# Dyre Banking Trojan

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### Introduction

- Also known as --Dyreza, Dyzap, and Dyranges Discovered --In early June 2014, by the Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Litt(TM) (CTU) research team
- **Banking Trojan**  $\bullet$ 
  - -- Used to take money and login credentials from the victims' bank accounts
- RAT
  - --Remote Access Trojan
- Target
  - -- Account holders of Bank of America, Citibank, NatWest, RBS and Ulsterbank
  - Dyre attack steals more than 1 million

### Distribution

- Through spam emails
  --which contain Upatre downloader
  - Executable in a **ZIP** attachment or as a malicious **URL**. User interaction is required to compromise the targeted system.
  - Use different lures



RE: Invoice #1006501 Sage.co.uk Sent: Monday, June 9, 2014 at 3:35 AM To:

Please remit BACs before 12/06/2014.

Please view complete invoice please click here

Injecting code into the victim's browsel

FAX [fax@sendfax.com] Sent: Mon 7/7/2014 & 11 AM To:

Incoming Fax Report

Dear Customer, You have received a new fax. Date/Time: 2013:10:17 12:29:00 Number of pages:2 Received from: 08447 29 44 87

To download / view Fax Report

Regards, FAX



# How it works

### **STEP 1: THE SPEAR PHISHING**

A victim receives an email that explains the attached invoice is for their review.



### STEP 2: THE FIRST STAGE MALWARE IS EXECUTED

Upatre's sole purpose is to download Dyre

### STEP 3: THE SECOND STAGE MALWARE IS EXECUTED Google Update Service Property

Once Dyre is loaded, Upatre removes itself

DYRE STAGE 1: ESTABLISHING PERSISTANCE

SERVICE\_NAME: googleupdate TYPE : 10 WIN32\_OWN\_PROCESS START\_TYPE : 2 AUTO\_START ERROR\_CONTROL : 1 NORMAL BINARY\_PATH\_NAME : C:\Windows\uJMoEqgu.exe LOAD\_ORDER\_GROUP : TAG : 0 DISPLAY\_NAME : Google Update Service DEPENDENCIES : SERVICE\_START\_NAME : LocalSystem

creating a service named "Google Update Service",

injects malicious code into SVCHOST.EXE process

| adir of | odate Ser              | vice Proper       | ties (Local | Computer) |        |
|---------|------------------------|-------------------|-------------|-----------|--------|
| General | Log On                 | Recovery          | Depender    | ncies     |        |
| Service | ename:                 | googleupd         | ate         |           |        |
| Display | name:                  | Google Up         | date Servic | e         |        |
| Descrip | tion:                  |                   |             |           | *      |
|         | executabl<br>dows\uJM  | le:<br>loEqgu.exe |             |           |        |
| Startup | type:                  | Automatic         |             |           | •      |
|         |                        |                   |             |           |        |
| Help m  | e configure            | e service sta     | tup options | <u>.</u>  |        |
|         | e configure<br>status: | stopped           | tup options | L.        |        |
| Service |                        |                   |             | Pause     | Resume |

| Remote Address  | Remote Host Name           | Local Port | Remote Port | Process |
|-----------------|----------------------------|------------|-------------|---------|
| 188.165.213.146 | ns371381.ip-188-165-213.eu | 49703      | 4443        | 636     |
| 188.165.213.146 | ns371381.ip-188-165-213.eu | 49687      | 4443        | 636     |
| 188.165.213.146 | ns371381.ip-188-165-213.eu | 49743      | 4443        | 636     |

| Image Name  | PID | User Name | CPU | Memory ( | Image Path Name                 |  |
|---|-----|-----------|-----|----------|---------------------------------|--|
| svchost.exe   | 636 | SYSTEM    | 00  | 8,092 K  | C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe |  |
| it books to the victim's common browsers (Internet Explorer, Chrome & Firefox) in order to intercer |     |           |     |          |                                 |  |

it hooks to the victim's common browsers (Internet Explorer, Chrome & Firefox) in order to intercept credentials the user may enter when visiting any of the targeted bank sites.

#### DYRE STAGE 4 – EMAIL SPREADING

If Dyre detects that the OUTLOOK email client is installed, it will attempt to send email messages to various recipients with the DYRE payload attached as a zip file.

#### STEP 5: THE WIRE TRANSFER

The attacker logs into the account and transfers money to various offshore accounts. There have been several reports of compromise resulting in losses of \$500,000 to over \$1,000,000 USD.

STEP 6: THE DDOS attack prevent victims from logging back into bank site.

**How to Defense?** 1.Strong security software 2.Security-conscious Internet service provider (ISP). **3.Updating Windows on time** 4.Keeping your browser updating. 5.Be careful about the website you are going to.

# Conclusion

- One of the most prominent banking trojans
- More powerful and robust.
- Advanced capabilities
  - -- web fakes
  - -- dynamic web injects
  - -- a modular design
  - -- multiple methods for maintaining command and control.
- Determination of threat actors targeting the financial vertical.

# Reference

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