot a + b & & \end{array}} \quad \underline{\text{IL\_in/VAR}}$$

Exercises: Prove **IL_in/VAR** and Formulate/Prove **IL_out/VAR**.

Convergence of New Events: Exercise

Given the original $\mathbf{m_1}$, what if the following ***variant*** expression is used:

$$\boxed{\textbf{variants} : a + b}$$

Are the formulated sequents still ***provable***?

PO of Refinement: Deadlock Freedom

- Recall:
  - We proved that the initial model m_0 is deadlock free (see **DLF**).
  - We proved, according to ***guard strengthening***, that if a ***concrete*** event is enabled, then its ***abstract*** counterpart is enabled.
- PO of ***relative deadlock freedom*** for a ***refinement*** model:

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} A(c) \\ I(c,v) \\ J(c,v,w) \\ G_1(c,v) \lor \cdots \lor G_m(c,v) \\ \vdash \\ H_1(c,w) \lor \cdots \lor H_n(c,w) \end{array}} \quad \text{DLF}$$

If an ***abstract*** state does not *deadlock* (i.e., $G_1(c,v) \lor \cdots \lor G_m(c,v)$), then its ***concrete*** counterpart does not *deadlock* (i.e., $H_1(c,w) \lor \cdots \lor H_n(c,w)$).

- Another way to think of the above PO:

  The ***refinement*** does **not** introduce, in the ***concrete***, any "new" *deadlock* scenarios **not** existing in the ***abstract*** state.

PO Rule: Relative Deadlock Freedom m_1

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{rll}
\textbf{axm0\_1} & \{ \; d \in \mathbb{N} & \\
\textbf{axm0\_2} & \{ \; d > 0 & \\
\textbf{inv0\_1} & \{ \; n \in \mathbb{N} & \\
\textbf{inv0\_2} & \{ \; n \le d & \\
\textbf{inv1\_1} & \{ \; a \in \mathbb{N} & \\
\textbf{inv1\_2} & \{ \; b \in \mathbb{N} & \\
\textbf{inv1\_3} & \{ \; c \in \mathbb{N} & \\
\textbf{inv1\_4} & \{ \; a + b + c = n & \\
\textbf{inv1\_5} & \{ \; a = 0 \lor c = 0 & \\
\text{Disjunction of } \textit{abstract} \text{ guards} & \left\{ \begin{array}{rl} & n < d \; \} \\ \lor & n > 0 \; \} \end{array} \right. & \begin{array}{l} \textbf{guards of } \textit{ML\_out} \textbf{ in } m_0 \\ \textbf{guards of } \textit{ML\_in} \textbf{ in } m_0 \end{array} \\
& \vdash & \\
\text{Disjunction of } \textit{concrete} \text{ guards} & \left\{ \begin{array}{rr} & a + b < d \land c = 0 \; \} \\ \lor & c > 0 \; \} \\ \lor & a > 0 \; \} \\ \lor & b > 0 \land a = 0 \; \} \end{array} \right. & \begin{array}{l} \textbf{guards of } \textit{ML\_out} \textbf{ in } m_1 \\ \textbf{guards of } \textit{ML\_in} \textbf{ in } m_1 \\ \textbf{guards of } \textit{IL\_in} \textbf{ in } m_1 \\ \textbf{guards of } \textit{IL\_out} \textbf{ in } m_1 \end{array}
\end{array}} \quad \textbf{DLF}$$

Example Inference Rules (6)

$$\boxed{\frac{H, \neg P \vdash Q}{H \vdash P \lor Q} \quad \textbf{OR\_R}}$$

To prove a ***disjunctive goal***, it suffices to prove one of the disjuncts, with the the negation of the other disjunct serving as an additional hypothesis.

$$\boxed{\frac{H, P, Q \vdash R}{H, P \land Q \vdash R} \quad \textbf{AND\_L}}$$

To prove a goal with a ***conjunctive hypothesis***, it suffices to prove the same goal, with the the two conjuncts serving as two separate hypotheses.

$$\boxed{\frac{H \vdash P \qquad H \vdash Q}{H \vdash P \land Q} \quad \textbf{AND\_R}}$$

To prove a goal with a ***conjunctive goal***, it suffices to prove each conjunct as a separate goal.

Proving Refinement: DLF of m_1

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ d > 0 \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \le d \\ a \in \mathbb{N} \\ b \in \mathbb{N} \\ c \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + c = n \\ a = 0 \lor c = 0 \\ n < d \lor n > 0 \\ \vdash \\ \quad a + b < d \land c = 0 \\ \lor \; c > 0 \\ \lor \; a > 0 \\ \lor \; b > 0 \land a = 0 \end{array}}$$

MON

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} d > 0 \\ a \in \mathbb{N} \\ b \in \mathbb{N} \\ c \in \mathbb{N} \\ \vdash \\ \quad a + b < d \land c = 0 \\ \lor \; c > 0 \\ \lor \; a > 0 \\ \lor \; b > 0 \land a = 0 \end{array}} \; \begin{array}{l}\textbf{OR\_R,}\\ \textbf{ARI}\end{array} \; \boxed{\begin{array}{l} d > 0 \\ a \in \mathbb{N} \\ b \in \mathbb{N} \\ c = 0 \\ \\ \vdash \\ \quad a + b < d \land c = 0 \\ \lor \; c > 0 \\ \lor \; a > 0 \\ \lor \; b > 0 \land a = 0 \end{array}} \; \begin{array}{l}\textbf{EQ\_LR,}\\ \textbf{MON}\end{array} \; \boxed{\begin{array}{l} d > 0 \\ a \in \mathbb{N} \\ b \in \mathbb{N} \\ \vdash \\ \quad a + b < d \land 0 = 0 \\ \lor \; 0 > 0 \\ \lor \; a > 0 \\ \lor \; b > 0 \land a = 0 \end{array}} \; \begin{array}{l}\textbf{OR\_R,}\\ \textbf{ARI}\end{array} \; \boxed{\begin{array}{l} d > 0 \\ a = 0 \\ b \in \mathbb{N} \\ \vdash \\ \quad a + b < d \land 0 = 0 \\ \lor \; b > 0 \land a = 0 \end{array}} \; \begin{array}{l}\textbf{EQ\_LR,}\\ \textbf{MON}\end{array} \; \boxed{\begin{array}{l} d > 0 \\ b \in \mathbb{N} \\ \vdash \\ \quad 0 + b < d \land 0 = 0 \\ \lor \; b > 0 \land 0 = 0 \end{array}} \; \textbf{ARI} \; \boxed{\begin{array}{l} d > 0 \\ b = 0 \lor b > 0 \\ \vdash \\ \quad b < d \land 0 = 0 \\ \lor \; b > 0 \land 0 = 0 \end{array}} \; \ldots$$

Proving Refinement: DLF of m_1 (continued)



$d > 0$, $b = 0 \lor b > 0$ $\vdash$ $b < d \land 0 = 0 \lor b > 0 \land 0 = 0$ **OR_L**

- $d > 0$, $b = 0$ $\vdash$ $b < d \land 0 = 0 \lor b > 0 \land 0 = 0$ **OR_R1**
  - $d > 0$, $b = 0$ $\vdash$ $b < d \land 0 = 0$ **OR_R1, MON**
    - $d > 0$ $\vdash$ $0 < d \land 0 = 0$ **AND_R**
      - $d > 0$ $\vdash$ $0 < d$ **ARI, HYP**
      - $d > 0$ $\vdash$ $0 = 0$ **EQ**
- $d > 0$, $b > 0$ $\vdash$ $b < d \land 0 = 0 \lor b > 0 \land 0 = 0$ **OR_R2**
  - $d > 0$, $b > 0$ $\vdash$ $b > 0 \land 0 = 0$ **AND_R**
    - $d > 0$, $b > 0$ $\vdash$ $b > 0$ **HYP**
    - $d > 0$, $b > 0$ $\vdash$ $0 = 0$ **EQ**

First Refinement: Summary

- The final version of our ***first refinement*** m_1 is ***provably correct*** w.r.t.:
  - Establishment of ***Concrete Invariants*** [*init*]
  - Preservation of ***Concrete Invariants*** [old & new events]
  - Strengthening of ***guards*** [old events]
  - ***Convergence*** (a.k.a. livelock freedom, non-divergence) [new events]
  - Relative ***Deadlock*** Freedom
- Here is the final specification of m_1:

constants: d

axioms:
axm0_1 : $d \in \mathbb{N}$
axm0_2 : $d > 0$

variables: a, b, c

invariants:
inv1_1 : $a \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_2 : $b \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_3 : $c \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_4 : $a + b + c = n$
inv1_5 : $a = 0 \lor c = 0$

variants:
$2 \cdot a + b$

init
begin
$a := 0$
$b := 0$
$c := 0$
end

ML_out
when
$a + b < d$
$c = 0$
then
$a := a + 1$
end

ML_in
when
$c > 0$
then
$c := c - 1$
end

IL_in
when
$a > 0$
then
$a := a - 1$
$b := b + 1$
end

IL_out
when
$b > 0$
$a = 0$
then
$b := b - 1$
$c := c + 1$
end

Model m_2: "More Concrete" Abstraction

- 2nd ***refinement*** has even more ***concrete*** perception of the bridge controller:
  - We "**zoom in**" by observing the system from **even closer to the ground**, so that the one-way traffic of the bridge is controlled via:

ml_tl: a traffic light for exiting the ML

il_tl: a traffic light for exiting the IL

abstract variables ***a***, ***b***, ***c*** from m_1 still used (instead of being replaced)



  - Nonetheless, sensors remain ***abstracted*** away!
- That is, we focus on these three ***environment constraints***:

ENV1	The system is equipped with two traffic lights with two colors: green and red.
ENV2	The traffic lights control the entrance to the bridge at both ends of it.
ENV3	Cars are not supposed to pass on a red traffic light, only on a green one.

- We are ***obliged to prove*** this ***added concreteness*** is ***consistent*** with m_1.

Model m_2: Refined, Concrete State Space

1. The **static** part introduces the notion of traffic light colours:

sets: *COLOR*

constants: *red*, *green*

axioms:
axm2_1 : $COLOR = \{green, red\}$
axm2_2 : $green \neq red$

2. The **dynamic** part shows the ***superposition refinement*** scheme:



- ***Abstract*** variables ***a***, ***b***, ***c*** from m_1 are still in use in ***m_2***.
- Two new, ***concrete*** variables are introduced: ***ml_tl*** and ***il_tl***
- **Constrast**: In m_1, ***abstract*** variable n is replaced by ***concrete*** variables a, b, c.

variables:
a, b, c
ml_tl
il_tl

invariants:
inv2_1 : $ml\_tl \in COLOUR$
inv2_2 : $il\_tl \in COLOUR$
inv2_3 : ??
inv2_4 : ??

- **inv2_1** & **inv2_2**: typing constraints
- **inv2_3**: being allowed to exit ML **means** cars within limit and no opposite traffic
- **inv2_4**: being allowed to exit IL **means** some car in IL and no opposite traffic

Model m_2: Refining Old, Abstract Events

- The system acts as an **ABSTRACT STATE MACHINE (ASM)**: it ***evolves*** as ***actions of enabled events*** change values of variables, subject to ***invariants***.
- ***Concrete/Refined*** version of ***event*** *ML_out*:

```
ML_out
  when
    ??
  then
    $a := a + 1$
  end
```

  - Recall the ***abstract*** guard of *ML_out* in m_1: $(c = 0) \land (a + b < d)$
    $\Rightarrow$ Unrealistic as drivers should **not** know about a, b, c!
  - *ML_out* is ***refined***: a car exits the ML (to the bridge) only when:
    - the traffic light *ml_tl* allows
- ***Concrete/Refined*** version of ***event*** *IL_out*:

```
IL_out
  when
    ??
  then
    $b := b - 1$
    $c := c + 1$
  end
```

  - Recall the ***abstract*** guard of *IL_out* in m_1: $(a = 0) \land (b > 0)$
    $\Rightarrow$ Unrealistic as drivers should **not** know about a, b, c!
  - *IL_out* is ***refined***: a car exits the IL (to the bridge) only when:
    - the traffic light *il_tl* allows

Q1. How about the other two "old" ***events*** *IL_in* and *ML_in*?
A1. No need to ***refine*** as already ***guarded*** by *ML_out* and *IL_out*.
Q2. What if the driver disobeys *ml_tl* or *il_tl*? [**A2**. **ENV3**]

Model m_2: New, Concrete Events

- The system acts as an **ABSTRACT STATE MACHINE (ASM)**: it ***evolves*** as ***actions of enabled events*** change values of variables, subject to ***invariants***.
- Considered ***events*** already existing in m_1:
  - *ML_out* & *IL_out* [REFINED]
  - *IL_in* & *ML_in* [UNCHANGED]
- ***New event*** *ML_tl_green*:

```
ML_tl_green
  when
    ??
  then
    $ml\_tl := green$
  end
```

  - *ML_tl_green* denotes the traffic light *ml_tl* turning green.
  - *ML_tl_green* ***enabled*** only when:
    - the traffic light not already green
    - limited number of cars on the bridge and the island
    - No opposite traffic

  [$\Rightarrow$ *ML_out*'s ***abstract*** guard in m_1]
- ***New event*** *IL_tl_green*:

```
IL_tl_green
  when
    ??
  then
    $il\_tl := green$
  end
```

  - *IL_tl_green* denotes the traffic light *il_tl* turning green.
  - *IL_tl_green* ***enabled*** only when:
    - the traffic light not already green
    - some cars on the island (i.e., island not empty)
    - No opposite traffic

  [$\Rightarrow$ *IL_out*'s ***abstract*** guard in m_1]

Invariant Preservation in Refinement m_2

constants: d

sets: $COLOR$

variables:
a, b, c
ml_tl
il_tl

axioms:
axm0_1 : $d \in \mathbb{N}$
axm0_2 : $d > 0$
axm2_1 : $COLOR = \{green, red\}$
axm2_2 : $green \neq red$

invariants:
inv2_1 : $ml\_tl \in COLOUR$
inv2_2 : $il\_tl \in COLOUR$
inv2_3 : $ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0$
inv2_4 : $il\_tl = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0$

```
ML_tl_green
  when
    $ml\_tl = red$
    $a + b < d$
    $c = 0$
  then
    $ml\_tl := green$
  end
```

```
IL_tl_green
  when
    $il\_tl = red$
    $b > 0$
    $a = 0$
  then
    $il\_tl := green$
  end
```

```
ML_out
  when
    $ml\_tl = green$
  then
    $a := a + 1$
  end
```

```
IL_out
  when
    $il\_tl = green$
  then
    $b := b - 1$
    $c := c + 1$
  end
```

```
IL_in
  when
    $a > 0$
  then
    $a := a - 1$
    $b := b + 1$
  end
```

```
ML_in
  when
    $c > 0$
  then
    $c := c - 1$
  end
```

Recall the ***PO/VC Rule of Invariant Preservation for Refinement***:

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} A(c) \\ I(c, \mathbf{v}) \\ J(c, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{w}) \\ H(c, \mathbf{w}) \\ \vdash \\ J_i(c, E(c, \mathbf{v}), F(c, \mathbf{w})) \end{array}} \quad \underline{\text{INV}} \qquad \text{where } J_i \text{ denotes a single concrete invariant}$$

- How many ***sequents*** to be proved? [# *concrete* evts × # *concrete* invariants = 6 × 4]
- We discuss two sequents: *ML_out*/**inv2_4**/*INV* and *IL_out*/**inv2_3**/*INV*

Exercises. Specify and prove (some of) other twenty-two ***POs of Invariant Preservation***.

INV PO of m_2: ML_out/inv2_4/INV

$$\begin{array}{r|l}
\textbf{axm0\_1} & d \in \mathbb{N} \\
\textbf{axm0\_2} & d > 0 \\
\textbf{axm2\_1} & COLOUR = \{green, red\} \\
\textbf{axm2\_2} & green \neq red \\
\textbf{inv0\_1} & n \in \mathbb{N} \\
\textbf{inv0\_2} & n \leq d \\
\textbf{inv1\_1} & a \in \mathbb{N} \\
\textbf{inv1\_2} & b \in \mathbb{N} \\
\textbf{inv1\_3} & c \in \mathbb{N} \\
\textbf{inv1\_4} & a + b + c = n \\
\textbf{inv1\_5} & a = 0 \lor c = 0 \\
\textbf{inv2\_1} & ml\_tl \in COLOUR \\
\textbf{inv2\_2} & il\_tl \in COLOUR \\
\textbf{inv2\_3} & ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0 \\
\textbf{inv2\_4} & il\_tl = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0 \\
\textit{Concrete}\text{ guards of } ML\_out & ml\_tl = green \\
 & \vdash \\
\textit{Concrete}\text{ invariant } \textbf{inv2\_4} \text{ with } ML\_out\text{'s effect in the post-state} & il\_tl = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land (a + 1) = 0
\end{array} \qquad \textbf{ML\_out/inv2\_4/INV}$$

INV PO of m_2: IL_out/inv2_3/INV

axm0_1	$\{ \ d \in \mathbb{N}$
axm0_2	$\{ \ d > 0$
axm2_1	$\{ \ COLOUR = \{green, red\}$
axm2_2	$\{ \ green \neq red$
inv0_1	$\{ \ n \in \mathbb{N}$
inv0_2	$\{ \ n \leq d$
inv1_1	$\{ \ a \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_2	$\{ \ b \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_3	$\{ \ c \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_4	$\{ \ a + b + c = n$
inv1_5	$\{ \ a = 0 \lor c = 0$
inv2_1	$\{ \ ml\_tl \in COLOUR$
inv2_2	$\{ \ il\_tl \in COLOUR$
inv2_3	$\{ \ ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0$
inv2_4	$\{ \ il\_tl = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0$
Concrete guards of *IL_out*	$\{ \ il\_tl = green$
	$\vdash$
Concrete invariant **inv2_3** with *ML_out*'s effect in the post-state	$\{ \ ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow a + (b - 1) < d \land (c + 1) = 0$

IL_out/inv2_3/INV

Example Inference Rules (7)

$$\frac{H, P, Q \vdash R}{H, P, P \Rightarrow Q \vdash R} \quad \textbf{IMP\_L}$$

If a hypothesis ***P*** matches the <u>assumption</u> of another ***implicative hypothesis P*** $\Rightarrow$ ***Q***, then the <u>conclusion</u> ***Q*** of the ***implicative hypothesis*** can be used as a new hypothesis for the sequent.

$$\frac{H, P \vdash Q}{H \vdash P \Rightarrow Q} \quad \textbf{IMP\_R}$$

To prove an ***implicative goal P*** $\Rightarrow$ ***Q***, it suffices to prove its conclusion ***Q***, with its assumption ***P*** serving as a new <u>hypotheses</u>.

$$\frac{H, \neg Q \vdash P}{H, \neg P \vdash Q} \quad \textbf{NOT\_L}$$

To prove a goal ***Q*** with a ***negative hypothesis*** $\neg$ ***P***, it suffices to prove the <u>negated</u> hypothesis $\neg(\neg P) \equiv$ ***P*** with the <u>negated</u> original goal $\neg$ ***Q*** serving as a new <u>hypothesis</u>.

Proving ML_out/inv2_4/INV: First Attempt



$$\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ d > 0 \\ COLOUR = \{green, red\} \\ green \neq red \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \leq d \\ a \in \mathbb{N} \\ b \in \mathbb{N} \\ c \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + c = n \\ a = 0 \lor c = 0 \\ ml\_tl \in COLOUR \\ il\_tl \in COLOUR \\ ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0 \\ il\_tl = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0 \\ ml\_tl = green \\ \vdash \\ il\_tl = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land (a + 1) = 0 \end{array}$$

MON

$$\begin{array}{l} green \neq red \\ il\_tl = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0 \\ ml\_tl = green \\ \vdash \\ il\_tl = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land (a + 1) = 0 \end{array}$$

IMP_R

$$\begin{array}{l} green \neq red \\ il\_tl = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0 \\ ml\_tl = green \\ il\_tl = green \\ \vdash \\ b > 0 \land (a + 1) = 0 \end{array}$$

IMP_L

$$\begin{array}{l} green \neq red \\ b > 0 \land a = 0 \\ ml\_tl = green \\ il\_tl = green \\ \vdash \\ b > 0 \land (a + 1) = 0 \end{array}$$

AND_L

$$\begin{array}{l} green \neq red \\ b > 0 \\ a = 0 \\ ml\_tl = green \\ il\_tl = green \\ \vdash \\ b > 0 \land (a + 1) = 0 \end{array}$$

AND_R

$$\begin{array}{l} green \neq red \\ b > 0 \\ a = 0 \\ ml\_tl = green \\ il\_tl = green \\ \vdash \\ b > 0 \end{array}$$

HYP

$$\begin{array}{l} green \neq red \\ b > 0 \\ a = 0 \\ ml\_tl = green \\ il\_tl = green \\ \vdash \\ (a + 1) = 0 \end{array}$$

EQ_LR, MON

$$\begin{array}{l} green \neq red \\ ml\_tl = green \\ il\_tl = green \\ \vdash \\ (0 + 1) = 0 \end{array}$$

ARI

$$\begin{array}{l} green \neq red \\ ml\_tl = green \\ il\_tl = green \\ \vdash \\ 1 = 0 \end{array}$$

??

Proving IL_out/inv2_3/INV: First Attempt



$$\begin{array}{l} d \in \mathbb{N} \\ d > 0 \\ COLOUR = \{green, red\} \\ green \neq red \\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\ n \leq d \\ a \in \mathbb{N} \\ b \in \mathbb{N} \\ c \in \mathbb{N} \\ a + b + c = n \\ a = 0 \lor c = 0 \\ ml\_tl \in COLOUR \\ il\_tl \in COLOUR \\ ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0 \\ il\_tl = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0 \\ il\_tl = green \\ \vdash \\ ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow a + (b - 1) < d \land (c + 1) = 0 \end{array}$$

MON

$$\begin{array}{l} green \neq red \\ ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0 \\ il\_tl = green \\ \vdash \\ ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow a + (b - 1) < d \land (c + 1) = 0 \end{array}$$

IMP_R

$$\begin{array}{l} green \neq red \\ ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0 \\ il\_tl = green \\ ml\_tl = green \\ \vdash \\ a + (b - 1) < d \land (c + 1) = 0 \end{array}$$

IMP_L

$$\begin{array}{l} green \neq red \\ a + b < d \land c = 0 \\ il\_tl = green \\ ml\_tl = green \\ \vdash \\ a + (b - 1) < d \land (c + 1) = 0 \end{array}$$

AND_L

$$\begin{array}{l} green \neq red \\ a + b < d \\ c = 0 \\ il\_tl = green \\ ml\_tl = green \\ \vdash \\ a + (b - 1) < d \land (c + 1) = 0 \end{array}$$

AND_R

$$\begin{array}{l} green \neq red \\ a + b < d \\ c = 0 \\ il\_tl = green \\ ml\_tl = green \\ \vdash \\ a + (b - 1) < d \end{array}$$

MON

$$\begin{array}{l} a + b < d \\ \vdash \\ a + (b - 1) < d \end{array}$$

ARI

$$\begin{array}{l} green \neq red \\ a + b < d \\ c = 0 \\ il\_tl = green \\ ml\_tl = green \\ \vdash \\ (c + 1) = 0 \end{array}$$

EQ_LR, MON

$$\begin{array}{l} green \neq red \\ il\_tl = green \\ ml\_tl = green \\ \vdash \\ (0 + 1) = 0 \end{array}$$

ARI

$$\begin{array}{l} green \neq red \\ il\_tl = green \\ ml\_tl = green \\ \vdash \\ 1 = 0 \end{array}$$

??

Failed: ML_out/inv2_4/INV, IL_out/inv2_3/INV

- Our first attempts of proving ***ML_out/inv2_4/INV*** and ***IL_out/inv2_3/INV*** both failed the 2nd case (resulted from applying IR **AND_R**):

$$\boxed{green \neq red \land il\_tl = green \land ml\_tl = green \;\vdash\; 1 = 0}$$

- This ***unprovable*** sequent gave us a good hint:
  - Goal $\boxed{1 = 0 \equiv \textbf{false}}$ suggests that the ***safety requirements*** $a = 0$ (for **inv2_4**) and $c = 0$ (for **inv2_3**) ***contradict*** with the current m_2.
  - Hyp. $\boxed{il\_tl = green = ml\_tl}$ suggests a ***possible, dangerous state*** of m_2, where two cars heading different directions are on the one-way bridge:

$$\langle \underbrace{init}_{\substack{d=2\\a'=0\\b'=0\\c'=0\\ml\_tl'=red\\il\_tl'=red}},\ \underbrace{ML\_tl\_green}_{\substack{d=2\\a'=0\\b'=0\\c'=0\\\mathbf{ml\_tl'=green}\\il\_tl'=red}},\ \underbrace{ML\_out}_{\substack{d=2\\\mathbf{a'=1}\\b'=0\\c'=0\\ml\_tl'=green\\il\_tl'=red}},\ \underbrace{IL\_in}_{\substack{d=2\\\mathbf{a'=0}\\\mathbf{b'=1}\\c'=0\\ml\_tl'=green\\il\_tl'=red}},\ \underbrace{IL\_tl\_green}_{\substack{d=2\\a'=0\\b'=1\\c'=0\\ml\_tl'=green\\\mathbf{il\_tl'=green}}},\ \underbrace{IL\_out}_{\substack{d=2\\a'=0\\\mathbf{b'=0}\\\mathbf{c'=1}\\ml\_tl'=green\\il\_tl'=green}},\ \underbrace{ML\_out}_{\substack{d=2\\\mathbf{a'=1}\\b'=0\\c'=1\\ml\_tl'=green\\il\_tl'=green}} \rangle$$

Fixing m_2: Adding an Invariant

- Having understood the failed proofs, we add a proper ***invariant*** to m_2:

invariants:

...

inv2_5 : $ml\_tl = red \lor il\_tl = red$

- We have effectively resulted in an improved m_2 more faithful w.r.t. **REQ3**:

REQ3	The bridge is one-way or the other, not both at the same time.

- Having added this new invariant ***inv2_5***:
  - Original 6 × 4 generated sequents to be updated: **inv2_5** a new hypothesis e.g., Are ***ML_out/inv2_4/INV*** and ***IL_out/inv2_3/INV*** now ***provable***?
  - Additional 6 × 1 sequents to be generated due to this new invariant e.g., Are ***ML_tl_green/inv2_5/INV*** and ***IL_tl_green/inv2_5/INV*** ***provable***?

INV PO of m_2: ML_out/inv2_4/INV – Updated

$$\begin{array}{rl}
\textbf{axm0\_1} & \{\ d \in \mathbb{N} \\
\textbf{axm0\_2} & \{\ d > 0 \\
\textbf{axm2\_1} & \{\ COLOUR = \{green, red\} \\
\textbf{axm2\_2} & \{\ green \neq red \\
\textbf{inv0\_1} & \{\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\
\textbf{inv0\_2} & \{\ n \leq d \\
\textbf{inv1\_1} & \{\ a \in \mathbb{N} \\
\textbf{inv1\_2} & \{\ b \in \mathbb{N} \\
\textbf{inv1\_3} & \{\ c \in \mathbb{N} \\
\textbf{inv1\_4} & \{\ a + b + c = n \\
\textbf{inv1\_5} & \{\ a = 0 \lor c = 0 \\
\textbf{inv2\_1} & \{\ ml\_tl \in COLOUR \\
\textbf{inv2\_2} & \{\ il\_tl \in COLOUR \\
\textbf{inv2\_3} & \{\ ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0 \\
\textbf{inv2\_4} & \{\ il\_tl = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0 \\
\textbf{inv2\_5} & \{\ ml\_tl = red \lor il\_tl = red \\
\textit{Concrete}\text{ guards of } ML\_out & \{\ ml\_tl = green \\
 & \vdash \\
\textit{Concrete}\text{ invariant } \textbf{inv2\_4} & \\
\text{with } ML\_out\text{'s effect in the post-state} & \{\ il\_tl = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land (a + 1) = 0
\end{array}$$

ML_out/inv2_4/INV

INV PO of m_2: IL_out/inv2_3/INV – Updated

$$\begin{array}{rl}
\textbf{axm0\_1} & \{\ d \in \mathbb{N} \\
\textbf{axm0\_2} & \{\ d > 0 \\
\textbf{axm2\_1} & \{\ COLOUR = \{green, red\} \\
\textbf{axm2\_2} & \{\ green \neq red \\
\textbf{inv0\_1} & \{\ n \in \mathbb{N} \\
\textbf{inv0\_2} & \{\ n \leq d \\
\textbf{inv1\_1} & \{\ a \in \mathbb{N} \\
\textbf{inv1\_2} & \{\ b \in \mathbb{N} \\
\textbf{inv1\_3} & \{\ c \in \mathbb{N} \\
\textbf{inv1\_4} & \{\ a + b + c = n \\
\textbf{inv1\_5} & \{\ a = 0 \lor c = 0 \\
\textbf{inv2\_1} & \{\ ml\_tl \in COLOUR \\
\textbf{inv2\_2} & \{\ il\_tl \in COLOUR \\
\textbf{inv2\_3} & \{\ ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0 \\
\textbf{inv2\_4} & \{\ il\_tl = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0 \\
\textbf{inv2\_5} & \{\ ml\_tl = red \lor il\_tl = red \\
\textit{Concrete}\text{ guards of } IL\_out & \{\ il\_tl = green \\
 & \vdash \\
\textit{Concrete}\text{ invariant } \textbf{inv2\_3} & \\
\text{with } ML\_out\text{'s effect in the post-state} & \{\ ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow a + (b - 1) < d \land (c + 1) = 0
\end{array}$$

IL_out/inv2_3/INV

Proving ML_out/inv2_4/INV: Second Attempt



Fixing m_2: Adding Actions

- Recall that an ***invariant*** was added to m_2:

invariants:
inv2_5 : $ml\_tl = red \vee il\_tl = red$

- Additional 6×1 sequents to be generated due to this new invariant:
  - e.g., ***ML_tl_green***/**inv2_5**/INV [for ***ML_tl_green*** to preserve **inv2_5**]
  - e.g., ***IL_tl_green***/**inv2_5**/INV [for ***IL_tl_green*** to preserve **inv2_5**]
- For the above ***sequents*** to be ***provable***, we need to revise the two events:

```
ML_tl_green
  when
    $ml\_tl = red$
    $a + b < d$
    $c = 0$
  then
    $ml\_tl := green$
    $il\_tl := red$
  end
```

```
IL_tl_green
  when
    $il\_tl = red$
    $b > 0$
    $a = 0$
  then
    $il\_tl := green$
    $ml\_tl := red$
  end
```

Exercise: Specify and prove ***ML_tl_green***/**inv2_5**/INV & ***IL_tl_green***/**inv2_5**/INV.

Proving IL_out/inv2_3/INV: Second Attempt



INV PO of m_2: ML_out/inv2_3/INV

axm0_1 { $d \in \mathbb{N}$
axm0_2 { $d > 0$
axm2_1 { $COLOUR = \{green, red\}$
axm2_2 { $green \neq red$
inv0_1 { $n \in \mathbb{N}$
inv0_2 { $n \leq d$
inv1_1 { $a \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_2 { $b \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_3 { $c \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_4 { $a + b + c = n$
inv1_5 { $a = 0 \vee c = 0$
inv2_1 { $ml\_tl \in COLOUR$
inv2_2 { $il\_tl \in COLOUR$
inv2_3 { $ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \wedge c = 0$
inv2_4 { $il\_tl = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \wedge a = 0$
inv2_5 { $ml\_tl = red \vee il\_tl = red$
Concrete guards of *ML_out* { $ml\_tl = green$
$\vdash$
Concrete invariant **inv2_3** with *ML_out*'s effect in the post-state { $ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow (a + 1) + b < d \wedge c = 0$

ML_out/inv2_3/INV

Proving ML_out/inv2_3/INV: First Attempt



$d \in \mathbb{N}$
$d > 0$
$COLOUR = \{green, red\}$
$green \neq red$
$n \in \mathbb{N}$
$n \leq d$
$a \in \mathbb{N}$
$b \in \mathbb{N}$
$c \in \mathbb{N}$
$a + b + c = n$
$a = 0 \lor c = 0$
$ml\_tl \in COLOUR$
$il\_tl \in COLOUR$
$ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0$
$il\_tl = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0$
$ml\_tl = red \lor il\_tl = red$
$ml\_tl = green$
$\vdash$
$ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow (a+1) + b < d \land c = 0$

MON

$ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0 \vdash ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow (a+1) + b < d \land c = 0$

IMP_R

$ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0,\ ml\_tl = green \vdash (a+1) + b < d \land c = 0$

IMP_R

$a + b < d \land c = 0,\ ml\_tl = green \vdash (a+1) + b < d \land c = 0$

AND_L

$a + b < d,\ c = 0,\ ml\_tl = green \vdash (a+1) + b < d \land c = 0$

AND_R

$a + b < d,\ c = 0,\ ml\_tl = green \vdash (a+1) + b < d$ **??**

$a + b < d,\ c = 0,\ ml\_tl = green \vdash c = 0$ **HYP**

Failed: ML_out/inv2_3/INV

- Our first attempt of proving ***ML_out/inv2_3/INV*** failed the 1st case (resulted from applying IR **AND_R**):

$$\boxed{a + b < d \land c = 0 \land ml\_tl = green \ \vdash\ (a+1) + b < d}$$

- This ***unprovable*** sequent gave us a good hint:
  - Goal $\underbrace{(a+1)}_{a'} + \underbrace{b}_{b'} < d$ specifies the ***capacity requirement***.
  - Hypothesis $\boxed{c = 0 \land ml\_tl = green}$ assumes that it's safe to exit the ML.
  - Hypothesis $\boxed{a + b < d}$ is **not** strong enough to entail $(a+1) + b < d$.
    e.g., $d = 3, b = 0, a = 0$ [$(a+1) + b < d$ evaluates to ***true***]
    e.g., $d = 3, b = 1, a = 0$ [$(a+1) + b < d$ evaluates to ***true***]
    e.g., $d = 3, b = 0, a = 1$ [$(a+1) + b < d$ evaluates to ***true***]
    e.g., $d = 3, b = 0, a = 2$ [$(a+1) + b < d$ evaluates to ***false***]
    e.g., $d = 3, b = 1, a = 1$ [$(a+1) + b < d$ evaluates to ***false***]
    e.g., $d = 3, b = 2, a = 0$ [$(a+1) + b < d$ evaluates to ***false***]
  - Therefore, $a + b < d$ (allowing one more car to exit ML) should be split:
    $a + b + 1 \neq d$ [more later cars may exit ML, ***ml_tl*** remains ***green***]
    $a + b + 1 = d$ [no more later cars may exit ML, ***ml_tl*** turns ***red***]

Fixing m_2: Splitting *ML_out* and *IL_out*

- Recall that ***ML_out/inv2_3/INV*** failed $\because$ two cases not handled separately:
  $a + b + 1 \neq d$ [more later cars may exit ML, ***ml_tl*** remains ***green***]
  $a + b + 1 = d$ [no more later cars may exit ML, ***ml_tl*** turns ***red***]
- Similarly, ***IL_out/inv2_4/INV*** would fail $\because$ two cases not handled separately:
  $b - 1 \neq 0$ [more later cars may exit IL, ***il_tl*** remains ***green***]
  $b - 1 = 0$ [no more later cars may exit IL, ***il_tl*** turns ***red***]
- Accordingly, we split ***ML_out*** and ***IL_out*** into two with corresponding guards.

```
ML_out_1
  when
    ml_tl = green
    a + b + 1 ≠ d
  then
    a := a + 1
  end
```

```
ML_out_2
  when
    ml_tl = green
    a + b + 1 = d
  then
    a := a + 1
    ml_tl := red
  end
```

```
IL_out_1
  when
    il_tl = green
    b ≠ 1
  then
    b := b − 1
    c := c + 1
  end
```

```
IL_out_2
  when
    il_tl = green
    b = 1
  then
    b := b − 1
    c := c + 1
    il_tl := red
  end
```

Exercise: Specify and prove ***ML_out***/**inv2_3/INV** & ***IL_out***/**inv2_4/INV**.
Exercise: Given the latest m_2, how many sequents to prove for ***invariant preservation***?
Exercise: Each split event (e.g., *ML_out_1*) refines its ***abstract*** counterpart (e.g., *ML_out*)?

---

m_2 Livelocks: New Events Diverging

- Recall that a system may ***livelock*** if the new events diverge.
- Current m_2's two new events ***ML_tl_green*** and ***IL_tl_green*** may *diverge* :

```
ML_tl_green
  when
    ml_tl = red
    a + b < d
    c = 0
  then
    ml_tl := green
    il_tl := red
  end
```

```
IL_tl_green
  when
    il_tl = red
    b > 0
    a = 0
  then
    il_tl := green
    ml_tl := red
  end
```

- *ML_tl_green* and *IL_tl_green* both ***enabled*** and may occur ***indefinitely***, preventing other "old" events (e.g., *ML_out*) from ever happening:

$$\langle \underbrace{init}_{\substack{d = 2 \\ a' = 0 \\ b' = 0 \\ c' = 0 \\ ml\_tl = red \\ il\_tl = red}},\ \underbrace{ML\_tl\_green}_{\substack{d = 2 \\ a' = 0 \\ b' = 0 \\ c' = 0 \\ ml\_tl' = green \\ il\_tl' = red}},\ \underbrace{ML\_out\_1}_{\substack{d = 2 \\ a' = 1 \\ b' = 0 \\ c' = 0 \\ ml\_tl' = green \\ il\_tl' = red}},\ \underbrace{IL\_in}_{\substack{d = 2 \\ a' = 0 \\ b' = 1 \\ c' = 0 \\ ml\_tl' = green \\ il\_tl' = red}},\ \underbrace{IL\_tl\_green}_{\substack{d = 2 \\ a' = 0 \\ b' = 1 \\ c' = 0 \\ ml\_tl' = red \\ il\_tl' = green}},\ \underbrace{ML\_tl\_green}_{\substack{d = 2 \\ a' = 0 \\ b' = 1 \\ c' = 0 \\ ml\_tl' = green \\ il\_tl' = red}},\ \underbrace{IL\_tl\_green}_{\substack{d = 2 \\ a' = 0 \\ b' = 1 \\ c' = 0 \\ ml\_tl' = red \\ il\_tl' = green}},\ \dots \rangle$$

$\Rightarrow$ Two traffic lights keep changing colors so rapidly that **no** drivers can ever pass!

- **Solution**: Allow color changes between traffic lights in a disciplined way.

Fixing m_2: Regulating Traffic Light Changes

We introduce two variables/flags for regulating traffic light changes:

- ***ml_pass*** is ***1*** **if**, since ***ml_tl*** was last turned ***green***, at least one car exited the ML onto the bridge. Otherwise, ***ml_pass*** is ***0***.
- ***il_pass*** is ***1*** **if**, since ***il_tl*** was last turned ***green***, at least one car exited the IL onto the bridge. Otherwise, ***il_pass*** is ***0***.

variables: ml_pass, il_pass

invariants:
inv2_6 : $ml\_pass \in \{0, 1\}$
inv2_7 : $il\_pass \in \{0, 1\}$
inv2_8 : $ml\_tl = red \Rightarrow ml\_pass = 1$
inv2_9 : $il\_tl = red \Rightarrow il\_pass = 1$

```
ML_out_1
  when
    $ml\_tl = green$
    $a + b + 1 \neq d$
  then
    $a := a + 1$
    $ml\_pass := 1$
  end
```

```
ML_out_2
  when
    $ml\_tl = green$
    $a + b + 1 = d$
  then
    $a := a + 1$
    $ml\_tl := red$
    $ml\_pass := 1$
  end
```

```
IL_out_1
  when
    $il\_tl = green$
    $b \neq 1$
  then
    $b := b - 1$
    $c := c + 1$
    $il\_pass := 1$
  end
```

```
IL_out_2
  when
    $il\_tl = green$
    $b = 1$
  then
    $b := b - 1$
    $c := c + 1$
    $il\_tl := red$
    $il\_pass := 1$
  end
```

```
ML_tl_green
  when
    $ml\_tl = red$
    $a + b < d$
    $c = 0$
    $il\_pass = 1$
  then
    $ml\_tl := green$
    $il\_tl := red$
    $ml\_pass := 0$
  end
```

```
IL_tl_green
  when
    $il\_tl = red$
    $b > 0$
    $a = 0$
    $ml\_pass = 1$
  then
    $il\_tl := green$
    $ml\_tl := red$
    $il\_pass := 0$
  end
```

Fixing m_2: Measuring Traffic Light Changes

- Recall:
  - Interleaving of ***new*** events charactered as an integer expression: ***variant***.
  - A variant $V(c, w)$ may refer to constants and/or ***concrete*** variables.
  - In the latest m_2, let's try $\boxed{\textbf{variants} : ml\_pass + il\_pass}$
- Accordingly, for the ***new*** event *ML_tl_green*:

$$\begin{array}{lll}
d \in \mathbb{N} & d > 0 & \\
COLOUR = \{green, red\} & green \neq red & \\
n \in \mathbb{N} & n \leq d & \\
a \in \mathbb{N} & b \in \mathbb{N} & c \in \mathbb{N} \\
a + b + c = n & a = 0 \lor c = 0 & \\
ml\_tl \in COLOUR & il\_tl \in COLOUR & \\
ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0 & il\_tl = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0 & \\
ml\_tl = red \lor il\_tl = red & & \\
ml\_pass \in \{0, 1\} & il\_pass \in \{0, 1\} & \\
ml\_tl = red \Rightarrow ml\_pass = 1 & il\_tl = red \Rightarrow il\_pass = 1 & \\
ml\_tl = red & a + b < d & c = 0 \\
il\_pass = 1 & & \\
\vdash & & \\
0 + il\_pass < ml\_pass + il\_pass & &
\end{array} \quad \underline{\text{ML\_tl\_green/VAR}}$$

Exercises: Prove **ML_tl_green/VAR** and Formulate/Prove **IL_tl_green/VAR**.

PO Rule: Relative Deadlock Freedom of m_2

axm0_1 $d \in \mathbb{N}$
axm0_2 $d > 0$
axm2_1 $COLOUR = \{green, red\}$
axm2_2 $green \neq red$
inv0_1 $n \in \mathbb{N}$
inv0_2 $n \leq d$
inv1_1 $a \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_2 $b \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_3 $c \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_4 $a + b + c = n$
inv1_5 $a = 0 \lor c = 0$
inv2_1 $ml\_tl \in COLOUR$
inv2_2 $il\_tl \in COLOUR$
inv2_3 $ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0$
inv2_4 $il\_tl = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0$
inv2_5 $ml\_tl = red \lor il\_tl = red$
inv2_6 $ml\_pass \in \{0, 1\}$
inv2_7 $il\_pass \in \{0, 1\}$
inv2_8 $ml\_tl = red \Rightarrow ml\_pass = 1$
inv2_9 $il\_tl = red \Rightarrow il\_pass = 1$

Disjunction of *abstract* guards

$a + b < d \land c = 0$ **guards of** *ML_out* **in** m_1
$\lor\ c > 0$ **guards of** *ML_in* **in** m_1
$\lor\ a > 0$ **guards of** *IL_in* **in** m_1
$\lor\ b > 0 \land a = 0$ **guards of** *IL_out* **in** m_1

$\vdash$

Disjunction of *concrete* guards

$ml\_tl = red \land a + b < d \land c = 0 \land il\_pass = 1$ **guards of** *ML_tl_green* **in** m_2
$\lor\ il\_tl = red \land b > 0 \land a = 0 \land ml\_pass = 1$ **guards of** *IL_tl_green* **in** m_2
$\lor\ ml\_tl = green \land a + b + 1 \neq d$ **guards of** *ML_out_1* **in** m_2
$\lor\ ml\_tl = green \land a + b + 1 = d$ **guards of** *ML_out_2* **in** m_2
$\lor\ il\_tl = green \land b \neq 1$ **guards of** *IL_out_1* **in** m_2
$\lor\ il\_tl = green \land b = 1$ **guards of** *IL_out_2* **in** m_2
$\lor\ a > 0$ **guards of** *ML_in* **in** m_2
$\lor\ c > 0$ **guards of** *IL_in* **in** m_2

DLF

Proving Refinement: DLF of m_2



$d \in \mathbb{N}$
$d > 0$
$COLOUR = \{green, red\}$
$green \neq red$
$n \in \mathbb{N}$
$n \leq d$
$a \in \mathbb{N}$
$b \in \mathbb{N}$
$c \in \mathbb{N}$
$a + b + c = n$
$a = 0 \lor c = 0$
$ml\_tl \in COLOUR$
$il\_tl \in COLOUR$
$ml\_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0$
$il\_tl = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0$
$ml\_tl = red \lor il\_tl = red$
$ml\_pass \in \{0, 1\}$
$il\_pass \in \{0, 1\}$
$ml\_tl = red \Rightarrow ml\_pass = 1$
$il\_tl = red \Rightarrow il\_pass = 1$
$a + b < d \land c = 0$
$\lor\ c > 0$
$\lor\ a > 0$
$\lor\ b > 0 \land a = 0$
$\vdash$
$ml\_tl = red \land a + b < d \land c = 0 \land il\_pass = 1$
$\lor\ il\_tl = red \land b > 0 \land a = 0 \land ml\_pass = 1$
$\lor\ ml\_tl = green$
$\lor\ il\_tl = green$
$\lor\ a > 0$
$\lor\ c > 0$

$\vdots$

$d \in \mathbb{N}$
$d > 0$
$b \in \mathbb{N}$
$ml\_tl = red$
$il\_tl = red$
$ml\_tl = red \Rightarrow ml\_pass = 1$
$il\_tl = red \Rightarrow il\_pass = 1$
$\vdash$
$b < d \land ml\_pass = 1 \land il\_pass = 1$
$\lor\ b > 0 \land ml\_pass = 1 \land il\_pass = 1$

...

$d \in \mathbb{N}$
$d > 0$
$b \in \mathbb{N}$
$ml\_tl = red$
$il\_tl = red$
$ml\_pass = 1$
$il\_pass = 1$
$\vdash$
$b < d \land ml\_pass = 1 \land il\_pass = 1$
$\lor\ b > 0 \land ml\_pass = 1 \land il\_pass = 1$

...

$d > 0$
$b \in \mathbb{N}$
$\vdash$
$b < d \lor b > 0$

ARI

$d > 0$
$b > 0 \lor b = 0$
$\vdash$
$b < d \lor b > 0$

OR_L

$d > 0$
$b > 0$
$\vdash$
$b < d \lor b > 0$

OR_R2

$d > 0$
$b > 0$
$\vdash$
$b > 0$

HYP

$d > 0$
$b = 0$
$\vdash$
$b < d \lor b > 0$

EQ_LR, MON

$d > 0$
$\vdash$
$0 < d \lor 0 > 0$

OR_R1

$d > 0$
$\vdash$
$0 < d$

HYP

Second Refinement: Summary

- The final version of our ***second refinement*** m_2 is ***provably correct*** w.r.t.:
    - Establishment of ***Concrete Invariants*** [*init*]
    - Preservation of ***Concrete Invariants*** [old & new events]
    - Strengthening of ***guards*** [old events]
    - ***Convergence*** (a.k.a. livelock freedom, non-divergence) [new events]
    - Relative ***Deadlock*** Freedom
- Here is the final specification of m_2:



```
constants:  d

sets:  COLOR

axioms:
  axm0_1 : d ∈ ℕ
  axm0_2 : d > 0
  axm2_1 : COLOR = {green, red}
  axm2_2 : green ≠ red

variables:
  a
  b
  c
  ml_tl
  il_tl
  ml_pass
  il_pass

invariants:
  inv2_1 :  ml_tl ∈ COLOUR
  inv2_2 :  il_tl ∈ COLOUR
  inv2_3 :  ml_tl = green ⇒ a + b < d ∧ c = 0
  inv2_4 :  il_tl = green ⇒ b > 0 ∧ a = 0
  inv2_5 : ml_tl = red ∨ il_tl = red
  inv2_6 : ml_pass ∈ {0, 1}
  inv2_7 : il_pass ∈ {0, 1}
  inv2_8 : ml_tl = red ⇒ ml_pass = 1
  inv2_9 : il_tl = red ⇒ il_pass = 1

variants:
  ml_pass + il_pass

ML_tl_green
  when
    ml_tl = red
    a + b < d
    c = 0
    il_pass = 1
  then
    ml_tl := green
    il_tl := red
    ml_pass := 0
  end

IL_tl_green
  when
    il_tl = red
    b > 0
    a = 0
    ml_pass = 1
  then
    il_tl := green
    ml_tl := red
    il_pass := 0
  end

ML_out_1
  when
    ml_tl = green
    a + b + 1 ≠ d
  then
    a := a + 1
    ml_pass := 1
  end

ML_out_2
  when
    ml_tl = green
    a + b + 1 = d
  then
    a := a + 1
    ml_tl := red
    ml_pass := 1
  end

IL_out_1
  when
    il_tl = green
    b ≠ 1
  then
    b := b − 1
    c := c + 1
    il_pass := 1
  end

IL_out_2
  when
    il_tl = green
    b = 1
  then
    b := b − 1
    c := c + 1
    il_tl := red
    il_pass := 1
  end

ML_in
  when
    c > 0
  then
    c := c − 1
  end

IL_in
  when
    a > 0
  then
    a := a − 1
    b := b + 1
  end
```

Index (1)

Learning Outcomes

Recall: Correct by Construction

State Space of a Model

Roadmap of this Module

Requirements Document: Mainland, Island

Requirements Document: E-Descriptions

Requirements Document: R-Descriptions

Requirements Document:
Visual Summary of Equipment Pieces

Refinement Strategy

Model m_0: Abstraction

Index (2)

Model m_0: State Space

Model m_0: State Transitions via Events

Model m_0: Actions vs. Before-After Predicates

Design of Events: Invariant Preservation

Sequents: Syntax and Semantics

PO of Invariant Preservation: Sketch

PO of Invariant Preservation: Components

Rule of Invariant Preservation: Sequents

Inference Rules: Syntax and Semantics

Proof of Sequent: Steps and Structure

Example Inference Rules (1)

Index (3)

Example Inference Rules (2)

Example Inference Rules (3)

Revisiting Design of Events: *ML_out*

Revisiting Design of Events: *ML_in*

Fixing the Design of Events

Revisiting Fixed Design of Events: *ML_out*

Revisiting Fixed Design of Events: *ML_in*

Initializing the Abstract System m_0

PO of Invariant Establishment

Discharging PO of Invariant Establishment

System Property: Deadlock Freedom

Index (4)

PO of Deadlock Freedom (1)

PO of Deadlock Freedom (2)

Example Inference Rules (4)

Example Inference Rules (5)

Discharging PO of DLF: Exercise

Discharging PO of DLF: First Attempt

Why Did the DLF PO Fail to Discharge?

Fixing the Context of Initial Model

Discharging PO of DLF: Second Attempt

Initial Model: Summary

Model m_1: "More Concrete" Abstraction

Index (5)

Model m_1: Refined State Space

Model m_1: State Transitions via Events

Model m_1: Actions vs. Before-After Predicates

States & Invariants: Abstract vs. Concrete

Events: Abstract vs. Concrete

PO of Refinement: Components (1)

PO of Refinement: Components (2)

PO of Refinement: Components (3)

Sketching PO of Refinement

Refinement Rule: Guard Strengthening

PO Rule: Guard Strengthening of *ML_out*

Index (6)

PO Rule: Guard Strengthening of *ML_in*

Proving Refinement: ML_out/GRD

Proving Refinement: ML_in/GRD

Refinement Rule: Invariant Preservation

Visualizing Inv. Preservation in Refinement

INV PO of m_1: ML_out/inv1_4/INV

INV PO of m_1: ML_in/inv1_5/INV

Proving Refinement: ML_out/inv1_4/INV

Proving Refinement: ML_in/inv1_5/INV

Initializing the Refined System m_1

PO of m_1 Concrete Invariant Establishment

Index (7)

Discharging PO of m_1 Concrete Invariant Establishment

Model m_1: New, Concrete Events

Model m_1: BA Predicates of Multiple Actions

Visualizing Inv. Preservation in Refinement

Refinement Rule: Invariant Preservation

INV PO of m_1: IL_in/inv1_4/INV

INV PO of m_1: IL_in/inv1_5/INV

Proving Refinement: IL_in/inv1_4/INV

Proving Refinement: IL_in/inv1_5/INV

Livelock Caused by New Events Diverging

Index (8)

PO of Convergence of New Events

PO of Convergence of New Events: NAT

PO of Convergence of New Events: VAR

Convergence of New Events: Exercise

PO of Refinement: Deadlock Freedom

PO Rule: Relative Deadlock Freedom of m_1

Example Inference Rules (6)

Proving Refinement: DLF of m_1

Proving Refinement: DLF of m_1 (continued)

First Refinement: Summary

Model m_2: "More Concrete" Abstraction

Index (9)

Model m_2: Refined, Concrete State Space

Model m_2: Refining Old, Abstract Events

Model m_2: New, Concrete Events

Invariant Preservation in Refinement m_2

INV PO of m_2: ML_out/inv2_4/INV

INV PO of m_2: IL_out/inv2_3/INV

Example Inference Rules (7)

Proving ML_out/inv2_4/INV: First Attempt

Proving IL_out/inv2_3/INV: First Attempt

Failed: ML_out/inv2_4/INV, IL_out/inv2_3/INV

Fixing m_2: Adding an Invariant

Index (10)

INV PO of m_2: ML_out/inv2_4/INV – Updated

INV PO of m_2: IL_out/inv2_3/INV – Updated

Proving ML_out/inv2_4/INV: Second Attempt

Proving IL_out/inv2_3/INV: Second Attempt

Fixing m_2: Adding Actions

INV PO of m_2: ML_out/inv2_3/INV

Proving ML_out/inv2_3/INV: First Attempt

Failed: ML_out/inv2_3/INV

Fixing m_2: Splitting *ML_out* and *IL_out*

m_2 Livelocks: New Events Diverging

Fixing m_2: Regulating Traffic Light Changes

Index (11)

Fixing m_2: Measuring Traffic Light Changes

PO Rule: Relative Deadlock Freedom of m_2

Proving Refinement: DLF of m_2

Second Refinement: Summary

Specifying & Refining a File Transfer Protocol

MEB: Chapter 4

EECS3342 Z: System
Specification and Refinement
Winter 2022

CHEN-WEI WANG

Learning Outcomes

This module is designed to help you review:

- What a ***Requirement Document*** (***RD***) is
- What a ***refinement*** is
- Writing ***formal specifications***
  - (Static) contexts: constants, axioms, theorems
  - (Dynamic) machines: variables, invariants, events, guards, actions
- ***Proof Obligations*** (***POs***) associated with proving:
  - ***refinements***
  - system ***properties***
- Applying ***inference rules*** of the ***sequent calculus***

A Different Application Domain

- The bridge controller we ***specified***, ***refined***, and ***proved*** exemplifies a ***reactive system***, working with the physical world via:
  - ***sensors*** `[ a, b, c, ml_pass, il_pass ]`
  - ***actuators*** `[ ml_tl, il_tl ]`
- We now study an example exemplifying a ***distributed program***:
  - A ***protocol*** followed by two ***agents***, residing on **distinct** geographical locations, on a computer **network**
  - Each file is transmitted ***asynchronously***: bytes of the file do **not** arrive at the ***receiver*** all at one go.
  - Language of ***predicates***, ***sets***, and ***relations*** required
  - The **same** principles of generating ***proof obligations*** apply.

Requirements Document: File Transfer Protocol (FTP)

You are required to implement a system for transmitting files between ***agents*** over a computer network.



Page Source: https://www.venafi.com

Requirements Document: R-Descriptions

Each ***R-Description*** is an **atomic** ***specification*** of an intended ***functionality*** or a desired ***property*** of the working system.

REQ1	The protocol ensures the copy of a file from the sender to the receiver.
REQ2	The file is supposed to be made of a sequence of items.
REQ3	The file is sent piece by piece between the two sites.

Refinement Strategy

- Recall the ***design strategy of progressive refinements***.
  0. ***initial model*** (m_0): a file is transmitted from the ***sender*** to the ***receiver***. [**REQ1**]
     However, at this ***most abstract*** model:
     - file transmitted from ***sender*** to ***receiver*** **synchronously** & **instantaneously**
     - transmission process ***abstracted*** away
  1. ***1st refinement*** (m_1 ***refining*** m_0):
     transmission is done ***asynchronously*** [**REQ2**, **REQ3**]
     However, at this more concrete model:
     - **no** communication between ***sender*** and ***receiver***
     - exchanges of ***messages*** and ***acknowledgements abstracted*** away
  2. ***2nd refinement*** (m_2 ***refining*** m_1):
     communication mechanism elaborated [**REQ2**, **REQ3**]
  3. ***final, 3rd refinement*** (m_3 ***refining*** m_2):
     communication mechanism optimized [**REQ2**, **REQ3**]
- Recall *Correct by Construction* :

  From each ***model*** to its ***refinement***, only a manageable amount of details are added, making it ***feasible*** to conduct **analysis** and **proofs**.

Model m_0: Abstraction

- In this most ***abstract*** perception of the protocol, we do **not** consider the ***sender*** and ***receiver***:
  - residing in geographically distinct locations
  - communicating via message exchanges
- Instead, we focus on this single ***requirement***:

REQ1	The protocol ensures the copy of a file from the sender to the receiver.

- ***Abstraction Strategy*** :



  - Observe the system with the ***process of transmission abstracted*** away
  - **only** meant to inform ***what*** the protocol is supposed to achieve
  - **not** meant to detail ***how*** the transmission is achieved

---

Math Background Review

Refer to LECTURE 1 for reviewing:

- Predicates [e.g., ∀]
- Sets
- Relations and Operations
- Functions

Model m_0: Abstract State Space

1. The **static** part formulates the ***file*** (from the ***sender***'s end) as a sequence of data items:

sets: $D, BOOLEAN$

constants: n, f

axioms:
axm0_1 : $n > 0$
axm0_2 : $f \in 1\,..\,n \rightarrow D$
axm0_3 : $BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\}$

2. The **dynamic** part of the state consists of two ***variables***:

variables: g, b

invariants:
inv0_1a : $g \in 1\,..\,n \mathrel{⇸} D$
inv0_1b : $b \in BOOLEAN$
inv0_2 : ??
inv0_3 : ??

✓ ***g***: file from the ***receiver***'s end

✓ ***b***: whether or not the ***transmission*** is completed

✓ **inv0_1a** and **inv0_1b** are ***typing*** constraints.

✓ **inv0_2** specifies what happens **before** the transmission

✓ **inv0_3** specifies what happens **after** the transmission

---

Model m_0: State Transitions via Events

- The system acts as an **Abstract State Machine (ASM)** : it ***evolves*** as ***actions of enabled events*** change values of variables, subject to ***invariants***.
- Initially, before the transmission:

```
init
  begin
    ??
  end
```

  - Nothing has been transmitted to the ***receiver***.
  - The ***transmission*** process has not been completed.
- Finally, after the transmission:

```
final
  when
    ??
  then
    ??
  end
```

  - The entire file f has been transmitted to the ***receiver***.
  - The ***transmission*** process has been completed.
  - In this ***abstract*** model:
    - Think of the transmission being ***instantaneous***.
    - A later ***refinement*** specifies how f is transmitted ***asynchronously***.

PO of Invariant Establishment

- How many ***sequents*** to be proved? [# invariants]
- We have four ***sequents*** generated for ***event*** *init* of model m_0:

1. $$\begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ f \in 1\,..\,n \rightarrow D \\ BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\} \\ \vdash \\ \varnothing \in 1\,..\,n \mathrel{⇸} D \end{array}$$ **init/inv0_1a/INV**
2. $$\begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ f \in 1\,..\,n \rightarrow D \\ BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\} \\ \vdash \\ FALSE \in BOOLEAN \end{array}$$ **init/inv0_1b/INV**
3. $$\begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ f \in 1\,..\,n \rightarrow D \\ BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\} \\ \vdash \\ FALSE = FALSE \Rightarrow \varnothing = \varnothing \end{array}$$ **init/inv0_2/INV**
4. $$\begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ f \in 1\,..\,n \rightarrow D \\ BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\} \\ \vdash \\ FALSE = TRUE \Rightarrow \varnothing = f \end{array}$$ **init/inv0_3/INV**

- Exercises: Prove the above sequents related to ***invariant establishment***.

PO of Invariant Preservation

- How many ***sequents*** to be proved? [# non-init events × # invariants]
- We have four ***sequents*** generated for ***event*** *final* of model m_0:

$$\begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ f \in 1\,..\,n \rightarrow D \\ BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\} \\ g \in 1\,..\,n \mathrel{⇸} D \\ b \in BOOLEAN \\ b = FALSE \Rightarrow g = \varnothing \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow g = f \\ b = FALSE \\ \vdash \\ f \in 1\,..\,n \mathrel{⇸} D \end{array}$$

final/inv0_1a/INV

$$\begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ f \in 1\,..\,n \rightarrow D \\ BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\} \\ g \in 1\,..\,n \mathrel{⇸} D \\ b \in BOOLEAN \\ b = FALSE \Rightarrow g = \varnothing \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow g = f \\ b = FALSE \\ \vdash \\ TRUE \in BOOLEAN \end{array}$$

final/inv0_1b/INV

$$\begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ f \in 1\,..\,n \rightarrow D \\ BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\} \\ g \in 1\,..\,n \mathrel{⇸} D \\ b \in BOOLEAN \\ b = FALSE \Rightarrow g = \varnothing \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow g = f \\ b = FALSE \\ \vdash \\ TRUE = FALSE \Rightarrow f = \varnothing \end{array}$$

final/inv0_2/INV

$$\begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ f \in 1\,..\,n \rightarrow D \\ BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\} \\ g \in 1\,..\,n \mathrel{⇸} D \\ b \in BOOLEAN \\ b = FALSE \Rightarrow g = \varnothing \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow g = f \\ b = FALSE \\ \vdash \\ TRUE = TRUE \Rightarrow f = f \end{array}$$

final/inv0_3/INV

- Exercises: Prove the above sequents related to ***invariant preservation***.

Initial Model: Summary

- Our ***initial model*** m_0 is ***provably correct*** w.r.t.:
  - Establishment of ***Invariants***
  - Preservation of ***Invariants***
  - ***Deadlock*** Freedom [EXERCISE]
- Here is the ***specification*** of m_0:

sets: $D, BOOLEAN$

constants: n, f

axioms:
axm0_1 : $n > 0$
axm0_2 : $f \in 1 \,..\, n \rightarrow D$
axm0_3 : $BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\}$

variables: g, b

invariants:
inv0_1a : $g \in 1 \,..\, n \nrightarrow D$
inv0_1b : $b \in BOOLEAN$
inv0_2 : $b = FALSE \Rightarrow g = \varnothing$
inv0_3 : $b = TRUE \Rightarrow g = f$

init
begin
$g := \varnothing$
$b := FALSE$
end

final
when
$b = FALSE$
then
$g := f$
$b := TRUE$
end

Model m_1: "More Concrete" Abstraction

- In $\mathbf{m_0}$, the transmission (evt. `final`) is ***synchronous*** and ***instantaneous***.
- The 1st ***refinement*** has a more ***concrete*** perception of the file transmission:
  - The sender's file is coped gradually, ***element by element***, to the receiver.
    → Such progress is denoted by occurrences of a ***new event*** `receive`.

h: elements transmitted so far

r: index of element to be sent

abstract variable ***g*** is replaced by ***concrete*** variables ***h*** and ***r***.



  - Nonetheless, communication between two agents remain ***abstracted*** away!
- That is, we focus on these two ***intended functionalities***:

REQ2	The file is supposed to be made of a sequence of items.
REQ3	The file is sent piece by piece between the two sites.

- We are ***obliged to prove*** this ***added concreteness*** is ***consistent*** with m_0.

Model m_1: Refined, Concrete State Space

1. The **static** part remains the same as $\mathbf{m_0}$:

sets: $D, BOOLEAN$

constants: n, f

axioms:
axm0_1 : $n > 0$
axm0_2 : $f \in 1 \,..\, n \rightarrow D$
axm0_3 : $BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\}$

2. The **dynamic** part formulates the ***gradual*** transmission process:

variables:
b, h, r

invariants:
inv1_1 : $r \in 1 \,..\, n + 1$
inv1_2 : ??
inv1_3 : ??
thm1_1 : ??

- **inv1_1**: typing constraint
- **inv2_2**: elements up to index ***r - 1*** have been transmitted
- **inv2_3**: transmission completed **means** no more elements to be transmitted
- **thm1_1**: transmission completed **means** receiver has a complete copy of sender's file
- A ***theorem***, once proved as ***derivable from invariants***, needs **not** be proved for ***preservation*** by events.

Model m_1: Property Provable from Invariants

- To prove that a ***theorem*** can be derived from the ***invariants***:

variables:
b, h, r

invariants:
inv1_1 : $r \in 1 \,..\, n + 1$
inv1_2 : $h = (1 \,..\, r - 1) \lhd f$
inv1_3 : $b = TRUE \Rightarrow r = n + 1$
thm1_1 : $b = TRUE \Rightarrow h = f$

- We need to prove the following ***sequent***:

$$\begin{array}{l} r \in 1 \,..\, n + 1 \\ h = (1 \,..\, r - 1) \lhd f \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow r = n + 1 \\ \vdash \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow h = f \end{array}$$

- Exercise: Prove the above sequent.

Model m_1: Old and New Concrete Events

- Initially, before the transmission:

init
  begin
    ??
  end

  - ◇ The ***transmission*** process has not been completed.
  - ◇ Nothing has been transmitted to the ***receiver***.
  - ◇ First file element is available for transmission.
- While the transmission is ongoing:

receive
  when
    ??
  then
    ??
  end

  - ◇ **While** sender has **more** file elements available for transmission:
    - Next file element is received and ***accumulated*** to the receiver's copy.
    - Sender's ***next available*** file element is updated.
  - ◇ In this ***concrete*** model:
    - Receiver having access to sender's private variable ***r*** is ***unrealistic***.
    - A later ***refinement*** specifies how two agents communicate.
- Finally, after the transmission:

final
  when
    ??
  then
    ??
  end

  - ◇ **When** sender has **no** more file element available for transmission:
    - The ***transmission*** process is marked as completed.

PO of Invariant Establishment

- How many ***sequents*** to be proved? [# invariants]
- We have three ***sequents*** generated for ***event*** *init* of model m_1:

1.
$$\begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ f \in 1 \mathinner{..} n \rightarrow D \\ BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\} \\ \vdash \\ 1 \in 1 \mathinner{..} n+1 \end{array}$$
init/inv1_1/INV

2.
$$\begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ f \in 1 \mathinner{..} n \rightarrow D \\ BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\} \\ \vdash \\ \varnothing \in (1 \mathinner{..} 1-1) \lhd f \end{array}$$
init/inv1_2/INV

3.
$$\begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ f \in 1 \mathinner{..} n \rightarrow D \\ BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\} \\ \vdash \\ FALSE = TRUE \Rightarrow 1 = n+1 \end{array}$$
init/inv1_3/INV

- Exercises: Prove the above sequents related to ***invariant establishment***.

PO of Invariant Preservation – `final`

- We have three ***sequents*** generated for ***old event*** *final* of model m_1.
- Here is one of the sequents:

$$\begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ f \in 1 \mathinner{..} n \rightarrow D \\ BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\} \\ g \in 1 \mathinner{..} n \nrightarrow D \\ b \in BOOLEAN \\ b = FALSE \Rightarrow g = \varnothing \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow g = f \\ r \in 1 \mathinner{..} n+1 \\ h = (1 \mathinner{..} r-1) \lhd f \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow r = n+1 \\ b = FALSE \\ r = n+1 \\ \vdash \\ r \in 1 \mathinner{..} n+1 \end{array}$$
final/inv1_1/INV

- Exercises: Formulate & prove other sequents of ***invariant preservation***.

PO of Invariant Preservation – `receive`

- We have three ***sequents*** generated for ***new event*** *receive* of model m_1:

receive/inv1_1/INV
$$\begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ f \in 1 \mathinner{..} n \rightarrow D \\ BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\} \\ g \in 1 \mathinner{..} n \nrightarrow D \\ b \in BOOLEAN \\ b = FALSE \Rightarrow g = \varnothing \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow g = f \\ r \in 1 \mathinner{..} n+1 \\ h = (1 \mathinner{..} r-1) \lhd f \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow r = n+1 \\ r \leq n \\ \vdash \\ (r+1) \in 1 \mathinner{..} n+1 \end{array}$$

receive/inv1_2/INV
$$\begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ f \in 1 \mathinner{..} n \rightarrow D \\ BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\} \\ g \in 1 \mathinner{..} n \nrightarrow D \\ b \in BOOLEAN \\ b = FALSE \Rightarrow g = \varnothing \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow g = f \\ r \in 1 \mathinner{..} n+1 \\ h = (1 \mathinner{..} r-1) \lhd f \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow r = n+1 \\ r \leq n \\ \vdash \\ h \cup \{(r, f(r))\} = (1 \mathinner{..} (r+1)-1) \lhd f \end{array}$$

receive/inv1_3/INV
$$\begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ f \in 1 \mathinner{..} n \rightarrow D \\ BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\} \\ g \in 1 \mathinner{..} n \nrightarrow D \\ b \in BOOLEAN \\ b = FALSE \Rightarrow g = \varnothing \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow g = f \\ r \in 1 \mathinner{..} n+1 \\ h = (1 \mathinner{..} r-1) \lhd f \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow r = n+1 \\ r \leq n \\ \vdash \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow (r+1) = n+1 \end{array}$$

- Exercises: Prove the above sequents of ***invariant preservation***.

Proving Refinement: receive/inv1_1/INV

$$\begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ f \in 1 \,..\, n \rightarrow D \\ BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\} \\ g \in 1 \,..\, n \nrightarrow D \\ b \in BOOLEAN \\ b = FALSE \Rightarrow g = \varnothing \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow g = f \\ r \in 1 \,..\, n+1 \\ h = (1 \,..\, r-1) \lhd f \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow r = n+1 \\ r \leq n \\ \vdash \\ (r+1) \in 1 \,..\, n+1 \end{array}$$

MON

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} r \in 1 \,..\, n+1 \\ r \leq n \\ \vdash \\ (r+1) \in 1 \,..\, n+1 \end{array}} \ \textbf{ARI} \ \boxed{\begin{array}{l} 1 \leq r \land r \leq n+1 \\ r \leq n \\ \vdash \\ \quad 1 \leq (r+1) \\ \land \ (r+1) \leq n+1 \end{array}} \ \textbf{AND\_L} \ \boxed{\begin{array}{l} 1 \leq r \\ r \leq n+1 \\ r \leq n \\ \vdash \\ \quad 1 \leq (r+1) \\ \land \ (r+1) \leq n+1 \end{array}} \ \textbf{AND\_R} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \boxed{\begin{array}{l} 1 \leq r \\ r \leq n+1 \\ r \leq n \\ \vdash \\ 1 \leq (r+1) \end{array}} \ \textbf{MON} \ \boxed{\begin{array}{l} 1 \leq r \\ \vdash \\ 1 \leq (r+1) \end{array}} \ \textbf{ARI} \\ \boxed{\begin{array}{l} 1 \leq r \\ r \leq n+1 \\ r \leq n \\ \vdash \\ (r+1) \leq n+1 \end{array}} \ \textbf{MON} \ \boxed{\begin{array}{l} r \leq n \\ \vdash \\ (r+1) \leq n+1 \end{array}} \ \textbf{ARI} \ \boxed{\begin{array}{l} r \leq n \\ \vdash \\ r \leq n \end{array}} \ \textbf{HYP} \end{array} \right.$$

Proving Refinement: receive/inv1_2/INV

$$\begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ f \in 1 \,..\, n \rightarrow D \\ BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\} \\ g \in 1 \,..\, n \nrightarrow D \\ b \in BOOLEAN \\ b = FALSE \Rightarrow g = \varnothing \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow g = f \\ r \in 1 \,..\, n+1 \\ h = (1 \,..\, r-1) \lhd f \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow r = n+1 \\ r \leq n \\ \vdash \\ h \cup \{(r, f(r))\} = (1 \,..\, (r+1)-1) \lhd f \end{array}$$

MON

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} f \in 1 \,..\, n \rightarrow D \\ r \in 1 \,..\, n+1 \\ h = (1 \,..\, r-1) \lhd f \\ r \leq n \\ \vdash \\ h \cup \{(r, f(r))\} = (1 \,..\, (r+1)-1) \lhd f \end{array}} \ \textbf{ARI} \ \boxed{\begin{array}{l} f \in 1 \,..\, n \rightarrow D \\ 1 \leq r \\ h = (1 \,..\, r-1) \lhd f \\ r \leq n \\ \vdash \\ h \cup \{(r, f(r))\} = (1 \,..\, (r+1)-1) \lhd f \end{array}} \ \begin{array}{c} \textbf{EQ\_LR,} \\ \textbf{MON,} \\ \textbf{ARI} \end{array} \ \boxed{\begin{array}{l} f \in 1 \,..\, n \rightarrow D \\ 1 \leq r \\ r \leq n \\ \vdash \\ (1 \,..\, r-1) \lhd f \cup \{(r, f(r))\} = (1 \,..\, r) \lhd f \end{array}} \ \textbf{ARI}$$

Proving Refinement: receive/inv1_3/INV

$$\begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ f \in 1 \,..\, n \rightarrow D \\ BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\} \\ g \in 1 \,..\, n \nrightarrow D \\ b \in BOOLEAN \\ b = FALSE \Rightarrow g = \varnothing \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow g = f \\ r \in 1 \,..\, n+1 \\ h = (1 \,..\, r-1) \lhd f \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow r = n+1 \\ r \leq n \\ \vdash \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow (r+1) = n+1 \end{array}$$

MON

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} b = TRUE \Rightarrow r = n+1 \\ r \leq n \\ \vdash \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow (r+1) = n+1 \end{array}} \ \textbf{IMP\_R} \ \boxed{\begin{array}{l} b = TRUE \Rightarrow r = n+1 \\ r \leq n \\ b = TRUE \\ \vdash \\ (r+1) = n+1 \end{array}} \ \textbf{IMP\_L} \ \boxed{\begin{array}{l} r = n+1 \\ r \leq n \\ b = TRUE \\ \vdash \\ (r+1) = n+1 \end{array}} \ \begin{array}{c} \textbf{EQ\_LR,} \\ \textbf{MON} \end{array} \ \boxed{\begin{array}{l} n+1 \leq n \\ b = TRUE \\ \vdash \\ ((n+1)+1) = n+1 \end{array}} \ \begin{array}{c} \textbf{ARI,} \\ \textbf{MON} \end{array} \ \boxed{\begin{array}{l} \bot \\ \vdash \\ ((n+1)+1) = n+1 \end{array}} \ \textbf{FALSE\_L}$$

---

m_1: PO of Convergence of New Events

- Recall:
  - Interleaving of ***new*** events charactered as an integer expression: ***variant***.
  - A variant $V(c, w)$ may refer to constants and/or ***concrete*** variables.
  - For m_1, let's try $\boxed{\textbf{variants} : n + 1 - r}$
- Accordingly, for the ***new*** event *receive*:

$$\begin{array}{l} n > 0 \\ f \in 1 \,..\, n \rightarrow D \\ BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\} \\ g \in 1 \,..\, n \nrightarrow D \\ b \in BOOLEAN \\ b = FALSE \Rightarrow g = \varnothing \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow g = f \\ r \in 1 \,..\, n+1 \\ h = (1 \,..\, r-1) \lhd f \\ b = TRUE \Rightarrow r = n+1 \\ r \leq n \\ \vdash \\ n+1-(r+1) < n+1-r \end{array} \quad \underline{\text{receive/VAR}}$$

Exercises: Prove **receive/VAR** and Formulate/Prove **receive/NAT**.

First Refinement: Summary

- The ***first refinement*** m_1 is ***provably correct*** w.r.t.:
  - Establishment of ***Concrete Invariants*** [*init*]
  - Preservation of ***Concrete Invariants*** [old & new events]
  - Strengthening of ***guards*** [old events, EXERCISE]
  - ***Convergence*** (a.k.a. livelock freedom, non-divergence) [new events, EXERCISE]
  - Relative ***Deadlock*** Freedom [EXERCISE]
- Here is the ***specification*** of m_1:

```
sets: $D, BOOLEAN$
constants: $n, f$

axioms:
  axm0_1 : $n > 0$
  axm0_2 : $f \in 1 \,..\, n \rightarrow D$
  axm0_3 : $BOOLEAN = \{TRUE, FALSE\}$

variables:
  $b, h, r$

invariants:
  inv1_1 : $r \in 1 \,..\, n+1$
  inv1_2 : $h = (1 \,..\, r-1) \lhd f$
  inv1_3 : $b = TRUE \Rightarrow r = n+1$
  thm1_1 : $b = TRUE \Rightarrow h = f$

init
  begin
    $b := FALSE$
    $h := \varnothing$
    $r := 1$
  end

final
  when
    $r = n+1$
    $b = FALSE$
  then
    $b := TRUE$
  end

receive
  when
    $r \leq n$
  then
    $h := h \cup \{(r, f(r))\}$
    $r := r + 1$
  end

variants:
  $n + 1 - r$
```

Index (1)

Learning Outcomes

A Different Application Domain

Requirements Document:
File Transfer Protocol (FTP)

Requirements Document: R-Descriptions

Refinement Strategy

Model m_0: Abstraction

Math Background Review

Model m_0: Abstract State Space

Model m_0: State Transitions via Events

PO of Invariant Establishment

Index (2)

PO of Invariant Preservation

Initial Model: Summary

Model m_1: "More Concrete" Abstraction

Model m_1: Refined, Concrete State Space

Model m_1: Property Provable from Invariants

Model m_1: Old and New Concrete Events

PO of Invariant Establishment

PO of Invariant Preservation – `final`

PO of Invariant Preservation – `receive`

Proving Refinement: receive/inv1_1/INV

Proving Refinement: receive/inv1_2/INV

Index (3)

Proving Refinement: receive/inv1_3/INV

m_1: PO of Convergence of New Events

First Refinement: Summary