

# Cascading Behavior in Networks

# Agenda

- Spreading Through Networks
- Decision Based Model of Diffusion
  - Granovetter's Model of Collective Action
  - Threshold Model of Diffusion
  - Game Theoretic Model of Diffusion
  - Extending the Model: Allow People to Adopt A & B (skipped)
- Probabilistic Models of Diffusion
  - Epidemic Model Based on Trees
  - Models of Disease Spreading
  - Independent Cascade Model
  - Modeling Interactions Between Contagions (skipped)

# Spreading Through Networks

- **Spreading through networks:**

- Cascading behavior
- Diffusion of innovations
- Network effects
- Epidemics

- **Behaviors that cascade from node to node like an epidemic**

- **Examples:**

- **Biological:**

- Diseases via contagion


- **Technological:**

- Cascading failures
- Spread of information

- **Social:**

- Rumors, news, new technology
- Viral marketing

# Information Diffusion: Media



# Twitter & Facebook post sharing



**Lada Adamic** shared a [link](#) via Erik Johnston.

January 16, 2013

When life gives you an almost empty jar of nutella, add some ice cream...  
(and other useful tips)



## 50 Life Hacks to Simplify your World

[twistedsifter.com](http://twistedsifter.com)

Life hacks are little ways to make our lives easier. These low-budget tips and trick can help you organize and de-clutter space; prolong and preserve your products; or teach you...

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40 3 25

## Timeline Photos

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$$V = \pi z^2 a$$

$$V = Pi(z*z)a$$

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**I fucking love science**

Seriously. If you have a pizza with radius "z" and thickness "a", its volume is  $Pi(z*z)a$ .

Lina von DerStein, Iman Khallaf, 周明佳 and 73,191 others like this.

27,761 shares

46 of 1,470 comments

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
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
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
# Diffusion in Viral Marketing

- **Product adoption:**
  - Senders and followers of recommendations






# Diffusion in Viral Marketing




# Spread of Diseases (e.g., Ebola)




# Network Cascades

- Contagion that spreads over the edges of the network
- It creates a propagation tree, i.e., **cascade**



Network



**Cascade**

(propagation graph)

## Terminology:

- Stuff that spreads: Contagion
- “Infection” event: Adoption, infection, activation
- We have: Infected/active nodes, adoptors


# How Do We Model Diffusion?

## ■ Decision based models (Threshold Model):

- Models of product adoption, decision making
  - A node observes decisions of its neighbors and makes its own decision
- **Example:**
  - You join demonstrations if  $k$  of your friends do so too

## ■ Probabilistic models:

- **Models of influence or disease spreading**
  - An infected node tries to “push” the contagion to an uninfected node
- **Example:**
  - You “catch” a disease with some prob. from each active neighbor in the network



# Decision Based Models of Diffusion

# Agenda

- Decision Based Model of Diffusion
  - Granovetter's Model of Collective Action
  - Threshold Model of Diffusion
  - Game Theoretic Model of Diffusion
  - Extending the Model: Allow People to Adopt A & B (skipped)




# Granovetter's Model of Collective Action

# Decision Based Models

- **Collective Action** [Granovetter, '78]
  - **Model where everyone sees everyone else's behavior** (that is, we assume a complete graph)
  - **Examples:**
    - Clapping or getting up and leaving in a theater
    - Keeping your money or not in a stock market
    - Neighborhoods in cities changing ethnic composition
    - Riots, protests, strikes
- **How does the number of people participating in a given activity grow or shrink over time?**


# Collective Action: The Model

- **$n$  people – everyone observes all actions**
- Each person  $i$  has a threshold  $t_i$  ( $0 \leq t_i \leq 1$ )
  - Node  $i$  will adopt the behavior iff at least  $t_i$  fraction of people have already adopted:
    - **Small  $t_i$ :** early adopter
    - **Large  $t_i$ :** late adopter
  - Time moves in discrete steps
- **The population is described by  $\{t_1, \dots, t_n\}$** 
  - **$F(x)$  ... fraction of people with threshold  $t_i \leq x$** 
    - $F(x)$  is a property of the contagion given to us.  $F(x)$  is the **c.d.f.** of  $x$



# Collective Action: Dynamics

- $F(x)$  ... fraction of people with threshold  $t_i \leq x$ 
  - $F(x)$  is non-decreasing:  $F(x + \varepsilon) \geq F(x)$
- The model is dynamic:
  - Step-by-step change in number of people adopting the behavior:
    - $F(x)$  ... frac. of people with threshold  $\leq x$
    - $s(t)$  ... number of people participating at time  $t$
  - Simulate:
    - $s(0) = 0$
    - $s(1) = F(0)$
    - $s(2) = F(s(1)) = F(F(0))$



# Collective Action: Dynamics

- **Step-by-step change in number of people :**


- $F(x)$  ... fraction of people with threshold  $\leq x$
- $s(t)$  ... number of participants at time  $t$

- **Easy to simulate:**

- $s(0) = 0$
- $s(1) = F(0)$
- $s(2) = F(s(1)) = F(F(0))$
- $s(t+1) = F(s(t)) = F^{t+1}(0)$


- **Fixed point:  $F(x)=x$**

- Updates to  $s(t)$  to converge to a stable fixed point
- There could be other fixed points but starting from **0** we only reach the first one



# Starting Elsewhere


- What if we start the process somewhere else?
  - We move up/down to the next fixed point
  - How is market going to change?



**Note:** we are assuming a fully connected graph



# Stable vs. Unstable Fixed Point




# Discontinuous Transition

- Each threshold  $t_i$  is drawn independently from some distribution  $F(x) = \Pr[\text{thresh} \leq x]$ 
  - **Suppose:** Normal with  $\mu=n/2$ , variance  $\sigma$


**Small  $\sigma$ :**

Normal(45, 10)







**Medium  $\sigma$ :**

Normal(45, 27)







# Discontinuous Transition



**Bigger variance let's you build a bridge from early adopters to mainstream**

# Discontinuous Transition



But if we increase the variance the fixed point starts going down



# Weaknesses of the Model

- **No notion of social network:**
  - Some people are more influential
  - It matters who the early adopters are, not just how many
- **Models people's awareness** of size of participation  
**not just actual number of people participating**
  - Modeling perceptions of who is adopting the behavior vs. who you believe is adopting
  - Non-monotone behavior – dropping out if too many people adopt
  - People get “locked in” to certain choice over a period of time
- **Modeling thresholds**
  - Richer distributions
  - Deriving thresholds from more basic assumptions
    - game theoretic models

# Threshold Model of Diffusion



# Linear Threshold Model



Thresholds:

$$\vartheta_v \sim U[0,1]$$


Influenced when:

$$\sum_{w \text{ active neighbor of } v} b_{v,w} \geq \theta_v$$

# Game-theoretic Model of Cascades

# Game Theoretic Model of Cascades

- **Based on 2 player coordination game**
  - 2 players – each chooses technology A or B
  - Each person can only adopt **one** “behavior”, **A or B**
  - You gain more payoff if your friend has adopted the **same** behavior as you



Local view of the  
network of node **v**

# Example: VHS vs. BetaMax



# Example: BlueRay vs. HD DVD



# The Model for Two Nodes

- *Payoff matrix:*

- If both **v** and **w** adopt behavior **A**, they each get payoff  **$a > 0$**
- If **v** and **w** adopt behavior **B**, they each get payoff  **$b > 0$**
- If **v** and **w** adopt the opposite behaviors, they each get **0**




- **In some large network:**

- Each node **v** is playing a copy of the game with each of its neighbors
- **Payoff:** sum of node payoffs per game

		w	
		A	B
v	A	a, a	0, 0
	B	0, 0	b, b



# Calculation of Node $v$



**Threshold:**  
 $v$  chooses **A** if

$$p > \frac{b}{a+b} = q$$

$p$ ... frac.  $v$ 's nbrs. with A  
 $q$ ... payoff threshold

- Let  $v$  have  $d$  neighbors
- Assume fraction  $p$  of  $v$ 's neighbors adopt **A**
  - $Payoff_v = a \cdot p \cdot d$  , if  $v$  chooses A
  - $= b \cdot (1-p) \cdot d$  , if  $v$  chooses B
- Thus:  $v$  chooses **A** if:  $a \cdot p \cdot d > b \cdot (1-p) \cdot d$

# Example Scenario

- Scenario:

Graph where everyone starts with **B**

Small set **S** of early adopters of **A**

- Hard-wire **S** – they keep using **A** no matter what payoffs tell them to do


- Assume payoffs are set in such a way that nodes say:

If **more than** 50% of my friends take **A**  
I'll also take **A**

(this means:  $a = b - \epsilon$  and  $q > 1/2$ )

# Example Scenario


$$S = \{u, v\}$$



If **more** than  
 $q=50\%$  of my  
friends are red  
I'll also be red

# Example Scenario


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
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
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
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# Example Scenario

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# Infinite Graphs


- Consider infinite graph  $G$

- (but each node has finite number of neighbors!)

- We say that a finite set  $S$  causes a cascade in  $G$  with threshold  $q$  if, when  $S$  adopts  $A$ , eventually **every node in  $G$  adopts  $A$**

- Example: **Path**

If  $q < 1/2$  then cascade occurs




$p$ ... frac.  $v$ 's nbrs. with  $A$   
 $q$ ... payoff threshold

$v$  chooses  $A$  if  $p > q$   
 $q = \frac{b}{a+b}$


# Infinite Graphs

- Infinite Tree:



If  $q < 1/3$  then  
cascade occurs


- Infinite Grid:



If  $q < 1/4$  then  
cascade occurs


# Stopping Cascades

- What prevents cascades from spreading?
- Def: **Cluster of density  $\rho$**  is a **set of nodes  $C$**  where each node in the set has at least  $\rho$  fraction of edges in  $C$



# Stopping Cascades

- Let  $S$  be an initial set of adopters of  $A$
- All nodes apply threshold  $q$  to decide whether to switch to  $A$
- **Two facts:**
  - 1) If  $G \setminus S$  contains a cluster of density  $>(1-q)$  then  $S$  can not cause a cascade
  - 2) If  $S$  fails to create a cascade, then there is a cluster of density  $>(1-q)$  in  $G \setminus S$



**Extending the Model:  
Allow People to Adopt A and B**

# Cascades & Compatibility

## ■ So far:

- Behaviors **A** and **B** compete
- Can only get utility from neighbors of same behavior: **A-A** get **a**, **B-B** get **b**, **A-B** get **0**

## ■ Let an extra strategy “**AB**”


- **AB-A** : gets **a**
- **AB-B** : gets **b**
- **AB-AB** : gets **max(a, b)**
- **Also:** Some **cost c** for the effort of maintaining both strategies (summed over all interactions)

- Note: a given node can receive **a** from one neighbor and **b** from another by playing **AB**, which is why it could be worth the cost **c**

		w		
		A	B	AB
v	A	a, a	0,0	a, a
	B	0,0	b,b	b,b
	AB	a, a	b,b	max(a,b), max(a,b)

# Cascades & Compatibility: Model


- Every node in an infinite network starts with **B**
- Then a finite set **S** initially adopts **A**
- Run the model for  $t=1,2,3,\dots$ 
  - Each node selects behavior that will optimize payoff (given what its neighbors did in at time  $t-1$ )



- How will nodes switch from **B** to **A** or **AB**?

# Example: Path Graph (1)

- **Path graph:** Start with all **B**s,  $a > b$  (**A** is better)
- **One node switches to A – what happens?**
  - With just **A**, **B**: **A** spreads if  $a > b$
  - With **A**, **B**, **AB**: Does **A** spread?
- **Example:  $a=3, b=2, c=1$**




**Cascade stops**



# Example: Path Graph (2)



- Example:  $a=5$ ,  $b=3$ ,  $c=1$



**Cascade never stops!**



# For what pairs $(c, a)$ does A spread?

- Infinite path, start with all Bs
- Payoffs for  $w$ : A: $a$ , B: $1$ , AB: $a+1-c$
- What does node  $w$  in A- $w$ -B do?





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- What does node  $w$  in A- $w$ -B do?





# For what pairs $(c, a)$ does A spread?

- Same reward structure as before but now payoffs for  $w$  change: **A**: $a$ , **B**: $1+1$ , **AB**: $a+1-c$
- Notice: Now also **AB** spreads
- What does node  $w$  in **AB-w-B** do?




# For what pairs $(c, a)$ does A spread?

- Same reward structure as before but now payoffs for  $w$  change: **A**: $a$ , **B**: $1+1$ , **AB**: $a+1-c$
- Notice: Now also **AB** spreads
- What does node  $w$  in **AB-w-B** do?



# For what pairs $(c,a)$ does A spread?


## ■ Joining the two pictures:



# Lesson

- **B** is the default throughout the network until new/better **A** comes along. What happens?

- **Infiltration:** If **B** is **too compatible** then people will take on both and then drop the worse one (**B**)
- **Direct conquest:** If **A** makes itself **not compatible** – people on the border must choose. They pick the better one (**A**)
- **Buffer zone:** If you choose an optimal level then you keep a static “buffer” between **A** and **B**



# Models of Cascading Behavior



- **So far:**

- Decision Based Models**

- Utility based
    - Deterministic
    - “Node” centric: A node observes decisions of its neighbors and makes its own decision
    - Require us to know too much about the data

- **Next: Probabilistic Models**

- Let's you do things by observing data
    - We lose “why people do things”





# Probabilistic Contagion and Models of Influence

# Agenda

- Epidemic Model Based on Trees
- Models of Disease Spreading
- Independent Cascade Model
- Modeling Interactions Between Contagions (Optional)

# Epidemics

Understanding the spread of viruses and epidemics is of great interest to

- Health officials
- Sociologists
- Mathematicians
- Hollywood



The underlying **contact network** clearly affects the spread of an epidemic

# Epidemics

- Model epidemic spread as a **random process** on the graph and study its properties
- Questions that we can answer:
  - What is the projected growth of the infected population?
  - Will the epidemic take over most of the network?
  - How can we contain the epidemic spread?


**Diffusion of ideas** and the **spread of influence** can also be modeled as epidemics

# Epidemic Model Based on Trees

Simple probabilistic model of cascades where we will learn about the **reproductive number**

# A Simple Model


- **Branching process**: A person transmits the disease to each people she meets independently with a probability  $p$
- An infected person meets  $k$  (new) people while she is contagious
- Infection proceeds in **waves**



Contact network is a **tree** with branching factor  $k$

# Infection Spread

- We are interested in the number of people infected (**spread**) and the duration of the infection
- This depends on the infection **probability  $p$**  and the **branching factor  $k$**




An aggressive epidemic with high infection probability

The epidemic **survives** after three steps

# Infection Spread

- We are interested in the number of people infected (**spread**) and the duration of the infection
- This depends on the infection **probability  $p$**  and the **branching factor  $k$**



A mild epidemic with low infection probability

The epidemic **dies out** after two steps



# Basic Reproductive Number

- **Basic Reproductive Number ( $R_0$ )**: the expected number of new cases of the disease caused by a single individual

$$R_0 = kp$$

- **Claim**: (a) If  $R_0 < 1$ , then with probability 1, the disease dies out after a finite number of waves. (b) If  $R_0 > 1$ , then with probability greater than 0 the disease persists by infecting at least one person in each wave
  1. If  $R_0 < 1$  each person infects less than one person in expectation. The infection eventually *dies out*
  2. If  $R_0 > 1$  each person infects more than one person in expectation. The infection *persists*

# Analysis

- $X_n$ : random variable indicating the number of infected nodes after  $n$  steps
- $q_n = \Pr[X_n \geq 1]$ : probability that there exists at least 1 infected node after  $n$  steps
- $q^* = \lim q_n$ : the probability of having infected nodes as  $n \rightarrow \infty$

It can be shown that

$$(a) R_0 < 1 \Rightarrow q^* = 0$$

$$(b) R_0 > 1 \Rightarrow q^* > 0.$$

# Probabilistic Spreading Models


## ■ Epidemic Model based on Random Trees

- (a variant of branching processes)
- A patient meets  $k$  other people
- With probability  $p > 0$  infects each of them

## ■ Q: For which values of $k$ and $p$ does the epidemic run forever?

- Run forever:  $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} P \left[ \begin{array}{l} \text{At least 1 infected} \\ \text{node at depth } n \end{array} \right] > 0$

- Die out:  $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} P \left[ \begin{array}{l} \text{At least 1 infected} \\ \text{node at depth } n \end{array} \right] = 0$



# Probabilistic Spreading Models

- $q_{nj}$  = prob. there is an infected node at depth  $n$  *starting from a specific child node*


$$q_{nj} = p \cdot q_{n-1}$$

- Fails with probability (the complementary view)

$$1 - p \cdot q_{n-1}$$

- All  $k$  subtrees fail with probability

$$(1 - p \cdot q_{n-1})^k$$




# Probabilistic Spreading Models

- $q_n$  = prob. there is an infected node at depth  $n$
- **We need:**  $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} q_n = ?$  (based on  $p$  and  $k$ )
- All  $k$  subtrees fail with probability

$$(1 - p \cdot q_{n-1})^k$$

- **Taking the complement:**

$$q_n = 1 - \underbrace{(1 - p \cdot q_{n-1})^k}_{\text{No infected node at depth } n \text{ from the root}}$$



- $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} q_n$  = result of iterating

$$f(x) = 1 - (1 - p \cdot x)^k$$


- Starting at  $x = 1$  (since  $q_1 = 1$ )

# Properties of $f(x) = 1 - (1 - px)^k$

- $f(0) = 0$  , *so intercepts at point (0,0)*
- $f(1) = 1 - (1 - p)^k < 1$ , *so at  $x=1$ ,  $f(1)$  is below the  $y=x$  line*
- $f'(x) = p \cdot k(1 - px)^{k-1}$ , positive and  $f'$  monotonically decreasing on  $[0,1]$ , *so concave curve*
- $f'(0) = p \cdot k = R_0$ , so
  - for  $R_0 > 1$   *$f$  starts above the  $y=x$  line*
  - for  $R_0 < 1$   *$f$  starts below the  $y=x$  line*

# Fixed Point: $f(x) = 1 - (1 - px)^k$

**Case 1:**  
 $R_0 = pk > 1$



**What do we know about  $f(x)$ ?**


$f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1 - (1 - p)^k < 1$ , so at  $x=1$ ,  $f(1)$  is below the  $y=x$  line

$f'(x) = p \cdot k(1 - px)^{k-1}$ , so concave on  $[0,1]$

$f'(0) = p \cdot k = R_0$ , so for  $R_0 > 1$   $f$  starts above the  $y=x$  line

# Fixed Point: When is this zero?

**Case 2:**  
 $R_0 = pk < 1$



**Reproductive  
number  $R_0 =$   
 $p \cdot k$ :  
There is an  
epidemic if  
 $R_0 \geq 1$**

**For the epidemic to die out  
we need  $f(x)$  to be below  $y=x$ !**

**So:  $f'(0) = p \cdot k < 1$**

**$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} q_n = 0$  when  $p \cdot k < 1$**

**$p \cdot k =$  expected # of people that we infect**



# Branching process

- Assumes no network structure, no triangles or shared neighbors

# Models of Disease Spreading


# The SIR model

- Each node may be in the following states
  - **Susceptible**: healthy but not immune
  - **Infected**: has the virus and can actively propagate it
  - **Removed**: (Immune or Dead) had the virus but it is no longer active
- Parameter  $p$ : the **probability** of an Infected node to infect a Susceptible neighbor


# The SIR process

- Initially all nodes are in state S(usceptible), except for a few nodes in state I(nfected).
- An infected node stays infected for  $t_I$  steps.
  - Simplest case:  $t_I = 1$
- At each of the  $t_I$  steps the infected node has probability  $p$  of infecting any of its susceptible neighbors
  - $p$ : Infection probability
- After  $t_I$  steps the node is Removed


# Example




# Example



# Example



# Example





# Example SIR Epidemic




Figure 21.2: The course of an SIR epidemic in which each node remains infectious for a number of steps equal to  $t_I = 1$ . Starting with nodes  $y$  and  $z$  initially infected, the epidemic spreads to some but not all of the remaining nodes. In each step, shaded nodes with dark borders are in the Infectious ( $I$ ) state and shaded nodes with thin borders are in the Removed ( $R$ ) state.

# Percolation

- **Percolation**: we have a network of “pipes” which can carry liquids, and they can be either **open**, or **closed**
  - The pipes can be pathways within a material
- If liquid enters the network from some nodes, does it **reach** most of the network?
  - The network **percolates**

# SIR and Percolation

- There is a connection between SIR model and percolation
- When a virus is transmitted from  $u$  to  $v$ , the edge  $(u,v)$  is **activated** with probability  $p$
- We can assume that all edge activations have happened **in advance**, and the input graph has **only** the **active edges**
- Which nodes will be infected?
  - The nodes **reachable** from the initial infected nodes
- In this way we transformed the **dynamic SIR process** into a **static** one
  - This is essentially percolation in the graph

# Example




Figure 21.4: An equivalent way to view an SIR epidemic is in terms of *percolation*, where we decide in advance which edges will transmit infection (should the opportunity arise) and which will not.

# The SIS model

- Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible
  - Susceptible: healthy but not immune
  - Infected: has the virus and can actively propagate it
- An Infected node infects a Susceptible neighbor with probability  $p$
- An Infected node becomes Susceptible again with probability  $q$  (or after  $t_I$  steps)
  - In a simplified version of the model  $q = 1$
- Nodes alternate between Susceptible and Infected status

# Example




Figure 21.5: In an SIS epidemic, nodes can be infected, recover, and then be infected again. In each step, the nodes in the Infectious state are shaded.

- When no **Infected** nodes, virus dies out
- Question: will the virus die out?

# An eigenvalue point of view

- If  $A$  is the adjacency matrix of the network, then the virus dies out if

$$\lambda_1(A) \leq \frac{q}{p}$$

- Where  $\lambda_1(A)$  is the first eigenvalue of  $A$

Y. Wang, D. Chakrabarti, C. Wang, C. Faloutsos. *Epidemic Spreading in Real Networks: An Eigenvalue Viewpoint*. SRDS 2003

# SIRS

- Initially, some nodes  $e$  in the  $I$  state and all others in the  $S$  state
- Each node  $u$  that enters the  $I$  state remains infectious for a fixed number of steps  $t_I$ . During each of these  $t_I$  steps,  $u$  has a probability  $p$  of infecting each of its susceptible neighbors
- After  $t_I$  steps,  $u$  is no longer infectious. Enters the  $R$  state for a fixed number of steps  $t_R$ . During each of these  $t_R$  steps,  $u$  cannot be infected nor transmit the disease
- After  $t_R$  steps in the  $R$  state, node  $u$  returns to the  $S$  state



# Models of Disease Spreading

We will learn about the  
**epidemic threshold**

# Spreading Models of Viruses


## Virus Propagation: 2 Parameters:

- **(Virus) Birth rate  $\beta$ :**

- probability that an infected neighbor attacks


- **(Virus) Death rate  $\delta$ :**

- Probability that an infected node heals



# More Generally: S+E+I+R Models

- **General scheme for epidemic models:**
  - Each node can go through phases:
    - Transition probs. are governed by the model parameters



# SIR Model

- **SIR model:** Node goes through phases




- Models chickenpox or plague:
  - Once you heal, you can never get infected again
- **Assuming perfect mixing** (The network is a complete graph) **the model dynamics are:**

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = -bSI$$


$$\frac{dR}{dt} = dI$$

$$\frac{dI}{dt} = bSI - dI$$




# SIS Model

- **Susceptible-Infective-Susceptible (SIS) model**
- Cured nodes immediately become susceptible
- **Virus “strength”**:  $s = \beta / \delta$
- **Node state transition diagram:**



# SIS Model



## Models flu:

- Susceptible node becomes infected
- The node then heals and become susceptible again

## Assuming perfect mixing (complete graph):

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = -\beta SI + \delta I$$

$$\frac{dI}{dt} = \beta SI - \delta I$$

# Question: Epidemic threshold $t$

- **SIS Model:**

Epidemic threshold of an arbitrary graph  $G$  is  $\tau$ , such that:

- If virus strength  $s = \beta / \delta < \tau$   
the epidemic can not happen  
(it eventually dies out)

- **Given a graph what is its epidemic threshold?**

# Epidemic Threshold in SIS Model

- We have no epidemic if:

The diagram illustrates the epidemic threshold condition  $\beta/\delta < \tau = 1/\lambda_{1,A}$  within a red rectangular box. Annotations include:

- An arrow from "(Virus) Death rate" pointing to  $\delta$  in the denominator of  $\beta/\delta$ .
- An arrow from "(Virus) Birth rate" pointing to  $\beta$  in the numerator of  $\beta/\delta$ .
- An arrow from "Epidemic threshold" pointing to  $\tau$ .
- A red arrow from "largest eigenvalue of adj. matrix **A**" pointing to  $\lambda_{1,A}$ .

(Virus) Death rate

Epidemic threshold

$$\beta/\delta < \tau = 1/\lambda_{1,A}$$


(Virus) Birth rate

largest eigenvalue of adj. matrix **A**

►  $\lambda_{1,A}$  alone captures the property of the graph!




# Experiments (AS graph)




# Experiments


- Does it matter how many people are initially infected?



(a) Below the threshold,  
 $s=0.912$




(b) At the threshold,  
 $s=1.003$



(c) Above the threshold,  
 $s=1.1$

# Example: Ebola



# Ebola: Model States & Parameters

## Model States

S: susceptible individuals

E: exposed individuals

I: infectious cases in the community

H: hospitalized cases

F: dead but not yet buried

R: individuals no longer transmitting the disease

## Model Parameters

$\beta_i$ : transmission coefficient in the community

$\beta_H$ : transmission coefficient at the hospital

$\beta_F$ : transmission coefficient during funerals

$\theta_1$ : computed so that  $\theta\%$  of infectious cases are hospitalized

$\delta$ : Compartment specific  $\delta_1$  and  $\delta_2$  so that overall case-fatality ratio is  $\delta$

$\alpha^{-1}$ : the mean incubation period

$\gamma_h^{-1}$ : the mean duration from symptom onset to hospitalization


$\gamma_{dh}^{-1}$ : the mean duration from hospitalization to death

$\gamma_i^{-1}$ : the mean duration of the infectious period for survivors


$\gamma_{ih}^{-1}$ : the mean duration from hospitalization to end of infectiousness for survivors

$\gamma_f^{-1}$ : the mean duration from death to burial

# Example: Ebola




# Example: Ebola



# Independent Cascade Model

# Independent Cascade Model

- Initially some nodes  $S$  are active
- Each edge  $(u,v)$  has probability (weight)  $p_{uv}$



- When node  $u$  becomes active/infected:
  - It activates each out-neighbor  $v$  with prob.  $p_{uv}$
- Activations spread through the network!