Introduction

MEB: Prologue, Chapter 1

EECS3342 Z: System Specification and Refinement
Winter 2022

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Learning Outcomes

This module is designed to help you understand:

- What a *safety-critical* system is
- **Code of Ethics** for Professional Engineers
- What a ***Formal Method*** Is
- ***Verification*** vs. ***Validation***
- ***Model***-Based System Development

What is a Safety-Critical System (SCS)?

A *safety-critical system (**SCS**)* is a system whose ***failure*** or ***malfunction*** has one (or more) of the following consequences:

- death or serious injury to **people**
- loss or severe damage to **equipment/property**
- harm to the **environment**

Professional Engineers: Code of Ethics

- *Code of Ethics* is a basic guide for ***professional conduct*** and imposes duties on practitioners, with respect to **society**, **employers**, **clients**, **colleagues** (including employees and subordinates), the **engineering profession** and him or herself.
- It is the duty of a practitioner to act at all times with,
  1. ***fairness*** and ***loyalty*** to the practitioner's associates, employers, clients, subordinates and employees;
  2. ***fidelity*** to public needs;
  3. devotion to ***high ideals*** of personal honour and professional integrity;
  4. ***knowledge*** of developments in the area of professional engineering relevant to any services that are undertaken; and
  5. ***competence*** in the performance of any professional engineering services that are undertaken.
- Consequence of misconduct?
  - ***suspension*** or ***termination*** of professional licenses
  - civil ***law suits***

Source: PEO's Code of Ethics

Developing Safety-Critical Systems

Industrial standards in various domains list *acceptance criteria* for mission- or safety-critical systems that practitioners need to comply with: e.g.,

Aviation Domain: ***RTCA DO-178C*** “*Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification*”

Nuclear Domain: ***IEEE 7-4.3.2*** “*Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations*”

Two important criteria are:

1. System ***requirements*** are precise and complete
2. System ***implementation*** conforms to the requirements

But how do we accomplish these criteria?

Using Formal Methods for Certification

- A ***formal method (FM)*** is a ***mathematically rigorous*** technique for the specification, development, and verification of software and hardware systems.
- ***DO-333*** “*Formal methods supplement to DO-178C and DO-278A*” advocates the use of formal methods:

  The use of ***formal methods*** *is motivated by the expectation that, as in other engineering disciplines, performing appropriate* ***mathematical analyses*** *can contribute to establishing the* ***correctness*** *and* ***robustness*** *of a design.*
- FMs, because of their mathematical basis, are capable of:
  - *Unambiguously* describing software system requirements.
  - Enabling *precise* communication between engineers.
  - Providing ***verification evidence*** of:
    - A ***formal*** representation of the system being *healthy*.
    - A ***formal*** representation of the system *satisfying* *safety properties*.

Verification: Building the Product Right?



- ***Implementation*** built via ***reusable programming components***.
- *Goal* : *Implementation Satisfies Intended Requirements*
- To verify this, we ***formalize*** them as a ***system model*** and a set of (e.g., safety) ***properties***, using the specification language of a theorem prover (EECS3342) or a model checker (EECS4315).
- Two Verification Issues:
  1. Library components may ***not behave as intended***.
  2. Successful checks/proofs ensure that we *built the product right*, with respect to the informal requirements. But...

Validation: Building the Right Product?



- Successful checks/proofs $\not\Rightarrow$ We ***built the right product***.
- The target of our checks/proofs may not be valid:

  The requirements may be ***ambiguous***, ***incomplete***, or ***contradictory***.
- Solution: ***Precise Documentation*** [EECS4312]

Model-Based System Development

- ***Modelling*** and ***formal reasoning*** should be performed <u>**before**</u> implementing/coding a system.
  - A system's ***model*** is its ***abstraction***, filtering irrelevant details.
    A system ***model*** means as much to a software engineer as a ***blueprint*** means to an architect.
  - A system may have a list of ***models***, "sorted" by **accuracy**:
    $$\langle m_0, m_1, \ldots, \boxed{m_i}, \boxed{m_j}, \ldots, m_n \rangle$$
    - The list starts by the <u>most</u> ***abstract*** model with least details.
    - A more ***abstract*** model $\boxed{m_i}$ is said to be ***refined by*** its subsequent, more ***concrete*** model $\boxed{m_j}$.
    - The list ends with the <u>most</u> ***concrete/refined*** model with most details.
  - It is far easier to reason about:
    - a system's ***abstract*** models (rather than its full ***implementation***)
    - ***refinement*** ***steps*** between subsequent models
- The final product is ***correct by construction***.

Learning through Case Studies

- We will study example ***models of programs/codes***, as well as ***proofs*** on them, drawn from various application domains:
  - SEQUENTIAL Programs [single thread of control]
  - CONCURRENT Programs [interleaving processes]
  - DISTRIBUTED Systems [(geographically) distributed parties]
  - REACTIVE Systems [sensors vs. actuators]
- The **Rodin Platform** will be used to:
  - Construct system ***models*** using the Even-B notation.
  - Prove ***properties*** and ***refinements*** using ***classical logic*** (<u>propositional</u> and <u>predicate</u> calculus) and ***set theory***.

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